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Introduction

The following report is an official AP history of AP operations in Germany in the years 1931–1945. These were years of extreme suffering and crimes against humanity, including the rise of fascism, the horrors of the Holocaust and the carnage of World War II. They tested news organizations that were the world’s link to the front lines and behind them. So many aspects of this period have been subject to multiple waves of historical review, aided by the perspectives of time and the unearthing of archives, and the work of the AP, one of the world’s largest news organizations, is no exception.

The report is the result of an exhaustive review of the work of the AP news bureau and its subsidiary picture service in Germany from 1931–45 and was prompted largely by an article written last year by German historian Harriet Scharnberg http://www.zeithistorische-forschungen.de/1-2016/id=5324. Her paper concluded that the AP, by opting to stay in Germany during the years 1933–1941, ceded influence over the production of its news pictures to Nazi propagandists. A researcher interested in the uses of imagery, Scharnberg studied Nazi-controlled publications of the period and found instances in which AP photos were used and exploited by Nazi propaganda specialists for use in Germany. She also identified AP German photographers, who after World War II began in 1939, joined or were drafted into Nazi military propaganda units, some while still on AP’s payroll in either a staff or freelance capacity.

Scharnberg’s assertions appeared in stark contrast to what today’s AP knew of its own history. AP was awarded the Pulitzer Prize in 1939 for its comprehensive and aggressive coverage of the Nazi regime and the Nazis’ anti-Semitic policies, and AP’s struggles against the Nazis and efforts on behalf of its Jewish employees have been written about in many past AP accounts. However, to journalists the constant pursuit of truth is paramount. AP’s news values and principles demand that any serious critique of the news cooperative’s activity be thoroughly reviewed. AP believes it is important to know one’s own story — warts and all — and so we have re-examined the period, taking a hard look, and report our findings here.

For this history, AP carried out its research first by going through previously unexamined AP archives. Then we extended the research to other records repositories, U.S. military documents, and in some cases oral histories and the personal papers of deceased employees. The U.S. National Archives and Records Administration declassified all documents relevant to this inquiry in response to AP’s Freedom of Information Act requests. We also interviewed Scharnberg herself, who had reviewed select documentation from the AP Corporate Archives, after corresponding with AP archivists.
We approached this research with the understanding that the AP’s chief mission always is to report the truth. In Germany in those years, that meant the AP’s primary task and focus was to cover the overwhelming news of the day in Germany: The rise of Hitler, the rearming of the country, and the country’s increasingly aggressive territorial demands, as well as the first manifestations of the virulent anti-Semitic policies that culminated in the Holocaust.

The evidence of this report points to a clear conclusion for The Associated Press. Viewed from the perspective of more than 80 years’ hindsight, the AP in the totality of its conduct fulfilled its mission to gather the news in Germany forthrightly and as independently as possible for the benefit of its audience and for the benefit of the truth. We recognize that AP should have done some things differently during this period, for example protesting when AP photos were exploited by the Nazis for propaganda within Germany and refusing to employ German photographers with active political affiliations and loyalties, whether to the Nazis or any party. (The law at the time required that all AP German news photographers be German citizens; current AP standards demand that employees refrain from declaring their views on contentious public issues.) However, suggestions that AP at any point sought to help the Nazis or their heinous cause are simply wrong. Due in large part to the AP’s aggressive reporting, the dangers of the Nazis’ ambitions for domination in Europe and their brutal treatment of its opponents were revealed to the wider world.

When The Associated Press began its expansion into global markets in 1931 by basing subsidiaries in Britain and Germany, it was not evident that Germany was about to be plunged into a dark era of totalitarianism, taken over by Adolf Hitler’s National Socialists. Upholding AP’s values of a free press and the pursuit of accurate information under one of the most repressive regimes in history became a daily struggle after 1932. American journalists in the AP’s news bureau in Berlin were called upon to collect and send out news while being hosted by a government that wanted nothing to do with independent, objective journalism. The Nazi regime revolutionized mass propaganda, brooked no dissent, and held the power to arrest, torture and execute at will. The challenges were even greater for the German staff of the AP’s separate new German-registered photo subsidiary, the AP GmbH, which like all German media organizations was wholly subject to Nazi law.

This report reflects on two distinct periods. The first period dates from 1933, when Hitler took power, until Dec. 11, 1941, four days after Pearl Harbor, when AP’s legal presence in Germany ended abruptly as Germany and the United States entered into a state of war.

During this time, the AP gathered news, little of it positive to the Nazi government, and collected and sold photos in Germany through its German service for the German market and sent some photos to New York. Photo editors there selected the best ones for distribution to AP’s 1,400 American newspaper members. During this time, AP used its network of sources across German society to report on the regime from within, filing reams of dispatches that tracked developments on a daily basis for a concerned world.
Photos from Germany were in high demand in the United States as fascism and fears of war were on the rise. As noted, AP's photographers were required by law to be German citizens, subject to the pressures of the Gestapo and the Propaganda Ministry, but the main AP office and management in Berlin and London worked to keep the photo service's output free of propaganda. One price for remaining in operation in Germany however was to follow Nazi law, and that forced AP in 1935 — after having resisted for two years — to let go of its Jewish employees. AP helped them resettle safely to other countries, which allowed all of them to survive the Holocaust that soon followed. AP also had to parry interference and intimidation from the Propaganda Ministry, at times exercising self-censorship. Many American and other foreign journalists left Germany in the 1930s under threat or because they were expelled. AP, however, concluded it had to remain to provide coverage for U.S. newspapers and the American public.

The second period begins after Germany declared war on the U.S. and lasts until Germany's defeat by the Allies in May 1945. On Dec. 11, 1941, AP's news office in Berlin was summarily closed and its American staff arrested, to be interned for five months and then deported in a prisoner exchange. The AP German picture service was seized and handed over to the German Foreign Ministry and put under control of a Waffen SS photographer named Helmut Laux. AP's German picture service was AP's no more.

During this period, in order to continue to obtain photographs from Nazi-controlled areas of Europe, AP arranged with Laux, who now reigned over the picture service that had once been AP's, to provide AP with German-censored photos through a third party in neutral Portugal and later Sweden. This was done in exchange for AP photos from abroad. The AP sought and was given a green light for this wartime arrangement by the U.S. government. AP photos from the rest of the world sent to Germany were subjected to U.S. wartime censorship, ensuring that no sensitive U.S. military material was passed on. Photos received by AP from Germany were also reviewed by censors on the Allied side, either British or American, who would block Nazi images they deemed unhelpful to the Allied cause. Although the exchange necessitated dealing with the Nazi regime, it was the AP's belief then and now that the photos gave the U.S. public a much fuller picture of the war than could have been obtained otherwise. That included scenes of fighting on the Russian front, the results of bombings of German cities and Germany's failing war fortunes. In the exchange, the Germans received AP photos that Laux then copied and gave to top Nazi leaders and also offered to German newspapers and magazines for publication. With one known exception, the AP images that appeared in German publications through this arrangement were unaltered by the Germans, but captions were rewritten by the Germans to conform to official Nazi views. It is important to note that the AP photos the Nazis received accurately reflected Allied advances in the war, and over time they therefore became of less interest to German editors because they undermined the official German propaganda narrative of victory.

All these facts and events are discussed in detail in the seven chapters of AP's history that follow. The report includes key events, personalities and findings.
from these years, and comprehensive endnotes spelling out the sources for the information. A separate PDF file posted with this report includes scans of 43 documents related to these events found in AP archives and referred to in the endnotes. Every effort has been made to be fully transparent.

Covering Nazi Germany tested the limits of independent journalism, and clearly, the AP made difficult choices. However, the industry’s regard for AP’s reporting was recognized by granting Berlin Bureau Chief Louis P. Lochner the 1939 Pulitzer Prize for correspondence. Ongoing research by the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum in Washington, D.C. has identified the AP was a prime source of information for ordinary Americans to learn of the Nazis’ persecution of Jews and events related to the Holocaust, before and during the war. The AP’s leadership of this era was outspoken in its pride in the work of its Berlin journalists and also considered it a success to be able to obtain a steady flow of news photos from Germany and Axis-occupied territories for its customers and the public even after the AP was ousted from Germany.

The AP is a not-for-profit cooperative whose members are U.S. media companies. It was formed for the purpose of gathering reliable and accurate news. The evidence in this report shows that overall the AP succeeded in fulfilling its mission to inform the world with truth and integrity to the best of its ability. Certain incidents were handled inadequately, and are identified and outlined in detail in the report. The results of the review as a whole show that during a violent and tragic period, the cooperative was working to obtain reliable information and photos, while protecting its values, in the face of the unprecedented challenges. This was in line with AP’s longstanding responsibility to report as much and thoroughly as it can on the actions of tyrannical regimes and to provide a factual and independent record of events.

Key findings: 1931–1941

- The AP German picture service (AP GmbH) was established as a subsidiary of The Associated Press of Great Britain in 1931 and was intended as a first step to setting up a news distribution service outside the United States. It aimed to serve the German press market while gathering photos from Europe for AP’s membership in the United States and scattered subscribers elsewhere. Shortly after the Nazi takeover of power in 1933, all German publications lost independence and were brought under the control of the Propaganda Ministry. As a result, German publications began to reflect state-approved propaganda. AP management insisted that its German picture service production stay neutral in keeping with AP world standards, and there is ample evidence of these efforts in AP’s internal communications. German staff members faced constant pressure from Propaganda Ministry officials and complained that they felt caught in a perilous bind, with some doing a better job of resisting Nazi demands than others. In addition, AP’s captions accompanying the photos were often rewritten by the German media or the photos were run in the German press with misleading or offensive headlines. The AP’s internal letters
reflect significant concern about keeping AP's picture service output free of Nazi influence, including mention by Lochner of complaints he directed toward senior Nazi officials about censorship pressure on the AP office and a series of sharply written memos and rebukes to the AP German photo editor from the German service's superior in London. These notes complained about instances of biased captions written or authorized by AP German service editors who were under pressure from the Propaganda Ministry. This review, however, found no record that AP protested directly to the editors of pro-Nazi media about the biased headlines and captions that they often supplied around AP photos that appeared in their publications.

- After resisting for two years, the AP in late 1935 submitted to the anti-Semitic edict that all people working in German media must be of German "Aryan" origin. The German picture service reassigned or discharged six employees considered Jewish by the Nazis. The AP made the difficult decision to comply because it believed it was critical for AP to remain in Germany and gather news and photos during this crucial period.

- With AP's aid, all of these Jewish employees who were forced from their jobs by the Nazi law would emigrate and survive the Holocaust. Five eventually resettled in the United States. A sixth was reassigned to AP's bureau in Vienna, Austria, where he was arrested by the Gestapo when the Nazis arrived in 1938. AP appealed to have him released and transferred to Prague, a city not then occupied by the Nazis. He eventually was released by the Germans and went back to Berlin. Exactly how he survived the war is unclear, but he resurfaced as a photographer in Communist East Germany in the late 1940s. Another of the AP employees who emigrated, Alfred Eisenstaedt, later became a famed photographer for Life magazine in New York, renowned for portrayals that captured the 20th century. Eisenstaedt and two other of his discharged Jewish former German AP colleagues, Leon Daniel and Celia Kutschuk, launched the Pix photo agency in New York at the end of 1935. It lasted for 34 years and provided work to scores of refugees from Europe.

- Lochner reported vividly on the anti-Semitic actions of the Nazis and in his personal letters and memos railed against the Nazis' treatment of Jews. He and other Americans working for AP in Berlin took in Jewish neighbors for their protection during the Kristallnacht pogrom of 1938, which was covered by the AP in a dramatic text account and chilling photos showing broken shop windows and a synagogue set on fire.

- AP's Berlin-based American reporters and German photographers covered the first part of World War II from 1939–41 from the German side of the battle lines. They provided accounts and pictures of the Nazi advances in Poland, the Netherlands, Belgium and France when the German forces were marching through Europe. Although the United States had not yet entered the war, some of this coverage was criticized by someone in the U.S. Embassy in Berlin as channeling German official views and disinformation and as demoralizing to the democracies. AP executives in
New York looked into the accusations and rejected the criticism, stating that the reporting accurately reflected events as witnessed by the reporters.

- AP photo and news managers worked to keep the German picture service objective and free of propaganda, as reflected in AP’s internal correspondence. Still, some of the German employees held pro-Nazi views and covered the German side of the war enthusiastically. One photographer employed by the AP German service, sometimes on staff and sometimes as a freelancer, was Austrian-born Franz Roth, an ardent Nazi. He gained prominence in Germany as a war photographer traveling with the Waffen SS to several fronts before and after the AP’s expulsion from Germany. Roth died in combat in 1943, a year and a half after AP was ousted from the country. A second pre-war German AP photographer, Eric Borchert, died in 1941 accompanying German troops in Tobruk, Libya.

- After 1939, the German government drafted several AP German picture service employees to serve with propaganda units accompanying troops to cover the fighting, requiring that the resulting photos be pooled for use by German media while their salaries still were paid by AP Germany. Some battlefront photos were sent directly to AP’s German picture service by these photographers as “exclusives.” AP management at the time believed their photography had important news value in spite of the restrictions caused by traveling with German forces or their personal views of the war.

- The Berlin office’s coverage of the war in Europe until the end of 1941 dominated front pages in the United States and was vital to readers at a time when little frontline reporting was otherwise available. AP managers praised how the Berlin staff had managed to tell the story in spite of its difficulties. In 1942 after the AP staff was ousted from the country, then Foreign Editor John Evans, who held that position from 1936 to 1943, concluded: “Censorship and the over-emphasized fear of reprisals never had prevented the essential truth of things from coming out.”

Key findings: 1941–1945

- With the U.S. entry into the war against Germany in December 1941, AP’s American staff members were arrested and interned for five months before being deported in a prisoner exchange. Meanwhile, the German-registered Picture Service was confiscated with all of its files and archival images and handed over to Helmut Laux’ Bureau Laux. Most German former AP personnel were absorbed into the Bureau Laux under the auspices of the Foreign Ministry. Others were drafted into military units. The original bureau and photo office were destroyed in Allied bombings during the course of the war.

- In an arrangement entered into in Portugal in 1942 between Laux and the local AP correspondent — an agreement in which AP’s Berlin chief Lochner played a key role during his deportation — the Bureau Laux gathered and sent regular packets of photos from Germany and German-occupied
Europe to AP New York and London via neutral Portugal, an arrangement that continued until 1945. (A faster channel later opened through Sweden.) AP sent photographs from the U.S. to the neutral countries for ultimate distribution by Bureau Laux inside Germany. The exchange was sanctioned by U.S. wartime officials, subject to censorship. The AP’s leadership in New York considered obtaining these photos for U.S. newspapers and the public as one of the cooperative’s accomplishments during the war, noting it in annual reports. Although it was known that the photos obtained from Germany had been approved by the Nazi Propaganda Ministry and had been passed by Nazi censors, the photos nevertheless provided important views of the war and occupation at a time when independent access was impossible. AP captions would make clear the German or Nazi origins of the photos selected by AP editors to be sent on to AP’s member newspapers.

- Willy Brandt, the German manager of the picture service from 1939 until 1941, was drafted into the German Luftwaffe when the AP picture service was closed but then was transferred by Laux into the Waffen SS to work fulltime for Laux’ operation inside the Foreign Ministry. Brandt avoided combat in this way. According to him, he remained committed to AP throughout the conflict and worked to preserve the photo archives while directing the effort to provide a flow of German-censored photos to AP. After the war, he appealed to come back to AP. The request was denied by U.S. military authorities overseeing de-Nazification of the German media because of his wartime enlistment into the SS, which Brandt argued had been forced. Lochner, who considered Brandt to be anti-Nazi, was embittered by AP’s decision not to challenge the U.S. military’s finding. After the de-Nazification period, Brandt was rehired by AP in 1950 and headed sales for a reconstituted and expanded AP German Service, which produced text news in German for the German market as well as photos from Germany for the German market and the world. His efforts helped expand AP’s reach in Germany, Switzerland and Austria. By the time he retired in 1978, the post-war AP GmbH was the largest single AP news and photo operation outside the United States serving more than 200 subscribers. Brandt died in 2001 at the age of 90 following a short illness.

- Laux, the SS officer who took over the AP’s assets and then proposed the photo exchange to AP’s Lisbon correspondent, cooperated with Allied criminal investigators and intelligence after the war. He argued to interrogators that his wartime arrangement with AP meant he should be spared punishment for Nazi activities. He served time in an Allied detention camp and after his release established his own photo agency in Frankfurt, Germany. He later sold a set of blockbuster images of Hitler on D-Day to Life magazine.

- The AP still maintains an all-format news bureau in Berlin to gather news, photos and video from Germany, but the separate German-language news and photo service no longer exists. It was sold in 2010 in view of a tightening news agency market in the country.
Values and principles

AP covers the world, which includes dictatorships and democracies, countries at war and countries at peace. This means AP journalists need to cover authoritarian governments and undemocratic political movements from within borders that these regimes control. This was the struggle of the Berlin bureau in the years 1933–41. This review of the historical data leads to the conclusion that AP succeeded in its journalistic mission in spite of the turmoil of the period and the enormous pressures the AP staff faced.

This evaluation of the historical record, including many documents surfaced for the first time through declassification, has been an exhaustive process but in so doing the AP has re-emphasized an enduring lesson in the historical experience that was relevant in the past and is relevant today. The AP now and in the future must:

- Uphold key news values and principles; ask: Will any action being taken on behalf of AP's newsgathering be defensible and understandable years in the future?

- Be transparent with staff and the outside world about what compromises if any have been made for access to a leader, or a government, and be willing to justify them.

- As far as possible work to obtain access, including emphasizing the AP's own record of fact-based objectivity and accuracy in reporting, its wide reach, and its willingness to tell all sides of a story.

- Report critically. Under no circumstances can the AP be used as a platform for any government's propaganda. Protect the integrity of AP's editorial content and its independence.

- Protest vocally if AP content is manipulated or distorted by any customer in any country and terminate our contracts with any customer if such behavior persists.

- AP has a core mission to gather news, even in very difficult political environments, because so much of the world depends on the AP for objective information. However if any country, group or person seeks to force AP to relinquish final editorial control over the news AP produces, the AP is best served by withdrawing from that environment and then seeking to accomplish its reporting by other means.

The project was overseen and edited by John Daniszewski, vice president for standards and editor at large. The author is Larry Heinzerling, an adjunct assistant professor at the Columbia Graduate School of Journalism and retired AP deputy international editor, with contributions by investigative researcher Randy Herschaft of the AP News Research Center in New York.

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1. Nazi Rule, Censorship and The Associated Press

“I have always gone on the theory that our men\(^1\) are guests of the countries in which they are accredited and that they should not abuse their hospitality. Correspondents of individual papers can do so, but not an organization that represents 1,400 newspapers.”

— AP General Manager Kent Cooper on reporting from Nazi Germany\(^1\)

Lamenting Germany’s descent into totalitarian rule and its draconian assault on the press, Louis P. Lochner, the doyen of the Berlin press corps, described the German media scene in a 1937 dispatch for The Associated Press this way:

“Freedom of the press as understood in America died on the night of Jan. 30, 1933, when Adolf Hitler took the government of Germany into his authoritarian hands.”\(^3\)

That night, the country’s journalists and its newspapers, its magazines and its national news agency were all doomed to become strictly controlled instruments of Nazi rule. German reporters, editors and photographers were all to become licensed functionaries of the Third Reich.

It would be as if all American journalists today — reporters, photographers, videographers, graphics artists and others — were licensed by government and depended by law on the editorial whims and dictates of the country’s ruling political party ruthlessly enforced by an all-powerful Federal Bureau of
Investigation. Serious transgressions could result in banishment from the profession or imprisonment.

How The Associated Press, an American, not-for-profit news cooperative worked in this atmosphere, both gathering news and photos from Germany for its some 1,400 newspaper members across the United States, and providing the German media an impartial international photo service, is the subject of this multi-faceted report on Nazi Germany and The Associated Press.

This study is prompted by the work of Harriet Scharnberg, a German historian at Martin Luther University at Halle, Germany, whose article in 2016, “The A and P of Propaganda: Associated Press and Nazi Image Propaganda,” inspired an internal examination of how AP functioned in a turbulent era more than 75 years ago as it sought to cover the Nazi rise to power and a global war in which 15 million died on the battlefield and perhaps three times that number of civilians were killed.

The magnitude of the story was enormous, the thirst for information unquenchable, but the new order of the Third Reich trampled all the basic tenets of honest journalism and sought to control information on a scale never seen before.

On March 14, 1933, just six weeks after seizing power, Hitler established the Reich Ministry of Popular Enlightenment and Propaganda and put the virulently anti-Semitic Joseph Goebbels, who was to be Nazi Germany's chief propagandist until the ruinous end of World War II, in charge.

Hitler’s dictatorship was to change dramatically not only who could report, edit and publish news and photos in Germany — and later in German-occupied countries — but also precisely what news would be covered and how. Similar controls were put on news and photos entering Germany from abroad [see The AP GmbH photo service].

By Sept. 22, 1933, Goebbels was able to announce the creation of the Reichskulturkammer, or Reich Chamber of Culture, which would impose his control over all German creative life. It had separate chambers or subdivisions for authors, radio performers, actors, musicians, artists and, for journalists, the Reichpressekammer.

The Propaganda Ministry, through the Reichpressekammer, took control of the Reich Association of the German Press, which regulated entry into the profession. No German could serve as editor or correspondent unless admitted to the Reichpressekammer. Expulsion from the organization was tantamount to losing the right to write for a living.

The head of the Propaganda Ministry’s press department was Otto Dietrich, who was second only to Goebbels and also served as Hitler’s personal press chief. Dietrich’s deputy, Karl Boemer, was responsible for relations with the foreign press.
To impose control on the domestic press, the regime subjected journalists and publishers to strict oversight. The Nazi party's publishing house, the Franz Eher Verlag, acquired the ownership directly or indirectly of most of the German press, and the Propaganda Ministry maintained control of everything published by newspapers through the Deutsches Nachrichtenbuero (DNB), the state-controlled press agency, including its photo service, Welt Bild. The ministry issued constant directives at daily 11 a.m. press conferences. By 1944, no more than 1,100 newspapers of the 4,700 published when the Nazis came to power in 1933 remained, but of these, many managed to publish until the end of the war.

“More than that: the German newsman is under oath not to reveal information divulged at the press conference as confidential matter, nor even to reveal information which he may himself have gathered but which the ministry decides may not be published,” Lochner wrote in an article for The Quill magazine. “The laws for the punishment of treason under which such revelations fall are extremely severe.”

Then, on Oct. 4, 1933, the Schriftleitergesetz, or Editor’s Law, came into force. It defined journalism as a public task regulated by the state and required all professional journalists to register for a permit to work. The new law provided that “only he can be an editor who is in possession of German citizenship, is of Aryan descent and not married to a person of non-Aryan descent, and has the qualifications necessary for the task of spiritually influencing the public,” Lochner reported.

“Many naïve souls evidently thought that outward conformity would suffice to save their jobs,” Lochner wrote. “They soon learned that their records were carefully examined, their political past searched, their blood tested as to its freedom from Jewish taint.”

The law included a sweeping passage defining what could not be published domestically, placing immense power into the hands of top officials of the Propaganda Ministry, unaffectionately referred to as the Promi by the foreign press corps. “Experience has abundantly shown that Dr. Goebbels does not hesitate to use his power,” Lochner wrote.

Labor law was also changed, establishing a Council of Confidence (Vertrauensrat) to replace the former work council (Betriebsrat) established to maintain harmony between employees and management. Under the law, the representative of the employees was no longer elected by the employees but instead approved by the Nazi party.

“I have gone into this with our American consul, with the American Chamber of Commerce and with the representatives of various American concerns, and all have agreed that there is nothing that we can do except bow to these regulations,” Lochner wrote to his New York headquarters.

The regulations only applied to German citizens employed by AP, including a reporter or two in the newsroom assisting Lochner and his fellow American
correspondents, and perhaps a dozen or more Germans employed by the AP GmbH, a German subsidiary selling AP photos from around the world to the German media. Foreign correspondents in Germany were subjected to a different type of control, self-censorship.

Lochner led the news bureau, which reported directly to New York, but he also served as the legal head of the photo service, which reported to The Associated Press of Great Britain, another AP subsidiary.

Explaining the new law to his headquarters in New York, Lochner wrote:

“I, as Geschaeftsfuehrer [managing director], must call together the entire staff of the AP GmbH [AP’s photo operation] and in their presence pledge the Nazi representative on the Council of Confidence to live up to all the principles of this organization, and I in turn must pledge that our GmbH will obey the rules and regulations of the Nazi state.”

“As a foreigner, I must not end my pledge with the customary ‘Heil Hitler,’” he added, “but in spirit I must accept the regulations or else our company is threatened with dissolution.”

While upholding the AP GmbH’s legal obligations, Lochner also struggled to uphold AP’s ability to report the news from the Reich as pressures mounted on foreign correspondents in the German capital.

In a 1934 document, “Record of a of a Long Distance Telephone Conversation with Chief of Bureau Frank King, London,” Lochner wrote:

Now, when the new regime came into power last year, I wrote a confidential letter (see below) to Mr. Cooper [AP General Manager Kent Cooper], outlining that I presumed the job of the AP was that of remaining in Germany at all costs, even if all the Specials [correspondents of individual American newspapers] were sent away, and even if we could not always tell all we know, because the American papers expect the AP to remain and to disseminate even such meager information as it might be possible to send. Mr. Cooper wrote me he agreed.

Actually, the “conversation” with King in London was a written statement Lochner read to King over the phone. Whether it was a defensive reaction to anticipated criticism for failing to satisfy a sensitive query from New York on German military matters, or a carefully worded subterfuge to sneak information to AP under the guise of bowing to the Propaganda Ministry, is unclear.

Frank: I am reading to you what I have to say about the query of last night, because records are presumably taken of all conversations with points abroad. For my own protection I want this record. New York, in asking us to follow the
airplane disclosures, probably does not realize that it is impossible for foreign correspondents to pry into questions of national defense and to go beyond what is officially stated or is a matter of common knowledge. Noel Panter and Pembroke Stephens, two British correspondents, were ejected from Germany precisely because they snooped around and in my negotiations as president of the Foreign Press Association with the German authorities I was told that, while the government was inclined to permit a certain latitude in the matter of reporting unwelcome facts or critical background concerning other events, it drew a line sharply on military matters. ... Perhaps the fellows on the desk don't know what dynamite they are playing with when they ask us to go after facts brought out in the Senate inquiry. That I am not afraid to tell the truth I think I showed in connection with the “blood purge” of June 30.

The “blood purge,” also known as “The Night of the Long Knives,” was a reference to the Nazi murders of political opponents and insufficiently loyal supporters, including leaders of the Sturmabteilung (SA), the paramilitary so-called Brownshirts, carried out from June 30 to July 2, 1934.

But at that time I was merely dealing with unwelcome facts and not with military secrets. If I were to try to assemble data on the smuggling of airplane materials from the USA and elsewhere that action would certainly be interpreted as espionage. All I can say without risking unwelcome consequences for the AP is that the Senate charges cause no surprise in the diplomatic corps, whose agents are busy trying to find out whether Germany is violating any treaty promises or not.

Lochner then proceeds to divulge to King “as a matter of common knowledge” that Germany is building underground airports and that a number of unidentified industrial plants involving liquid air, motors, airplanes and iron and steel products were no longer open to visitors.

One large chemical factory, on the other hand, of which it was rumored that it was manufacturing poison gases, not long ago invited the foreign press to visit the plant. What the foreign correspondents were shown was all of a decidedly harmless nature. It is also known that Goering [Hermann Goering, commander-in-chief of the Luftwaffe and Hitler’s designated successor] evinced great interest in a particularly speedy airplane motor which Ernst Udet, former war ace and now internationally famed sports flyer, brought with him from America, but that can be easily explained on the grounds of Goering's personal interest, as commander of the Richthofen squad after Richthofen's death, in airplanes generally.
Under Dietrich, the Ministry of Propaganda’s focus was not just aimed at solidifying domestic support for the Reich, but guarding against unsavory news about Germany being spread abroad and news and photos contrary to the Nazi narrative entering Germany.

In 1933, the year Hitler took power, Lochner reported to New York why he had rejected using a picture offered by a photographer in Munich showing a Jewish businessman being led in his shorts through the streets of the city with an anti-Semitic placard hanging from his neck.12

The photographer had sold it to others and it appeared in publications abroad prompting a Nazi raid on AP’s photo office where it became evident AP did not have and had not distributed the photo.

Official apologies followed.

AP’s New York office, however, had complained by cable message: “Nazi attacks on Jews played big. Licked here first pictures.”

Lochner’s response to this criticism, in a letter to Cooper, was to become a common refrain throughout his remaining years in Nazi Germany:

I hold, however, that it is more important for us to remain in the field here, even if occasionally we are licked, than to risk having our whole organization destroyed by publishing a picture to which the regime in power objects.

Not that I like it one bit: I abhor censorship, and feel terrible that we cannot report everything we know. ... But if I understand the functions of a news bureau in a country in which certain decrees are in vogue, and in which liberty of speech and of the press are curtailed, right, these functions consist in trying just as long as possible to remain within that country. If individual correspondents or photographers want to risk being ejected, that’s their business. But the members of the A.P., I take it, want us to stick to our post.13

He concluded his letter asking for criticisms and suggestions and the following list of do’s and don’ts he believed he should follow:

1. Accept the German nationalistic revolution as a fact and give the new regime a chance.

2. Be scrupulously accurate about every item that leaves the office.

3. Stick only to unquestionable sources; decline to handle anonymous.

4. Refrain from sending sensational or alarmist stories unless those who supply the facts are ready to stand for them in case I am questioned.
5. Live up to the laws and the decrees of the country even though they are irksome and contrary to journalistic ideals.

6. Cultivate the men of the new regime with a view to gaining their confidence in the fairness, integrity, and objectivity of the A.P. even in the case of stories that those in control of the new Germany frown upon for personal or partisan reasons, but that must be carried by a nonpartisan organization like A.P. if it does not want to lose its reputation.

7. Always remember that, no matter what may happen, the A.P. will want to have a bureau in Germany.

Two years later, on Aug. 3, 1935, Lochner and his news staff became the focus of just the kind of Nazi wrath he had sought so hard to avoid. Angered by AP reporting, an order was issued by the Ministry of Science, Education and Culture in Berlin to all the Reich's ministers and state government officials, including the minister of propaganda, banning all contact with AP by German officials for more than six months.

“The American news agency Associated Press has recently distinguished itself by particularly spiteful reportage. A dispatch Aug. 1 called for an especially sharp rejection of AP's lying reports. I therefore deem it necessary to withhold from this agency, until further notice, all interviews, information and communications etc. Heil Hitler,” the order said.

Lochner wrote to Kent Cooper sounding “a note of alarm” two days later.

“The position of the foreign correspondent has for the first time since the advent of the Hitler regime become precarious,” he wrote. “It seems to have dawned upon the powers that be that the news agencies in merely reporting facts are far more dangerous to the regime than the individual correspondent who writes a single story for his paper only, and who advises his home office to pick up the spot news from the AP.”

Lochner attributed the ban to three recent stories — one involving a dramatic explosion June 14 at a munitions factory at Reinsdorf, another on July 15 about Jews beaten along the fashionable Kurfuerstendamm for protesting the showing of an anti-Semitic movie, and another about Protestant clergymen opposed to a Nazi takeover of the churches — and his refusal to divulge sources.

“The prime reason [for the timing of the ban] seems to be the fear that our reports on the situation may put a question mark behind the 1936 Olympic Games,” he added. “The AP with its large reading public in North America and a section of South America, Havas [the French news agency, predecessor to Agence France Presse] with its appeal to French and South American readers are considered dangerous to the success of the Olympic Games.”

With the summer Olympics, viewed as a showcase for Germanic prowess, just months away, the ban was lifted Feb. 12, 1936.
AP General Manager Kent  Cooper’s view of AP’s role in Germany was set out just after the outbreak of war in Europe in a letter of Sept. 20, 1939, to Robert S. Bates of the Tribune Publishing Co. of Meadville, Pennsylvania. Cooper was responding to a question about censorship and requested his response be kept in confidence.  

My reason for this is that The Associated Press has very much at stake in the matter of keeping its staff abroad in good standing with the respective governments of the countries in which they are assigned. I have always gone on the theory that our men are guests of the countries in which they are accredited and that they should not abuse their hospitality. Correspondents of individual papers can do so, but not an organization that represents 1,400 newspapers.

“It is not a serious thing for the correspondent of a newspaper that has membership in The Associated Press to be expelled, but that newspaper would be the first one to complain if The Associated Press did something that caused it to be expelled.”  

He described responsibility censorship as “one that leaves the correspondent of The Associated Press free to send what he wishes unless the government of the country to which he is accredited asks that there be no mention of something which is specifically identified. Intentionally to disregard such a request would result in expulsion.”  

Responding to a question of whether ways would be developed to “combat censorship or at least circumvent it,” Cooper wrote:

“It is my opinion that the Associated Press has an obligation to do the best it can in sending the true news from any country in the world. It cannot do this under present conditions if it has a policy of combating censorship or if it tries to circumvent censorship.

“This might mean that we cannot send all the news that comes under the eyes of our men but it leaves us in good standing constantly to educate the censors (as we continually do) that any policy of suppression is short-sighted.”  

Cooper also told The Associated Press Board of Directors in New York that the problems of news coverage were many and difficult.

Not only did censorship interpose serious barriers, Cooper said, “but lines of communication were disrupted in every direction, and rapid shifts in the news fronts made it imperative that our staff be kept in a high state of mobility.”

For example, AP correspondent Lynn Heinzerling [the author’s father] witnessed the historic first shots of World War II at Westerplatte in the Free City of Danzig, on Sept. 1, 1939, as the German warship Schleswig-Holstein fired shell after shell at the Polish garrison stationed there, but German control of outgoing communications did him in.
“Heinzerling pounded out an eye witness story and then to his consternation found that he was completely cut off from the outside world with only one consolation: George Kidd of the United Press, Walter Dietzel of the International News Service, and other correspondents were in the same fix,” Newsweek magazine later reported. “After four frantic days he got a dispatch through, but by that time the great story was already history.”

“Rumors and speculation spring up prolifically in an atmosphere of war,” Cooper reported to the board. “Every censorship creates multitudinous problems of conduct for the correspondents caught in its grip. Belligerency loosens all remaining restraint from the hand of propaganda, at the same time that it seeks to interpose every possible obstacle to disclosure of the real truth.”

Cooper then outlined AP’s approach to these vexing problems.

“We have tried to deal with these questions soundly and realistically. Where the truth was not ascertainable, Associated Press dispatches have not presented rumor in its stead. Particularly, we have refrained from giving currency to fantastic reports, printed or otherwise circulated in one belligerent nation with respect to supposed happenings in an enemy country. Every correspondent and every editor has made it his concern to weed out propaganda, and to present official statements for what they are, and no more,” he said.

Cooper was particularly annoyed with British censorship and on Oct. 7, 1940, wrote a scathing letter comparing procedures in London and Berlin to M.E. Nichols, publisher of the Vancouver Daily Province, of Vancouver, British Columbia. “Every time I talk about this British censorship I get a little excited,” he wrote. “It’s so silly.”

... I mean that everything we send from England must be written out in dispatch form and filed with the transmission company which then turns it over to the censor. From Germany we send practically nothing in dispatch form. Instead, we telephone it to Bern (Switzerland) where it is put on the wireless.

A government statement given out officially in London has to be written, filed with the transmission company and passed upon by the censor before the transmission company is allowed to send it. We have had cases of the highest officials of the government giving out official statements and the censor holding them up for an hour or two “in the public interest.” In Germany, when an official gives us a statement we send it and there is no censorship...

The difference between “responsibility” censorships of Germany and Italy and the censorship of Britain is that in Germany and Italy in case the reporter is in doubt whether
he should send something he asks and is given a definite answer immediately. He has direct access to the department of information or censorship. In London he can have no contact whatever with the censor. He files what he is in doubt about and what he is not in doubt about with the transmission company, which in turn turns it over to the censor. Sometimes when the censor refuses to pass the story the reporter is notified. Most of the time he is in blissful ignorance as to whether or not his story has gone.25

Cooper was incensed by the “outrageous censorship of the British at Bermuda.”26 They monitored trans-Atlantic mail passing through the island that arrived aboard flying boats including packages of AP photos from London and Berlin. Bermuda was a staging point for all the U.S.-European flights operated by Pan Am and Britain’s Imperial Airways.

About 1,500 British intelligence agents, academics and code breakers were stationed at the Imperial Censorship station at the Princess Hotel there shortly after war broke out, according to Bernews, a Bermuda news site. Cooper continued to Nichols:

I said the censorship at Bermuda. In fact, it is confiscation of every picture and news story sent to us from the European continent. Every air liner and every steamer that lands in Bermuda is met by a colonial officer who accosts each passenger with the question as to whether he has any pictures or news from The Associated Press. If the passenger says “yes” the pictures and news are confiscated. If all passengers say “no” detailed search of the ship begins. Never do the officers ask whether they have pictures or news for anyone other than The Associated Press. This probably is because the gentlemen in Bermuda never heard of anything but The Associated Press. I certainly wouldn’t charge them with more than ignorance even though the gross discrimination in letting pictures for unknown agencies and news for unknown agencies get through is wholly beyond my ken.27

As large-scale air raids began to inflict increasingly greater damage on German and British cities in late 1940, the censors tightened their controls.

A confidential, not-for-publication note to the editors of American newspapers from AP distributed via AP’s news circuits during this period announced tougher oversight in Germany:

News from Germany has been restricted by two new orders by the German Ministry of Propaganda. Correspondents in Berlin still are under censorship of responsibility and may telephone their news to a neutral country, but they have been told that they must obey new limitations.
An order Thursday forbade foreign correspondents to utilize their own judgement or observation on air raid damage. They were instructed to confine their reports to facts announced officially. Also, they were warned against “political speculation” such as that on questions considered in Hitler’s conferences with [Pierre] Laval [of Vichy France], [Francisco] Franco [of Spain] and Marshall [Philippe] Petain [President of Vichy France].

Recently, another order forbade report of military information from 4:00 p.m. E.S.T. until 11:00 p.m. E.S.T., which is a variation of a British censorship rule prohibiting their use of exact times of air raids.

The foregoing information was given the A.P. correspondent in Berlin with the understanding that it would not be published.

The A.P.

The raids were also having an impact in Britain where AP was finding it increasingly difficult to send photos of bomb damage out of the country.

Following the raid on the port of Southampton on Dec. 1, 1940, one of a series that became known as “Southampton’s Blitz,” AP’s Assistant General Manager Lloyd Stratton complained to Rene MacColl, of the official British Press Service in New York.

Stratton, quoting an incoming message from AP’s London office, related this sequence of events after New York had requested London send pictures of the damage at Southampton:

Our good views killed. Still Trying. Photo censorship stopped our excellent first pictures which submitted many hours ahead of opposition. Pursuing but hopeless to get intelligent explanation.

About an hour later, this cable was received:

“Admiral Thompson censorship head insists our general views unpassable.” From the description of the pictures as given by London, they were of the same general character as those already in print over here, as cleared to other (newsphoto) services. To this hour, we still do not have the pictures referred to, and of course we don’t want them now, anyway.
While Lochner and AP’s American reporters were able to joust with the Nazi authorities up to a point after war broke out in Europe, the plight of AP’s German photo staff in Berlin was another matter.

Virtually all outgoing wartime photos sent to New York were made by photographers working for various Wehrmacht and Waffen SS propaganda units — including a few AP photographers who were drafted and seconded to such units — whose extensive coverage of the war fronts was channeled to the German and international media via the Ministry of Propaganda.

In a few isolated cases, photos taken by AP reporters on a sanctioned tour of battlefield sites, accompanied by German authorities, especially on the Russian front, would be cleared for dispatch abroad. In general, however, AP’s international photo service had to rely on and evaluate the newsworthiness of thousands of government-produced and officially approved images from Germany and Nazi occupied territories.

When Germany declared war on the United States on Dec. 11, 1941, the AP’s five American reporters in Germany were detained for five months and subsequently repatriated via Lisbon in the spring of 1942.

Upon their arrival in the United States, John Evans, AP’s foreign editor, gave this assessment of stories written by Lochner and the others — now finally free of all censors — while awaiting trans-Atlantic passage by ship home.

[These men] sent from Lisbon illuminating interpretive stories of what goes on “inside,” but so well had they reported previously from their bailiwicks that there were no revelations. Five months’ internment gave them time to discuss and reflect upon events so that they came out with well-rounded, long considered analyses of situations which they often had covered in the day’s work. Censorships and the over-emphasized fear of reprisals never had prevented the essential truth of things coming out.30

Germany’s propaganda minister, however, remembered Lochner’s reporting as nothing but hostile to Nazi Germany.

In the May 19, 1942, entry to his diary, translated by Lochner after the war, Goebbels, commenting on Lochner’s reporting from Lisbon immediately after his release from detention, wrote:

As regards the American journalists, the representative of the United Press [sic] Lochner is behaving in an especially contemptible way. His attacks are directed above all against German propaganda and he aims at me personally. I have never thought much of Lochner. We made too much fuss about him.31
2. Louis P. Lochner

“Our orders from our bosses were to tell no untruth, but to report only as much of the truth without distorting the picture as would enable us to remain at our post.”

LOUIS P. LOCHNER, ASSOCIATED PRESS CHIEF OF BUREAU IN BERLIN, 1928-1942

No news in the 1930s surpassed the rise of fascism in Germany and the road to World War II. And no foreign correspondent chronicled the era as extensively as Louis P. Lochner of The Associated Press, who reported from Berlin from 1924 until his arrest by the Gestapo in December 1941. He and his fellow American correspondents were deported in May 1942 five months after Adolf Hitler’s declaration of war on the United States. At war’s end, Lochner’s rare credentials included having been accredited at different times to the military forces of both Germany and the United States.

He was erudite, a prolific writer, a tireless reporter, and he played Berlin’s social game with energy, style and enthusiasm, his fluency in German giving him access to a wide and rich variety of news sources. Over the years, he met and interviewed many of the most noteworthy personalities of Germany’s Weimar Republic as well as the Nazi regime.

In What About Germany?, published in 1942, Lochner described how he had quietly built up a network of extra-official connections, including dependable and well-informed opponents of the regime, monarchists and communists, trade unionists, social democrats and Lutheran pastors, Catholic priests and Jewish rabbis.

Lochner took pride in having interviewed the exiled Kaiser Wilhelm II, the last of the German emperors; Paul von Hindenburg, Germany’s second president; and Gustav Stresemann five days before the beleaguered Weimar Republic’s last president died. He also interviewed virtually the entire top leadership of the Third Reich, including Adolf Hitler, twice, first in 1932, and, more notably, in 1934, a year after he came to power; Hermann Goering, Joseph Goebbels, Heinrich Himmler, Rudolf Hess and Joachim Von Ribbentrop.
His abiding cultural interests led him to report on composer Richard Strauss and dramatist Max Reinhardt. He was a personal friend of violinists Fritz Kreisler and Yehudi Menuhin and composer Ottorino Respighi.\textsuperscript{38}

Lochner’s correspondence, stored at the U.S. Embassy in 1940 for safekeeping and later destroyed in the bombing of Berlin, included letters from Jane Addams, William Jennings Bryan, Albert Einstein, Maxim Gorki, Jean Sibelius and Woodrow Wilson, according to his later book, \textit{Always the Unexpected}, published in 1956.

“I knew practically the whole top hierarchy of the Nazi government,” Lochner told interrogators gathering evidence for the war crimes proceedings at Nuremberg in 1945, “due to the fact that I was not only here as Associated Press correspondent, but for six years had been president of the Foreign Press Association, which naturally involved many official contacts, and had been president of the American Chamber of Commerce in Germany.”\textsuperscript{36}

Martha Dodd, daughter of William E. Dodd, then the U.S. ambassador in Berlin, described him as a “short bald-headed bulbous-looking man resembling a gnome, somewhat officious and patronizing towards some people … There was hardly an official or unofficial function at which Louis was not present, circulating among friends, listening to bits of news and giving his own, talking seriously with diplomats and Germans.”\textsuperscript{37}

Lloyd Stratton, deputy to AP General Manager Kent Cooper, visited the Berlin bureau from New York in 1931, and gave Cooper this assessment of Lochner:

\begin{quote}
I have been here about 36 hours yet in that short time I do not know that I have been in a bureau where the associations, contacts and connections of the bureau chief became so quickly evident. And everyone speaks so highly of him.

The acquaintances are not German alone either; while I have been writing this there have been telephone calls from officials of one sort or another from Poland, Russia and Austria. I stumbled into a dinner he was having at his home last night, a private affair. Twenty were present, including two ambassadors, two ministers and a string of lesser dignitaries and talent.\textsuperscript{38}
\end{quote}

Lochner’s work in the Nazi police state was often risky and rather than being expelled he would often pass up stories when informants refused to be identified because they feared for their lives. In an interview after the war, Lochner estimated he was able to use no more than 40 percent of the information he obtained in AP’s news service but did inform the U.S. Embassy in Berlin, “where the head of its military mission, Colonel William D. Hohenthal, assured him again and again that Washington was grateful for this service.”\textsuperscript{39}
Lochner said he also sometimes smuggled confidential information out of Germany in embassy diplomatic pouches or asked American tourists to carry his stories out of the country.\(^{40}\)

In September 1934, he wrote his daughter complaining of physical and mental exhaustion following three months covering the “blood purge,” also known as The Night of the Long Knives,” a reference to the Nazi murders of political opponents, including leaders of the Sturmabteilung (SA), the paramilitary Brownshirts, carried out from June 30 to July 2, 1934; the assassination of Austrian Chancellor Engelbert Dollfuss by Austrian Nazis and the illness of German President Paul von Hindenburg who was succeeded by Adolf Hitler.

It wasn’t alone the amount of work — it was chiefly the responsibility for every word that was cabled. On the one hand I had the duty of informing America objectively on what was transpiring in Germany, on the other I had to stay clear of the possibility of being yanked before the secret service and then deported, if I sent anything that did not jibe with the facts.\(^{41}\)

His contacts with Germans unsympathetic to the regime included a source in the Catholic Center Party who occasionally brought him smuggled Propaganda Ministry directives to the German Press that Lochner passed on to the U.S. Embassy. Lochner said he was told the State Department regarded these directives as “the most enlightening and worthwhile things that were coming out of Germany at all, and begging me to make every effort to get as complete a dossier as I could.”\(^{42}\)

I was naturally never fool enough to ever to publish them at the time because that would have meant putting the Gestapo on the definite hunt of who might be the man, and that would dry up my source.

To me, it was far more important that the American government should know what the real facts are, as compared with the propaganda, and that I should know where they were headed for, so that I wouldn’t fall for their propaganda, than to come out officiously — Well, here is a transcript.\(^{43}\)

Lochner reported on many aspects of German life under the Nazis: the suppression of the Jews,\(^{44}\) the supremacy of the state over the individual and the adulation of the country’s Fuehrer: “Hitler is Germany and Germany is Hitler, thousands of orators pour into the ears of 75,000,000 Teutons day in, day out,” Lochner reported.\(^{45}\)
Although based in Berlin, he sometimes traveled outside the country to cover German-related stories. He accompanied Chancellor Heinrich Brüning to Paris and to the Seven Power Conference in London and to Rome in 1931. He attended the world disarmament conference in Geneva in 1932.

He was best known, however for his expertise in German affairs, with many connections to the former imperial regime and exponents of German democracy, so much so that a U.S. War Department evaluation of Lochner in 1937 concluded “he has constituted himself the press agent of the House of Hohenzollern.”

In 1933, he witnessed the burning of some 20,000 books considered “un-German literature” by the Nazis on the huge Franz Josef Platz between the University of Berlin and the State Opera.

Other stories of note covered by Lochner, both in 1936, included the politically charged Olympics in Berlin and Amsterdam and the maiden trip of the dirigible Hindenburg, the German passenger airship that exploded over Lakehurst, New Jersey, the following year.

In 1938, he accompanied Hitler to Rome, Naples and Florence to meet Benito Mussolini, or Il Duce, leader of Italy’s National Fascist Party.

Lochner also wrote consistently on the plight of Germany’s Jews.

“American correspondents in Germany were unceasing in their vigilance concerning new manifestations of anti-Semitism,” Lochner wrote. “So blind were the Nazis in their hatred of the Jew that they had less objection to truthful reporting on anti-Semitic measures and action than on almost any other manifestation of Nazi-regimented German life.”

Joy Schaleben, in Getting the Story Out of Nazi Germany: Louis P. Lochner, (1969), says a close examination of Lochner’s stories on the plight of Jews in Germany shows he dealt with the subject in a straightforward manner. She gives the following examples from 1938:

**June 18** — A merciless official campaign against Jews, reinforced by mob action, was extended to all Germany today by secret police orders.

**August 21** — Anti-Semitism has reached a new high in Germany with the concerted effort of Nazi-ism to eliminate the Jew from business and stamp him as an inferior if not criminal human being.

**November 19** — Nazi Germany broadened its campaign to eradicate all possible traces of Jewry from national life today.

**December 3** — An order by Berlin’s chief of police today revived a medieval practice of forbidding Jews access to
certain streets and quarters despite recent assurances of Nazi leaders there was no intention to establish Jewish ghettos in Germany.

On the night of Nov. 9–10, 1938, AP reported the infamous events that came to be known as Kristallnacht, the night of broken glass. Lochner reported it this way:

BERLIN, November 10 (AP) — The greatest wave of anti-Jewish violence since Adolf Hitler came to power in 1933 swept Nazi Germany today and Jews were threatened with new official measures against them.

Millions of dollars’ worth of Jewish property was destroyed by angry crowds. Jewish stores were looted. Synagogues were burned, dynamited or damaged in a dozen cities.

Sounds of breaking glass and shouts of looters died away only near midnight. Hundreds of Jews voluntarily spent the night in jails fearing worse violence as reports of burning and looting continued to come in from many cities.50

Individual newsmen, including Lochner, were affected personally by the carnage in the streets that night. “One of our men who had been present at wrecking scene went into a public phone booth to telephone me what he had seen,” Lochner wrote later. “He was nearly mobbed on the grounds that he was spreading false reports.”51

The AP bureau chief described Kristallnacht and its aftermath as “the most terrible experience in all my life.” In a letter to his children, dated Nov. 28, he wrote:

I never dreamed that human nature could descend to such depravity and to such sadism and cruelty as I was witness to these last weeks. We have all become much older, and we sometimes wonder when we shall ever be able really to laugh again. Our home has been a refuge harbor, as have the houses of hundreds of foreigners here. Haunted and hunted creatures pitifully begged for a night’s lodging, and no Christian that I know said no: we left it to the heathens to take upon themselves the odium of perpetrating crimes that will some day cost the country dearly.52

Years later, Lochner wrote in his book What About Germany? that he would always associate Kristallnacht with a feeling of pride that he was American. “During that hideous night, when no Jew dared remain in his home for fear he might be tortured or murdered, there was not an American house in Berlin which did not offer shelter to some Jewish fugitive from Nazi terror,” he wrote.53
The Nazi regime claimed without credibility Kristallnacht was a spontaneous protest against the assassination two days earlier of Ernst vom Rath, a German diplomat in Paris killed by 17-year-old Herschel Grynszpan, a Polish Jew, protesting the expulsion of Polish Jews, including his parents, from Germany.

A fellow American correspondent, Wallace R. Deuel of the Chicago Daily News, reported that “For two hours straight on the night of the rioting, Lochner took the under-secretary of the Propaganda Ministry “over the coals,” following complaints about AP’s reporting. "Lochner lectured him on how in First World War days he, Lochner, was head of an organization in the U.S. that was fighting for a written declaration of the United States’ war aims. As a consequence, he got his house painted yellow [a color associated with cowardice] and very nearly got strung up ... he, personally, knew what it was like to be persecuted, and he certainly had the right to tell off the German government."54

After the Nazis annexed Austria in March 1938, Lochner focused on Hitler’s menacing demands on behalf of the German minority in the Sudetenland area of Czechoslovakia. He predicted that if negotiations failed to win autonomy for the 3.5 million Germans in that country, “Adolf Hitler is prepared to go the way of force, if necessary, to unite all Germans along the fringes of the Reich with greater Germany.”55

On Sept. 30, the Munich Pact was signed, surrendering the Sudetenland to Germany, and British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain returned home to Britain to declare to a cheering crowd outside his office: “My good friends this is the second time in our history that there has come back from Germany to Downing Street peace with honor. I believe it is peace in our time.” Just a year later, Hitler scorned the Munich agreement as just a “scrap of paper” and readied for an invasion of Poland.

Even as British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain was trumpeting “peace in our time,” Lochner continued reporting on the increasingly bellicose mood of the Nazi regime leading up to the invasion of Poland the following year.

Lochner’s reporting in 1938 — the fifth year of the proclaimed 1,000-year Reich — won him the Pulitzer Prize “for his dispatches from Berlin” and marked the pinnacle of his career as a foreign correspondent.

Ironically, as The New York Times put it in reporting on his Pulitzer award, it fell to a one-time pacifist “to become an outstanding reporter in the midst of developments that many believe have brought the world closer to war than at any time since 1914.”56
Born in Springfield, Illinois, on Feb. 22, 1887, Lochner was the son of a German-born Lutheran minister, the Rev. Frederick Lochner, and Maria von Haugwitz.

In 1905 he graduated from the Wisconsin Conservatory of Music — after successfully performing Beethoven’s second piano concerto for the examiners — and then went on to attend the University of Wisconsin, first majoring in Greek and Latin but later switching to journalism. He graduated with a bachelor’s degree and Phi Beta Kappa honors.

In World War I, he was a leading figure in the American and international anti-war movement. In 1914, he was appointed executive director of the Emergency Peace Federation in Chicago and worked closely with activist Jane Addams to convene a meeting of neutral nations to mediate an end to the war. The following year he became Henry Ford’s secretary and served as head of publicity for Ford’s ill-fated “Peace Ship,” on which Ford organized an amateur peace mission to Europe. His peace work and international travel as a youth helped form his worldview.

“...My living together with men from many lands enabled me to keep my balance during two world wars,” Lochner wrote many years after World War II. “I could never persuade myself that any nation is made up of preponderantly bad people. I could never subscribe to the thesis which our demand for Unconditional Surrender rested in 1945; namely that all Japanese and all Germans were so bad that the principles as embodied in the Atlantic Charter must be denied them.”

In 1920, his first wife, Emmy Hoyer, died in an influenza epidemic. A year later, an opportunity arose for him to become a labor reporter for Federated Press. Lochner left his two children, Elsbeth, 9, and Robert, 15 months, with their maternal grandparents, and moved to Berlin. There he met his second wife, Hilda Deterra, the divorced daughter of Supreme Military Court Judge Christian Hugo Steinberger. They were married the following year. Hilda had a 4-year-old daughter, Rosemarie, lovingly known as Putz. Lochner, looking for better work, joined the Berlin staff of The Associated Press on May 1, 1924, and became chief of bureau in 1928.

After winning journalism’s highest award, Lochner remained in Berlin to cover the 1939 invasion of Poland and later the occupation of Denmark and Norway and then, traveling with the German High Command, he followed the German armies into Holland, Belgium and France in May of 1940, writing under the dateline “With the German Armies on the Western Front.” He witnessed the French capitulation at Compiègne and entered Paris on June 14, 1940, the day of its surrender.
Reporting the success of Hitler’s armies thundering across Europe brought little joy to Washington or to American newspaper editors. He and other foreign correspondents in Nazi Germany walked a tightrope — especially The Associated Press, which represented some 1,400 daily newspapers across America — in balancing the need to cover the story and maintaining access to officials while avoiding expulsion. Almost inevitably, there were accusations, which AP consistently fought, that Lochner was pro-Nazi.

There is sometimes a “Gee Whiz” character to Lochner’s war reporting, perhaps a whiff of awe at German prowess or a lack of experience covering armies on the move.

“From what I have beheld, it is evident that Nazi Germany’s tremendous air force dominates the fighting in Germany’s blitzkrieg attempt to bring France and Great Britain to their knees,” Lochner reported on May 21.

“Regiment after regiment of infantry, detachment after detachment of well-nourished cavalry and seeming inexhaustible reserves of air force and artillery poured into the operational areas,” he wrote.  

Two days later, this:

With the German armies, on the Western Front

May 23 — The writer has reached the English Channel to find German forces here with the Nazi swastika flying. It seems almost unbelievable to find Germans here, but the swastika waving from the local commander’s headquarters leaves no doubt about it.

Crews of U-boats and speedboats are impatient to be sent on their errands of destruction.

Here, as elsewhere, the roads of approach are jammed with infantry, more infantry and still more infantry and with artillery ever more formidable backed by an air force equipped to the last fine detail.

All are awaiting Chancellor Hitler’s final command to go to England. Everywhere one hears soldiers singing the ‘Sailing Against England’ song, young men realizing such a venture would be no picnic.

By the end of June 1940, Germany had invaded Denmark, Norway, France, Belgium, Luxemburg and the Netherlands. More than 300,000 French and British troops had been evacuated from Dunkirk and Hitler toured Paris, the French capital, posing for photos in front of the Eiffel Tower.

The victory celebrations in Germany were tumultuous, Lochner giving this account of the thousands cheering in the streets of Berlin that day.
BERLIN, July 6 (AP) — Adolf Hitler came back from his conquests today to ride a vast carpet of flowers and hear the tumult of a welcome such as Berlin never had seen before.

The proportions of this homecoming were Napoleonic, the press, in fact, in an article written by Hitler’s own press chief, Dr. Otto Dietrich, compared the Fuehrer to both Napoleon and Caesar.

I have ridden behind Hitler many times, at Nuremberg party conventions, when he entered Danzig last September, when he returned victorious from the Austrian Anschluss.

There has always been enthusiasm, but today it was different.

The distinguishing feature was the complete abandon with which the population cheered, waved flags and cried “Heil!”

Lochner and his fellow foreign correspondents and AP’s German-run photo operation worked under the yoke of Joseph Goebbels and his Reich Ministry of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda.

The Propaganda Ministry expected reporters to conform to Nazi news policy or Nachrichtenpolitik, which was set forth at the ministry’s daily press conferences, by “commentaries” from the Foreign Office and the official German news agency Deutsches Nachrichtenburo and by the articles and editorials in the controlled German press, “authoritative” spokesmen, official communiques and other connected insiders.

Stories based on independent reporting that ran counter to the Nazi narrative were considered unfair and reporters testing the boundaries faced threats, denial of press privileges and possibly expulsion.

Lochner compiled a list of 40 journalists between 1933 and 1937 who were expelled, left under threat of expulsion or because as Jews they were no longer welcome. Later there were others.

Journalists who were expelled included Dorothy Thompson, the wife of Sinclair Lewis, and Pembroke Stevens of the London Daily Express. Edgar Mowrer, correspondent for the Chicago Daily News and head of the Foreign Press Association, had left under Nazi pressure that included being followed by brownshirts and an ominous declaration by a German official that his safety could not be guaranteed; United Press correspondent Richard C. Hottelet was jailed for four months in 1941 and then expelled before the U.S. entered World War II.
Other correspondents from Britain, the Soviet Union and such European countries as Czechoslovakia, Sweden, Austria, Switzerland, Denmark, Holland, France, Italy and Poland, also had to leave.

Radio correspondents such as CBS’s William L. Shirer didn’t have to worry, since their reports were vetted ahead of time, and they could always simply blame the censor. Newspaper correspondents could take more chances, since if they were kicked out, their papers could still rely on AP, and the expulsion could be worn as a badge of honor. Not so the AP. If AP were kicked out, all its customers would lose.⁴

A study in 1942 of German propaganda techniques and the American press found Germany’s intimidation and harassment of reporters effective and concluded Goebbels had “succeeded in suppressing most of the news he did not want cabled while foisting upon us and the whole world a phenomenal amount of both obvious and subtle propaganda.”⁶²

The report was written by Sidney A. Freifeld, a news editor in the radio division of the Office of the Coordinator of Information, an intelligence and propaganda agency of the U.S. government that was later split into the Office of War Information and the Office of Strategic Services, predecessor to the Central Intelligence Agency. The report was titled “Nazi Press Agentry and the American Press” and was published in the Public Opinion Quarterly of the American Association for Public Opinion Research.

“They deluged the world with copy to ‘build up’ Hitler and his satellites, to depict the ‘National Socialist’ regime as a ‘Western bulwark against Asiatic Bolshevism,’” and generally to glamorize the ‘New’ Germany in a favorable light,” he wrote.⁶³

In giving examples, he mentions other news organizations, but zeroes in on AP’s reporting from Berlin after the outbreak of war in Europe, saying “It is not suggested that our press representatives in Germany or their employers here were ‘pro-Nazi’ or should have been more ‘anti-Nazi’ in the slightest degree. The political opinions and personal sympathies of correspondents or publishers are completely irrelevant as regards the problems discussed here.”⁶⁴

Freifeld offers numerous stories that cause him concern and which, he says “a survey of newspaper files will show, with rich variations, might be multiplied a hundredfold.”⁶⁵

BERLIN, July 19 [1940] (AP) — Political circles, commenting today on President Roosevelt’s acceptance speech, privately made no secret of their opinion that by aiding the Axis’ enemies the President is prolonging the war. ...

Freifeld calls this dispatch “particularly loose reporting” since there were no “political circles” outside the Nazi party, and “the implications of ‘privately making no secret of their opinion’ is ludicrous.”⁶⁶
BERLIN, May 10 [1941] (AP) — German leaders gave the deepest attention tonight to American developments as the impression grew in Berlin that “war agitators” were gaining ground in the United States. ...

Freifeld’s view was that if such obvious propaganda was to be filed at all, the correspondent would better have written that “the Propaganda Ministry desires to create the impression in America that ‘war agitators’ are ‘gaining ground’ in the U.S.” He added: “The idea of ‘German leaders giving serious attention’ as the ‘impression grew in Berlin’ is farcical.”

Verbatim reporting of Nazi propaganda handouts was defended by some news executives, Freifeld wrote, on grounds they came from authoritative sources. The official reaction of important governments is newsworthy, they maintain, even though it is deliberately manufactured for propaganda purposes, Freifeld added. “But surely that is equivalent to saying that the propaganda of any government must be reported in our press simply because it is ‘official.’”

Another Nazi public relations technique was to reward correspondents with access to important officials, with the understanding such interviews were to follow Propaganda Ministry dictates, converting the reporter into “a mere conveyor of an oral Nazi handout,” as Freifeld put it.

Lochner mentions one such episode in an address delivered in Madison, Wisconsin, in 1958, in which he discusses one of his interviews with Hitler and reveals agreeing to conditions of editorial control that have been unacceptable to AP and U.S. journalists generally for well over half a century, if not longer.

“Somewhere among the papers which I have the honor to present to this [Mass Communications History] Center there is a revealing text of an utterance concerning the Jewish question which Adolf Hitler made in the course of an interview I had with him [in 1932],” Lochner told his audience. “It was never published because Hitler had made it a condition for receiving me that I would submit the text for his clearance.” Elsewhere, Lochner mentions that Hitler was also permitted to edit an interview conducted in February 1934 that was approved in April “with naval sections then cut out.”

“The burden of his pontification [in 1932] was that the Jew must be eliminated from the German scene because, as he put it, “Wir koennen als Volk ihn nicht verdauen” (“We cannot as a people digest him”), Lochner said.

Lochner said Hitler had earlier extolled the superhuman qualities of the Nordic race, of which, as an Austrian, he was not representative.

“The Nazi dictator must himself have noted what a fatal admission he had made, for with an angry gesture he crossed the whole passage out as he read my script,” Lochner said.

Lochner stirred some of the greatest controversy, however, with his coverage of the so-called blitzkrieg as the Nazis launched their 1940 spring offensive in
the West and German tanks rolled into Belgium, France and the Netherlands. He was among a select group of correspondents invited to join a tour conducted by the High Command. In a variety of ways, writes Freifeld, the idea was planted that the German advance was not going to continue from Belgium on into France but would head across the channel to England. “The German aim apparently was to tempt the British into withholding further aid to France, create alarm in England and a false sense of relief in France and generate further friction between the two countries,” he wrote.

Lochner’s dispatches were widely published in the United States. Freifeld offered the following examples [Italics are Freifeld’s throughout]:

WITH THE WESTERN GERMAN ARMIES, MAY 22 [1940]
— Col. Gen. Walther von Reichenau waited in a peaceful old castle today for a telephone call from Adolf Hitler which would send the powerful right wing of the German army westward against a half-million Allied troops in Flanders.

_The object would be to drive back toward the English Channel the forces which block a direct Nazi attack on England._

#

WITH THE WESTERN GERMAN ARMIES, MAY 23 [1940]
— Here as elsewhere the roads of approach are jammed with infantry, more infantry and still more infantry, and with artillery ever more formidable, backed by an air force equipped to the last fine detail. _All are awaiting Adolf Hitler’s final command to go to England._

Everyone hears soldiers singing the “Engelland song. …”

Another thing the Germans are trying to do now is to try to smash enough Belgian and French airports to prevent the _Continental Allies from bringing effective aid to England in the event she needs it, during any German attack on the British Isles._ …

The men of the armies with which I am travelling for five days frequently ask me what has happened in the Channel. _They seem to be itching to get over to England._ …

#

WITH THE WESTERN GERMAN ARMIES, MAY 24 [1940]
— Today for the first time since entering the Western zone of operations, I _stand in an airport facing England — location not revealable — only thirty minutes from Britain as a Messerschmitt flies._ In addition to air force and army officers we have also seen naval officers hastening back and forth in this area.
That fact speaks volumes. These men are here for business.

WITH THE WESTERN GERMAN ARMIES, MAY 26 [1940]
— The progress of the German offensive has imbued army leaders with a buoyancy of spirit and a confidence that makes it difficult for an observer to realize that a bitterly fighting Allied army is not far away...

When correspondents entered staff headquarters no effort was made to hide highly significant maps. One commanding general had an enormous map indicating not only how the pincer movement was to work against the Allied forces in northwestern France and Belgium but beyond that how troops were to move in the offensive on England.

He did not bother to remove it as we entered his private workroom. No one seems to care any longer whether the enemy knows the German plans.

At this point, in a footnote, Freifeld comments: “It is difficult to envision High Command officers leaving “highly significant” maps around to be “discovered” by the foreign press. Might it not have been reasonable to assume that these maps were deliberately left lying about in a not-too-subtle campaign of press agentry?”

Five days later, Lochner “gave the whole show away,” as Freifeld put it, in filing the following story:

WITH THE WESTERN GERMAN ARMIES, MAY 31 [1940]
— Talk in army circles is to the effect that Germany appears again to have outwitted her enemies and now seems to be planning a concentric attack on Paris with Italians coming in from the South.

On the Belgian front last week, all the talk was that troops would attempt to land in England first. That has changed. Now one hears that artillery shooting across the narrow Channel and the Nazi dive bombers are to keep England in a state of jitters while Britain’s last prop, France, is being finished.

All signs point to a complete surprise of the French by the Germans.

There was also criticism from peers in Berlin, some from newspaper editors and media critics in the United States and some from anonymous U.S. government sources believed to have originated in the U.S. Embassy in Berlin.
A gossipy letter dated May 8, 1940, from the “head of the Christian Science Monitor’s bureau in Berlin” — who was not identified by name in the correspondence but was at the time Joseph Closer Harsch — to the newspaper’s managing editor in Boston, complained that “Trips, interviews, advance notice of news breaks are all used as bait or reward,” by the Germans, “which has resulted in a demoralization of the American press corps here.”

The letter reached President Franklin D. Roosevelt, according to a June 11, 1940, White House memorandum, via his wife, Eleanor.

“The most glaring single instance of how the system works is a special private press conference held one hour before the general press conference. The special conference is an invitation affair. At it, all the news given out an hour later is given to the favored few giving them an hour beat. ... Those who accept put themselves under obligation to the regime here for the sake of the advantage it gives them over their competitors,” the letter said. “The entire staff of the Propaganda Ministry is under formal instructions to see to it that the AP and INS [International News Service] get all the news well in advance of the UP [United Press].”

“After watching this process in action it is possible to divide the Americans into two groups, those who play the game and write as favorably as they can, and those who respect their integrity and write as honestly as they can,” the letter added. “In the first group are Guido Enderis and his (New York) Times staff (now that [Otto] Tolischus is gone), Louis Lochner and the AP, Pete Huss and the INS (International News Service) and Max Jordan of NBC. ...”

“If one were to probe behind the predicament you would probably discover in the background the demoralizing effect of [AP General Manager] Kent Cooper’s attitude towards his subordinates which I have encountered in several places in Europe,” the writer said. “They are hounded, bullied and badgered in a way which seems almost sadistic, sapping the morale of the organization and driving some of them to such devices as the pitiful plea here to the Propaganda Ministry for even more favors than the very substantial ones already arranged for them.”

In a letter dated Aug. 30, 1940, Lochner wrote Cooper, saying he had heard from various sources “that someone in the American Embassy, I don’t know who it may be, is making reports to the State Department to the effect that I am merely a stooge of the Nazis.” Lochner added:

I have tried conscientiously to hew the line you staked out for me, namely, to tell as much of the truth as is permissible under war and Nazi conditions; never to prevaricate; and to cultivate the best possible relations with the authorities of whatever country I happen to be stationed in, without in any way committing myself to that country’s policies nor letting those relationships becloud my objective vision. Nobody in the Nazi regime suspects me of being a Nazi. I am credited, however, with honesty and integrity, and for that reason am shown confidence.
Lochner told Cooper his official relations with the Nazis were “excellent,” a fact “without which our bureau would perhaps not have been able to function as well as it did,” and continued:

> If I receive favors, it has never yet been due to my trading in principles for favor, but solely to the fact that I have succeeded in selling the authorities the two-fold fact that the Associated Press is neutral and objective, and that it is so powerful an instrument of public information that no government can afford to slight it.

Nevertheless, the following month at Cumberland, Maryland, the Chesapeake Association of The Associated Press (a group representing area newspapers receiving the AP news service) cast a unanimous vote censuring AP’s reporting from Berlin. Comments from the participants included “Lochner’s reports are biased,” “Lochner is spreading Hitler’s views,” and “With due allowance for censorship, I have the impression that Lochner has swallowed Hitler’s propaganda ‘hook, line and sinker.’”

The AP’s chief of bureau in Baltimore, William O. Varn, defended Lochner’s work, saying AP’s man in Berlin had only the German viewpoint to report and that if reports from Berlin proved displeasing to the authorities the correspondent responsible might face expulsion. “The stories there,” he said, “are not censored before leaving the country, as they are in England, but it is a sort of self-censorship that must tell the news and yet pass the German censor who sees copy after transmission.”

Cooper presented these and other criticisms, including a critical article in the Oklahoma City Times, to AP’s board of directors, who unanimously dismissed the allegations. “The Board declared its continued confidence in the foreign staff and in the efforts made to present an unbiased news report,” according to the minutes of the meeting. “The Board viewed with great regret the publication of the article without investigation.”

“Naturally America’s virtual participation in the war has made our lot as American correspondents even more difficult. But we continue to do the best we can,” Lochner wrote Cooper on Feb. 10, 1941, while on vacation in Switzerland. He added:

> We’re always between the devil and the deep sea. To get the official news ahead of the opposition, if possible, we naturally keep nursing our official contacts. But that is a thorn in the flesh of our competitors, who thereupon denounce us as pro-Nazi. On the other hand, I must also keep abreast of numerous opposition currents, just as I took up the contact with Hitler early in the game, when he was in the opposition. Now that he’s in power, of course, his men don’t like it if you mix with men whose sympathies with the regime are, to say the least, doubtful. The only thing to do under the circumstances is to hew to the good old line of
getting the NEWS, wherever and whenever it may be available, and no matter what people think of me.

Criticism of Lochner’s work rose to a new level, in the form of a private letter dated March 15, 1941, from Harold L. Ickes, U.S. Secretary of the Interior, to Frank B. Noyes, of the Washington Star, who served 38 years as president of the AP board of directors. Ickes attached photocopies of a portion of a report showing only pages 8½, 9, 10 and 11 prepared by sources he did not identify but are presumed to have originated from within the U.S. embassy in Berlin.

“I am not vouching for a single fact in the photostatic copy of a communication that I am enclosing,” Ickes wrote. “I know that those who prepared this report are able and sincere men, none of whom, as far as I am aware, has ever been a public critic of our press, even to a small degree.”

But while not vouching for the content of the criticisms, Ickes wrote that he recalled Lochner, an anti-war activist in his youth, was regarded as pro-German during World War I. Ickes wrote: “I realize under what difficulties the American newspaper correspondents must necessarily work in Germany at this time. But I sometimes wonder whether we would not be better off without dispatches from that country if the alternative is to be fed daily doses of arsenical propaganda.”

The report first complained about Lochner’s reporting of Germany’s lightening thrust into Holland, Belgium and France in 1940. It echoed the criticisms raised by the Office of the Coordinator of Information that Lochner had been bamboozled by the Germans. After Lochner assured his readers that “Hitler is not nearly so much interested in Paris as in London,” the Germans turned against France and vanquished it in 43 days, the report said.

A survey of Lochner’s dispatches from the front reveals that he is an easy victim for many a Nazi trap. On June 1, 1940, he added to the confusion by reporting that the Germans said they captured one million Allied prisoners, “not counting the Belgians and the Dutch.” This was such an obvious exaggeration at that time that his home office was compelled to remark [inserted into the story]: “The German estimates probably exceed the total manpower of all the British and French forces in the battles of the Netherlands, Belgium and France. ...”

It was Lochner who was used by the Germans to inform the American public of a letter written by King Leopold III to President Roosevelt, a story used by the Nazis in an obvious attempt at whitewashing the tragic king who then seemed to play the Nazi game.

Lochner also reported that the Belgians were glad when the Germans arrived to liberate them from the British and French “invaders” who looted their communities. In another
dispatch he wrote that the Belgians were calm and seemed to like the German army of occupation, while a few days later he contradicted himself when he admitted that the Belgians “were bitter in their hatred.”

The catalogue of criticism did not end there. AP’s German photo operation was also targeted [see The AP GmbH photo service].

Noyes, in a letter of March 29, 1941, replied that he would forward Ickes’ concerns to AP and its board of directors but shot back a robust private defense of AP’s correspondent in Berlin:

I am not in any sense speaking for the Associated Press but responding to your personal letter let me say that those who prepared the report seem to me to fundamentally misunderstand the mission of The Associated Press and its correspondents, including Lochner. Our duty, as I see it, is to truthfully report the news as it happens. I personally think that Lochner has done a magnificent job in a very difficult situation and I have been proud of his performance. His dispatches during the invasion of Holland, Belgium and France seem to me to have been tragically and prophetically true and the criticisms examples of wishful thinking.

I would have been delighted if our correspondents with the Allied forces instead had been able to have sent reports of Allied successes. I am personally sure that Lochner has not been deceived into sending propaganda save as is done in transmitting official claims.

Cooper, writing to Noyes, thanked him for defending Lochner’s coverage.

“Because of the majority pro-English feelings in this country it is only natural that our boys in Germany who are telling the truth are going to receive the brunt of criticism against the Associated Press,” he wrote. “When it gets so that they cannot tell the truth because of conditions that they confront there or here we might just as well take them all out of Germany.”

On May 9, 1941, AP President Robert McLean wrote Ickes a brief letter to say the AP’s board of directors had been presented with the confidential report and correspondence with Noyes.

“The board heartily echoed Mr. Noyes’ personal representations to you as to his confidence in the operations of the foreign staff and particularly in Louis Lochner’s performance and personal integrity,” McLean wrote. “Upon examination and consideration of the original dispatches and all available material where it was possible to identify the matters referred to, the Board found that the statements in the report were not substantiated by the facts — were, in fact, based on partial and misleading evidence.”

AP Board President Robert McLean, 1942.
In a more expansive letter the same day, McLean wrote Noyes enclosing a copy of his letter to Ickes, saying he believed “the serious charges are those made by Ickes himself,” mentioning Ickes’ remark about being fed “daily doses of arsenical propaganda” and his further charge “that if his (Ickes’) recollection served him correctly he had personally accused Lochner of being pro-German during the last war — leaving the impression that he is still of the same feeling.”

McLean said Cooper presented the original dispatches where they could be found to the Board, which noted that “several of the examples cited in the report were incomplete quotations from the dispatches, one particularly where a phrase was attributed directly to Lochner which in the dispatch was part of a quotation of German military authorities.”

McLean went on to say he was perhaps putting too much emphasis on the matter.

“It is possible that Ickes will consider his letter to you of a purely confidential nature, but I feel that there remains the danger that portions of the report and perhaps his deductions therefrom might be included in some future document perhaps coupled with the statement that the material had been placed before the authorities of The Associated Press and that his conclusions were unchallenged,” he wrote.

“Kent [Cooper], I know, feels that some of these unwarranted and unfair accusations against Lochner have filtered back to Lochner himself and are causing him unhappiness and concern to a degree that is undesirable. In addition, he [Cooper] feels, and I heartily concur, as does the Board, that controversial discussions arising at this time will only aggravate the problem.”

In June of that year, Cooper fended off more criticism from a reader of The New York Times about Lochner’s “blatantly pro-Nazi” reporting, offering his historical perspective.

It is Lochner’s business to report what he sees and in some cases what he is told by the highest authorities. I have confidence that he is honest in reporting what he sees and I have confidence that he accurately quotes the authorities when he carries their statements.

This is the second period of this kind through which I have personally gone. At the time of the anti-German sentiment in this country from 1914 until that sentiment brought us into war in 1917, The Associated Press correspondents who were telling the truth from Germany were denounced as you denounced Lochner and for the same reason, namely that the true reports they gave of the progress of the German attack were unpleasant reading to those biased in favor of the Allies.
Actually, however, in the instance of the year 1940, the reports of our correspondents from Germany have been practically little different from the speeches and announcements of [British Prime Minister] Winston Churchill and Premier [Paul] Reynaud [of France].

Assuring you, first, that Lochner, being a natural born and loyal American as well as a thoroughly experienced Associated Press man, is fully reliable; and, second, even if he were not reliable (which he is) all of his reports pass through the hands of competent editors on the staff here—men who, like Lochner, have been with the Associated Press many, many years and who are as zealous of The Associated Press avoiding bias as you would have them be, I am,

Sincerely yours

Kent Cooper

In response to yet another letter writer, who questioned whether Lochner was American, accused him of being a Nazi and complained that his “gleeful gloating over German successes is repugnant to all decent Americans,” Cooper wrote:

I have yours of May 24, and I assure you that Mr. Lochner is a natural born American, a loyal one, a graduate of the University of Wisconsin, and that he is not a Nazi.

If he had the same opportunity to report a similar advance of the Allies and had used the same words, I am quite confident that you would not have felt he was either an Englishman or a Frenchman.

He was last year’s recipient of the Pulitzer Prize in journalism for the accuracy and impartiality of his correspondence.

Lochner himself addressed the criticism two years later in his book *What About Germany?*

Why did we accept invitations to the front, if we knew that we were taken only when the situation was believed to be favorable? Why risk being called “pro-Nazi” — as indeed many of us were — when we reported truthfully what we saw?

The answer is simple. No foreign correspondent would be worth his salary if he did not look deeper than the surface, if he did not utilize the opportunity of going even on a
“conducted” trip to make observations and studies that might, at a given moment later on, be of service to his own country, if he did not embrace every opportunity to see for himself just what this terrible machine of Hitler’s was that swept everything before it. Certainly, our very able military attaches in Berlin were green with envy at our opportunities to see the Wehrmacht in action. 

On Sept. 26, 1940, Lochner was able to smuggle out a letter to Kent Cooper in New York describing the deteriorating conditions in Berlin following “the longest [British] air raid of the year” the night before.

“I realize, of course, that the men in London are even worse off. These nightly bombings, however, have reduced the efficiency of each and every one of us enormously, and I have to make constant readjustments in our working schedules to afford our staff a minimum of rest. As the raids increase in intensity and duration, the population, ourselves included, gets rawer and rawer nerves. The bombings hit us after a year of exceedingly strenuous work.”

The main subject of his letter, however, was the changed attitude of the authorities towards Americans ever since the Sept. 2 announcement that the United States would provide Britain with 50 mothballed U.S. navy destroyers in exchange for land rights on British possessions.

“Until then we American correspondents were considered the outstanding hope for preventing America’s entry into the war. Now most higher-ups think of America as getting into the fray early next year,” Lochner wrote. He added:

That means that now we American correspondents are already regarded as potential enemies. The result is a marked cooling-off in our relations to the authorities. They no longer give us information freely. They are very cagey in their replies. They call us on the carpet much more frequently in an effort to intimidate us. We are all given a whole list of things we may no longer report as they allegedly constitute military secrets. …

From this changed attitude I must assume that, if and when the United States should ever sever diplomatic relations with Germany, we must face, quite concretely, the problem of what to do about it. It is here that I want your guiding advice especially. 

Are we to leave with the diplomatic and consular mission? Are all of us to remain until war is declared? Are only some of us to remain? If so, who?

In the summer of 1941, Lochner wrote a letter with detailed suggestions on keeping AP’s news operation afloat in Berlin if the United States joined the war against Germany.
Lochner said AP’s American rivals, United Press (UP) and the International News Service (INS), planned to work with third parties from neutral countries in Germany to continue the news flow, UP with a South American newspaper correspondent, INS with the correspondent of Stockholm Tidningen of Sweden.

Lochner recommended to the Germans that the AP GmbH, the AP’s photo subsidiary in Germany, take over the AP news bureau’s assets and provide news to AP.

The best I could do was obtain the binding assurance that if either UP or INS, or both, are permitted through third parties to continue to operate, then the AP will be accorded the same privilege. Furthermore, if the project for having the GmbH run a service does not pan out, then I am to have an opportunity to make an arrangement with a third party, such as some Swiss paper or the Argentine agency.

Lochner said he saw two alternatives:

1. Obtain permission for the AP GmbH to operate a news gathering department which would send news to a neutral agency or newspaper, with the understanding the agency or newspaper in turn would make the news available exclusively to AP.

2. Turn the Berlin news bureau over to some friendly agency or bureau which would utilize AP’s German-born staff to supply a service to The Associated Press via its own home office.

No reply to this letter has been found to date in the AP files, but a very similar proposal would surface after war broke out regarding the AP GmbH. In the meantime, as a precaution, AP secretly arranged with Agencia Assionada Nacional di Informaciones Buenos Aires (Andi Agency) in Argentina to send a reporter to Berlin to cover Germany in the event the Germans closed the AP’s news bureau.

AP used that cover to send one of its best South American reporters, Roman Jimenez, to Berlin to represent AP.

“He has no outward connection whatever with A.P. and you can readily see why complete secrecy about this measure is necessary, since any leak would destroy his utility to A.P. and indirectly to us as an A.P. member,” according to a letter dated Sept. 1, 1941, from Time magazine’s correspondent in Argentina reporting to her headquarters in New York.99
Jimenez arrived in Berlin on Aug. 24, 1944, to establish himself. After Germany declared war on the United States that December and the American news staff was detained, he joined up with the AP news bureau’s German reporters Rudi Josten and R. F. Schildbach as well as two administrative employees. They began filing stories surreptitiously to Buenos Aires for AP.


Jimenez left Berlin sometime in February 1942, and dismissed the remaining AP news employees, paying them three months severance, but Josten continued to send news to the Andi Agency until he received a call from the Propaganda Ministry.90

“One day in June [1942] they said, ‘Herr Josten, why don’t you come to the Propaganda Ministry? We have to talk to you,’” Josten recounted years later.91 “All your messages you sent to Buenos Aires appear in American newspapers. How is that?”

Because of his command of English, Josten escaped serious trouble and ended up monitoring American radio stations and later BBC broadcasts for Transocean, a German news agency, until the end of the war.

As war between Germany and the United States grew inevitable in late 1941, Lochner wrote of another gathering storm, reporting from Berlin on Oct. 27, “Complete elimination of Jews from European life now appears to be fixed German policy.”92

The story described transports moving eastward several times a week carrying Jews from the Rhineland and Westphalia, Berlin, Prague or Vienna.

“The deportees are given several days of warning that they must give up their apartments,” Lochner reported. “Thereafter, at any hour of the day or night they may expect the Gestapo or regular police to call for them. Their homes, with all inventory, are sealed and declared state property.”

Some were being taken to the Government General [unannexed] area of Poland, Lochner wrote, but others were being banished to Riga, occupied capital of Latvia, and Minsk, in the German-occupied Byelorussia Soviet Socialist Republic.

Lochner also reminded readers of Hitler’s remarks in 1939, which he had reported, months before the outbreak of the European war:
“If international finance and Jewry within and outside Europe should succeed once more in plunging the peoples into a world war the result will not be the Bolshevization of Europe and thereby victory of Jewry but annihilation of the Jewish race in Europe.”

It had not yet found its name, but the Holocaust was underway.
3. The AP GmbH Photo Service

“If you cannot put out a picture with a caption that tells honestly what it shows, and thus have to forego certain sales, remember that your honor and integrity as anewspaperman are something never to be exchanged for sales, and that the honor and integrity of the organization you work for is worth more to it and to you than all the money the GmbH will earn for the rest of eternity.”

GIDEON SEYMOUR, MANAGING DIRECTOR, THE ASSOCIATED PRESS OF GREAT BRITAIN, 1936–1937

Louis P. Lochner and his fellow reporters worked from AP’s top floor office at 28 Zimmerstrasse, just two blocks from the Berlin subway station at Kochstrasse, later known as Check Point Charlie.

In its heyday, the news bureau consisted of nine men, seven Americans and two Germans, but Lochner was not just AP’s top news correspondent in Berlin, he was also the reluctant Geshaeftsfuehrer, or managing director, of The Associated Press Gesellschaft mit beschraenkter Haftung (GmbH), AP’s German limited liability company.
The AP GmbH was established in 1931 as a subsidiary of The Associated Press of Great Britain, itself a subsidiary of The Associated Press of New York, established earlier the same year. It sold U.S. and international photos to the state-controlled German media and collected German photos for distribution internationally. After 1933, it, and German media it served, came under the watchful eye of the Propaganda Ministry.

By 1937 it had become a miniature battleground where American free-press values grappled with wily adversaries, Joseph Goebbels's Nazi propaganda apparatus and Germany's restrictive press laws.

The Propaganda Ministry demanded photo captions delivered to the German media reflect a Nazi outlook on events. AP managers in London refused to compromise. German photo editors, subject to harsh penalties under German law if they failed to compromise, were caught in the middle, one pleading at one point: “… don’t you think I should also try to please the authorities occasionally?”

There were management issues, aggravated by financial considerations, and possible conflicts between a New York office eager to expand photo business abroad and a manager in London more focused on maintaining professional editorial standards. Lochner himself was more interested in covering news than overseeing photo sales.

The AP GmbH was part of a major expansion planned by The Associated Press, until then an essentially domestic American news agency, to distribute news and photos internationally, the forerunner of AP's post-war World Services division. AP had launched its news photo service in the United States in 1927.

While the Nazis' rise to power interrupted General Manager Kent Cooper’s plans to distribute AP news in Germany, revenue from the sale of photos to German media helped cover some of the expenses incurred by the news staff based in Berlin. This was especially welcome because AP could not send its photo profits out of the country.

The photo service was located around the corner from the news bureau at 77 Markgrafenstrasse and Lochner made clear on more than one occasion he had little interest in its business.

Modest in size, in 1935 it consisted of a chief photo editor, two photographers, a sales director and accountant, two salespersons, a stenographer, a librarian, two darkroom attendants, three messengers, a telephone operator and a janitress.

“Technically, I was the manager of this company, although it was understood between our head office in New York and myself that I was to be its top executive in name only, my duties as news correspondent being far more important to AP and me,” Lochner wrote years later in his book *Tycoons and Tyrant: German Industry from Hitler to Adenauer.*
Lochner was lamenting the photo operation as far back as 1937, telling Gideon Seymour, “When I look back over the entire period of my having had anything to do with the GmbH, I find that it has been a most thankless task.”

Seymour was the managing director of The Associated Press of Great Britain, which supervised the Berlin photo operation from London and monitored its editorial work on a daily basis. Lochner was forever its nominal manager.

AP appointed Wolf von Schierbrand, a German with news experience in Chicago, St. Louis, and other U.S. cities, as its first correspondent in Germany in 1894. While several other correspondents were scattered in capitals around the globe, much of AP’s international news in the first half of the 20th century came through a cartel news exchange agreement with Reuters of Britain, Havas of France and Wolf of Germany. Photos from outside the United States in the 1930s were obtained from the European photo agency Keystone, among others.

Kent Cooper, AP’s general manager from 1925 to 1948, hoped to break up the cartel arrangement that barred AP from selling its news outside the United States, a humiliating position for AP as a national news cooperative representing some 1,400 newspapers in a rising world power.

Cooper also saw this as a matter of principle, an unhealthy chokehold on the worldwide flow of information, which he railed against at length in his book, Barriers Down: The Story of the News Agency Epoch, published in 1942.

In the early 1930s, he saw an opening to break out and expand AP’s global role through the growing world market for photos.

At the end of March 1931, with an eye to the future, AP announced it was ending its partnership with Keystone in Europe and had acquired Pacific and Atlantic, Ltd., the British-based European branch of the Pacific and Atlantic News Photo Service, which formerly operated in the United States.

AP established The Associated Press of Great Britain, Ltd., on June 2, 1931. A week later, on June 9, 1931, AP established the AP GmbH, which then acquired the Pacific and Atlantic subsidiary in Germany.

In forming the German company, documents were presented by Lochner, then chief of bureau, to the Prussian Court of Justice in Berlin stating the object of the enterprise was:

... to carry out all those business activities in Germany and to follow such aims as the Associated Press of Great Britain, Limited, London, carries out in England, ie., above all the
collection of reliable news of every description in Germany, and the distribution of the same throughout the entire world, as well as the collection of such news from abroad (especially from the Associated Press of Great Britain, Limited) for publication in Germany; furthermore the collection of pictures, drawings, matrixes, clichés, and photographs of all kinds for the same purpose, independent of how such materials are transmitted, whether with or without wire or by any other means of communication. In carrying out these purposes the company may do business on its own account, or may act as agent.99

AP’s photos in the 1930s were collected and distributed internationally by land, sea, air and radio, depending on the photo’s importance. The images were gathered in New York and London, each sharing with the other, and then copied and redistributed to newspapers, magazines and others by mail, radio or, in a few cases still limited to the United States starting in 1935, by AP Wirephoto, a system of transmission over telephone lines.

The London office sent a daily shipment of photos by air to Berlin which were selected, reproduced, re-captioned in German for the German market, and relayed to approximately 90 different daily newspapers and magazines, in Germany, Scandinavia, Switzerland and Italy.100

Berlin, in return, would send German photos to London daily for reproduction and global distribution. When war broke out in Europe in 1939, disrupting this arrangement, the AP GmbH sent prints or negatives or radiophotos to New York instead of London for redistribution.

Subject to approval by the Ministry of Propaganda, AP’s photos could be sold in Germany, but the ministry only allowed photos taken by German photographers, all of whom fell under the Schriftleitergesetz or Editors Law, to be sent outside the country.

The AP GmbH could only employ Germans, all of whom were required by law to be members of the Reich Press Chamber, a sub-organization of the Press Department of the Propaganda Ministry, as described in Chapter 1.

While Lochner and AP’s other American newsmen could joust with the Nazi authorities up to a point over censorship of news and other issues, the plight of AP’s German photo staff in Berlin was another matter.

In 1933, Lochner had been able to avoid demands he dismiss Jewish employees under Hitler’s sweeping anti-Semitic laws.
There were at least six Jewish employees associated with the AP GmbH in Berlin in the 1930s. They included Alfred Eisenstaedt, a freelance photographer; Willi Jacobson, senior staff photographer; Leon Daniel, photo editor; Cecile Kutschuk, photo sales director; Harry Jenkins, another photo editor, whose real surname was Seidenstein, and Lisa Jordan, a photo librarian.

“They are efficient, they are honest, they are splendid characters, they are well educated and speak three or four languages. There is no reason in the world outside of the accident of their having been born Jews that I should fire them,” he wrote his daughter Betty in April 1933. “Well, I’ve simply refused to do so.”

In September, he wrote his daughter that Seidenstein, an Austrian, was to be thrown out of Germany as a reprisal for the ejection of Nazis from Austria.

“You have no idea how much bother these affairs always give,” Lochner wrote. “I must run around to the criminal police, the secret police, the foreign office, the legation or embassy concerned, and talk my head off. The order against poor Seidenstein was finally rescinded when I stated the man was essential to our picture service.”

A letter dated Feb. 27, 1934, from American Consul Raymond H. Geist, to the U.S. State Department in Washington, reported it had been carrying on negotiations “for several months” with the office of Propaganda Minister Joseph Goebbels on AP’s behalf in which it was agreed to seek a “special dispensation” from Goebbels himself for the company’s Jewish employees.

Geist wrote:

The Associated Press G.m.b.H. through its director, Mr. Louis P. Lochner, correspondent of The Associated Press in Berlin, complained to the Consulate General that the operation of the law would require him to throw out of his organization his most experienced men, and that inasmuch as these men had been with the organization for a long time and had rendered very valuable services it was felt that they could not be disposed of in this manner without disrupting the organization. Their knowledge of German was an essential requirement of their work, and if The Associated Press G.m.b.H. had to dispense of their services it was not foreseen from what quarters their successors could be recruited. Mr. Lochner protested that this was tantamount to putting their firm out of business.

A separate letter in November of that year from Consulate General Douglas Jenkins to Hull reports that despite the “apparently lenient attitude” of the Propaganda Ministry, Lochner “now tells me that actually only one Jewish employee was allowed to continue his work, and in his case favorable action resulted from the fact that the man’s father had been killed at the front, rather than from pressure on the part of the Consulate General.”
This is an apparent but unconfirmed reference to the AP GmbH’s chief photographer Willi Jacobson.

But on Aug. 14, 1935, the official SS magazine Das Schwarze Korps (The Black Corps) published an inflammatory article naming all Jewish-German employees working at German photo agencies, including AP, amid calls to boycott those companies.\textsuperscript{106}

The SS or Schutzstaffel was a paramilitary organization and served as the main agency of surveillance and terror in Germany and German-occupied Europe.\textsuperscript{107}

The Scharnberg study of AP’s role in Nazi Germany during this period offers this assessment:

\begin{quote}
Given these attacks and the unofficial boycott, the New York Times decided to close its Berlin image office [Wide World Photos] in 1935. AP, however, backed down. Leon Daniel, Cecile Kutschuk and Alfred Eisenstaedt, AP employees of Jewish descent, had to go into exile in America. Lochner found a job for Jacobson in Vienna.\textsuperscript{108}
\end{quote}

This left AP as the sole foreign agency distributing photos in Germany.

Stanley Thompson, an American supervising the AP GmbH operation at the time, wrote to New York to explain the situation, seemingly oblivious to the plight of the Jewish staffers involved. He noted Das Schwarze Corp “is a good customer of ours, buying mostly foreign pictures but sometimes German ones.”\textsuperscript{109}

Thompson said the article, titled “Off with the Cloak of Invisibility,” made false allegations and that AP had demanded a retraction. “It alleged that Jenkins, mentioning his real name of Seidenstein, is Hauptschriftleiter and that ‘Daniel divides the task with him’ with Kutshuk joining in,” he wrote.\textsuperscript{110}

While it has not been possible to establish the exact nature of the “false allegations,” it is known that Daniel had already left Germany and embarked from France for the United States in June of that year. The records found to date do not make clear who was serving as Hauptschriftleiter at the time.

\begin{quote}
I have seen a proof of the correction which was promised to appear on August 28 and made a correction in it,” Thompson wrote. “The paper promised to print the correction as corrected, and at the same time is printing a two-page series of German pictures from us. If the thing actually appears as I saw it, we will benefit wonderfully, and I have no reason to believe that there will be any slip-up,” he continued. “It is almost impossible to get a correction out of these party papers, and I feel that we did as well as could be hoped for.”\textsuperscript{111}
\end{quote}
But the Nazis were not finished with AP yet.

The subsequent two-page spread of AP photos in Das Schwarz Korps that Thompson apparently was boasting about were photos commissioned from the AP GmbH to discredit a Canadian journalist’s report about poor conditions in a Nazi labor camp for women.

The SS article claimed the Canadian reporter had never visited the camp and that the camp’s inmates were resentful of her allegedly distorted account of their circumstances.112

One obviously staged photo shows women waving clenched fists and farm implements in protest while other images focus on basic Nazi themes of hard work and unity.

The magazine rubbed it in, telling its readers:

> We had all assertions checkout out on the spot and photographed. The pictures were taken by a representative of the American picture firm “Associated Press” — who by the way inform us that on the basis of our publication in the last edition of Das Schwarze Korps of “Off with the Cloak of Invisibility” that chief editors, all editors and the business leadership of the Associated Press GmbH are all Aryan and the Jewish employees named by us have been dismissed.113

Scharnberg points to this episode to illustrate how “from 1935, the Propaganda Ministry had the Berlin AP photo service under its control just as it did the German picture agencies.”114

However, there is some evidence this episode distressed AP’s senior managers in New York, London and Berlin responsible for the GmbH’s work, and later pointed to it as an example not to follow.

The photos in the magazine were credited to Eitel Lange, who Thompson described in a letter dated September 14, 1935, to Lloyd Stratton in New York as “a substitute for [photographer Eric] Borchert while Borchert was working on commission and at the time I sent you a form to cover his addition as an employee effective April 1.”

Thompson was responding to a critical letter from Stratton regarding various administrative anomalies at the AP GmbH that included the remark, “Neither do we know whether Lange was employed. ...”

Both Lange and Thompson left AP within three months of the Schwartz Korps affair, Lochner reporting to New York at the time that Thompson had “proved a failure.”

Lange later worked as personal photographer for Hermann Goering, commander-in-chief of the Luftwaffe and Hitler’s designated successor.
Looking back on the dismissal of Jewish employees, Lochner, wrote in his 1942 book *What About Germany?* “It was a case of conforming with the German laws or closing up shop.”

“It so chanced that our actual [photo] manager [Daniel], our ace photographer [Jacobson] and our efficient sales lady [Kutschuk] who knew her way about in every editorial office, were all three Jewish,” he wrote.

“There was nothing I could do about it but dismiss these three able, faithful employees; and our head office was not ready to renounce its operations in Germany in protest,” Lochner wrote later. “The only thing I could do for them was to help arrange their emigration to the United States, where they have fortunately established themselves well and with our friendship unmarred.”

“Suddenly, a few days after the public denunciation of the AP, Jacobson was given peremptory notice that he had been stricken off the list of news photo operators and that he must return his permit within 24 hours on pain of being arrested,” Lochner wrote Cooper.

Jacobson was transferred to AP’s Vienna office, but three years later was arrested and clapped in prison for months by the Gestapo — as told in detail in Oliver Gramling’s *AP: The Story of News* — after Austria was annexed by Germany in March 1938.

“The combined efforts of the Berlin and Vienna bureaus to bring about his release accomplished nothing and the photographer remained under arrest until the authorities decided to release him,” Gramling wrote.

AP sought permission to transfer him to Prague, but he was eventually taken to Berlin and disappeared, unable under German law to continue working as a journalist.

“The only charge against him was that he was a Jew,” W. F. Brooks, who had replaced Seymour in London as managing director, reported to New York.

His fate during the war has been a mystery ever since, although there is considerable evidence he survived. A photo found in Germany’s Bundesarchiv dated August 1945 shows a bulldozer clearing debris from ruins in Berlin and is credited to Jacobson/Sonnenfeld. It was also recently discovered that more than a dozen photos made in Berlin in 1946 for the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee bear captions crediting the [Willi] Jacobson-[Herbert] Sonnenfeld photo agency. This strongly suggests he survived the war but where and in what circumstances remains unknown. The “Joint” is one of the world’s leading Jewish humanitarian organizations and played a critical role in Jewish relief during and after World War II.

There is also evidence that Jacobson regularly photographed commemoration ceremonies between 1950 and 1957 at the concentration camp for women at Ravensbrueck north of Berlin. A Berlin telephone directory lists a Willi...
Jacobson “bildreporter” or photographer as late as 1957 living in East Berlin at Zellestrasse 10. A photographer of the same name also passed on some photos to the German Historical Museum in former East Germany.

There is no suggestion the German-born Eisenstaedt, who began freelance work for AP in Germany in 1928 and became one of the great photographers of the 20th century, bore any ill will towards AP over his departure from Germany. “I left Germany in November, 1935 and emigrated to the United States,” he wrote. “I was lucky because I was still a free-lancer for the Associated Press, so I found work very soon.” He went on to considerable fame as a photographer for Life magazine.

In his introduction to “Eisenstaedt remembrances” in 2000, Bryan Holme wrote:

Despite his success, Eisie saw more and more clearly that not only was the political climate in Germany deteriorating ominously — in 1933 and 1934, he had photographed with distaste a scowling Joseph Goebbels, ... a goose-stepping Hitler ... and a bombastic Mussolini — but that, from what he had heard, the greatest opportunity for photojournalists now lay in the U.S. in 1935, after several of the best illustrated magazines (in Germany) had folded owing to the rise of Hitler. Eisie finally made up his mind to emigrate. He sailed from Le Havre on the Ile de France, arriving in NY at the end of November.

Both Daniel and Eisenstaedt traveled to the United States in 1935 and co-founded a photo agency in New York named PIX that specialized in helping photographers from Europe get a start in the United States. They were later joined by Kutschuk, who became treasurer, and Jordan. The photo agency survived until 1969 when Daniel retired.

The pressures on the German staff of the AP GmbH to conform to the Nazis’ worldview mounted as civil war broke out in Spain in 1936, a proxy struggle for the later conflict between Germany and the Soviet Union. German employees, especially Rudolf “Rudi” Josten, the Haupschriftleiter, or chief photo editor, found themselves increasingly caught in a vice, squeezed between an American news agency seeking to report world affairs as impartially as it could and Nazi propagandists armed with legal cudgels demanding their views take precedence.

Josten, hired in 1925 as an editorial assistant in the Berlin news bureau, grew into the role of a reporter trusted with important stories and was placed on AP’s New York payroll. He helped cover the Blood Purge in Silesia in 1934 and

Rudolf Josten, who worked as a reporter and briefly as a photo editor in the AP Berlin bureau during the 1930s. This photo was taken in 1965.
AP PHOTO
German stories on Richard Hauptmann in the Lindbergh kidnapping case in 1935, among others, and later in his career, after an unhappy stint as a photo caption writer at the AP GmbH, the March 1938 Annexation of Austria and the September 1938 Annexation of the Sudetenland.

In 1936, Josten was transferred to the AP GmbH photo desk from the news bureau, “a stop-gap appointment, a better man not having been available at the time,” as Wilson Hicks in the New York photo department put it in a memo to Lloyd Stratton. He replaced Thompson, assigned to Berlin from New York in 1934, who had presided over the disastrous “Das Schwarze Korps” affair.

Under the Editor’s Law, editors were required to keep out of the media anything critical that could weaken the German Reich externally or internally, says historian Scharnberg.

“Accordingly,” she writes, “their loyalty to nation, government and Fuehrer had to exceed their loyalty to their employer” and AP GmbH photographers and editors “were at risk of occupational bans, honor trials and imprisonment should they fall in disgrace at the Propaganda Ministry.”

Josten himself had his doubts about the appointment. He said his wife and friends told him, “It’s dangerous. You’ve been so Americanized, and you have so many American friends. The Nazis, they will … they will cause difficulty … and they did, actually.”

One day Josten was summoned to the Propaganda Ministry to discuss his work.

Josten gave this account in 1997, at the age of 91, for AP’s oral history program, illustrating how the ministry wanted photos that would serve its anti-Soviet views and how it pressured people to get its way:

Then one day I was called into the Propaganda Ministry and they said, “Well, you’re a communist.” I said “How, how come, why?” “Well, the way you work and the way — we want pictures from you [the AP], and, and, especially from the Soviet Union. We want pictures of the poor people in Moscow, the beggars and so forth, and you can’t deliver them.” And then they said, “Well, why don’t you take a trip to Moscow? We’ll pay for it for them” [For AP]. I don’t want to be caught by the GPU (The Soviet secret police) (laughs) and taken as a spy. So from that day on I simply couldn’t work any longer. And then I, I finally said to the [AP’s] legal office, “Just see to it that I get back into the newsroom. I simply can’t get along.” And they also called me — I also had difficulties you know with my family because my grandmother, her name was Wolf. And any of these animal names in Germany were sort of — well, they weren’t liked. They all said. “Well these animals are Jews.” And I could not
— I simply couldn't produce any documents from my great grandfather that he was baptized and that he was normally a Protestant. So I finally got out [of photo work] ... then I got back into the news.126

The Propaganda Ministry seemed generally far more concerned about — and imposed direct controls upon — photos and photo captions being delivered daily to German media than news stories sent to media abroad.

As a result, AP's efforts to maintain basic editorial standards led to a classic, prolonged exchange of letters with Josten that put into sharp contrast the missions of The Associated Press and the Ministry of Propaganda.

Germany and Italy supported the Spanish fascist coup leader Gen. Francisco Franco, who sought to overthrow the country's leftist but democratically elected government. The Spanish government was supported by the Soviet Union and anti-fascist volunteers from many countries, including the United States.

The AP London package of photos sent to Berlin Nov. 6, 1936, for redistribution to clients in Germany included a news photo showing the scene at a Madrid morgue after an air raid by forces loyal to Franco.

The London caption described the photo this way:

Madrid, Oct. 31 — Insurgent bombers flying high over this city yesterday carried out the worst air raid on the capital since the start of the civil war. In all, 95 lives were lost. Bombs fell in busy streets and one wrecked a school killing 70 children. Associated Press photo shows a view of the Madrid morgue on Oct. 31, after an air raid the previous day. This picture was issued by the Madrid ministry of state to show the results of the rebel air raid on Madrid.

The AP GmbH photo desk, relaying the photo to its subscribers, attached a caption in German which said: "Horrors of the civil war — Thousands of innocent victims have already been claimed by the frightful Spanish Civil War, into which the irresponsible Communistic wire-pullers have plunged the country."

This did not quite blame the deaths on the leftist government but said it was to blame for the "frightful" civil war itself.

The photo subsequently appeared in the Muenchner Neuesten Nachrichten with a third caption of its own that simply reversed the blame for the carnage: "Mercilessly killed by the Reds — This frightful picture presented itself to the national troops advancing on Madrid in a suburb of the Spanish capital. The Reds had previously killed all the hostages who were in their power."
Both captions drew a sharp rebuke from Seymour in London who wrote Josten Nov. 17, with copies to Lochner and Stratton in New York.

“Obviously we do not and you cannot assume responsibility for the distortion of a caption by the Muenchner Neuesten Nachrichten, but in this case the AP GmbH itself is much more gravely at fault than the Muenchen paper,” Seymour wrote.

Now let us get straight to the point once and for all: If you cannot issue pictures with honest captions do not issue them at all. I know German newspapers are not interested in scenes of the loss of life caused by Franco’s bombing planes, because German sympathy is entirely for Franco. But that is absolutely no excuse for using the picture with a caption which attempts to fix it up for Germany by leaving out the truth and attributing the war to “irresponsible Communistic wire-pullers.”

If you cannot put out a picture with a caption that tells honestly what it shows, and thus have to forego certain sales, remember that your honor and integrity as a newspaperman are something never to be exchanged for sales, and that the honor and integrity of the organization you work for is worth more to it and to you than all the money the GmbH will earn for the rest of eternity. Please tell me, with a copy to Mr. Stratton, who wrote this caption and let us have your assurance that the injunction against this despicable sort of propaganda is understood and will be obeyed. It is extremely disheartening to have such dishonest caption-writing recur so soon after the Schwarze Korps affair which you assured us would not have happened had you not been on vacation.

Lochner, writing to Seymour on Nov. 19 about this “disheartening” experience, says Josten told him “the Propaganda Ministry simply ordered him to write such a caption.” Lochner said he told Josten that “in future we shall in such a case withdraw the picture and not permit its use in Germany. Either we can put out a correct caption or we don’t propose to make our material available.”

“Josten then argued that he might have difficulties because he is a German Hauptschriftleiter,” Lochner added. “I told him that I understand the property rights in pictures of this sort to be vested in the bureau which took the pictures, in this case apparently the London bureau, and that in such a case, I, as representative of the Associated Press of Great Britain Ltd., would not hesitate to withhold the pictures. Josten could put all the blame on me.”

Not satisfied, Seymour replies to Lochner on Nov. 20 demanding a confidential and “scrupulously veracious account” from Josten with a copy to Stratton in New York, “relating just exactly the circumstances under which the propaganda ministry ‘ordered him’ to write such a caption, with any remarks on previous similar ‘orders’ and the general policy or practice of the Propaganda Ministry in this respect.”
Seymour then wrote Lochner, zeroing in on the fundamental issue: Should AP close down its photo service in Germany in order to maintain its integrity?

I know Josten will be completely candid with us in writing such a memorandum and will not place on the propaganda ministry directly or by inference any responsibility for the caption which does not belong squarely there; for if it was an overzealous slip on Josten’s part it can be forgiven and the experience will help him guard against repetition, but if he did what he did, knowing it to be wrong, under the compulsion of the propaganda ministry, that bears very vitally on whether we can operate in Germany with integrity. If the propaganda ministry gave such instructions, Josten should have insisted for his own protection on having them in writing. But was there actually any such explicit instruction? We can understand and tolerate, even if we do not like, the government’s telling us what pictures we cannot distribute in Germany or even, in extraordinary instances, what we cannot say in the captions under them. But if the government can tell us what we must put out, and what we must say in captions, that is quite a different matter and we cannot tolerate it for a minute. If there is no alternative to toleration but closure, I fear the answer must be closure.

Josten then proceeded to offer Seymour two contradictory and confusing accounts.

In a letter dated Nov. 21, he said the offending photo arrived without a caption and he proceeded to write the caption “Horrors of War” based on a caption of a similar photo published in a Berlin newspaper the day before.

“Our picture being much superior to the one that appeared 24 hours earlier was widely used and I am sorry to say that the editors interpreted the morgue scene according to their own ideas and brushed it up as they seemed fit for their readers,” he added.

Josten said that other photo packages also had arrived in Berlin without captions, a point Seymour, in his response of Nov. 24, said he found “hard to believe” and “did not square” with Josten’s earlier assertion, reported by Lochner, that the Propaganda Ministry compelled issuance of the picture with the objectionable caption.

Seymour further complained that the absence of a caption was no excuse for Josten to conjure up one of his own without knowing what the photo showed when he could have messaged London by wire for one.

“You know surely,” Seymour admonished Josten, “that the fact that the same picture from another service had appeared under a caption you realized was objectionable, was double reason for you to issue it, if at all, under a correct caption and an honest one.”
Josten’s second account of events, mailed to Seymour on Nov. 27, says he was “overzealous” in writing the offending caption after the authorities brought the similar photo that had appeared the day before to his attention.

“Here I must admit that I fell for the indirect hint of the authorities and wrote that caption but afterwards qualms of conscience induced me to withdraw the picture,” he wrote. “Mysteriously or not, one print must have escaped my attention and days later it developed that this one wrongly captioned picture had again been used by the Sherl publishing company.” He added: “I hope that this will close the correspondence of this unpleasant matter because, believe me, I feel very unhappy about it.”

As 1936 neared an end, Lochner wrote on Dec. 11 to Stratton and Seymour in Josten’s defense, recalling Josten’s first explanation was that he was “ordered” to write the caption.

“The reply did not seem unreasonable, because I am acquainted with the German practice of ordering editors and caption writers to do certain things,” Lochner wrote. “On the news side they are often instructed even how the headlines must read, so that every paper in Germany carries the same monotonous headline.”

Lochner said when he questioned Josten further on the matter he conceded that there was not an actual “order” to write thus-and-so, but a “request.”

“In Josten’s support,” wrote Lochner, “I will say that in general practice a ‘request’ from the Propaganda Ministry is regarded by German writers as a command. Were Josten on a German newspaper he would probably find himself out of a job the next day if he did not yield to such a ‘request.’”

Lochner said he told Josten in future to tell the Propaganda Ministry he had no authority to satisfy such requests because they involve AP policy and they should go to Lochner himself.

“Mind you I am not thereby trying to relieve Josten of responsibility vis-à-vis the AP, but merely vis-à-vis the German authorities, who can take measures against Josten as a German citizen that they cannot take against me as an American,” Lochner wrote.

He said a recent incident involving the bombing of the palace of the Duke of Alba in Spain by Franco’s forces supported this approach.

“The Propaganda Ministry was ready to have these pictures appear in Germany, but ‘requested’ that our captions giving a correct version of what happened be changed into something to the effect that Bolshevist looters had invaded and destroyed the palace,” he wrote. “Josten consulted me on this ‘request’ and I simply withdrew the pictures from the German market. Nothing has happened since.”
Lochner concluded that the caption controversy was a “costly and regrettable but effective lesson for Josten who, I believe, got this matter under his skin so thoroughly that we need not fear a repetition.”

On Dec. 7, Seymour sent Stratton a blistering assessment of Lochner’s managerial skills involving the GmbH and Josten’s work as chief photo editor.

Seymour wrote that Lochner’s counsel was valuable on questions of policy but that he was “uninformed and erratic” when it came to operational matters. Seymour complained that Lochner “has let us go astray repeatedly on rather vital GmbH matters” and concluded “the more completely he can be disassociated from the GmbH company, except to be ‘on call’ for advice to London and New York, the better for it, us and him.” Seymour made clear he was referring to Lochner’s relations with the GmbH and not the news bureau.

In the same letter, Seymour describes Josten as “conscientious and plodding but without much display so far of any aptitude for news photo work or of aggressiveness, ideas and punch.” And, in a reference to the Propaganda Ministry, Josten “Generally takes no for an answer.”

[Lochner] has groped his way without much effectiveness in the Haupschriftleitership. How fully these handicaps will be surmounted by the guidance and prodding of London remains to be seen; I am not too sanguine. Lochner will take him back if we decide the German company doesn’t want to keep him. Probably misled by the Thompson example, he was too ensconced in an office too far out of the current either of Berlin news photo or news activities, to know what was going on in either; even dictating his captions to a stenographer who took them down in shorthand and stenciled them. I told him to take off his coat, roll up his sleeves and get into the news photo business.

On Christmas Eve, Seymour wrote to Josten proposing to “close the file” on the Madrid caption matter, but, he concluded, “I know less now about what actually happened, and why, than I did at the start.”

That same day, following an eight-day visit to Berlin, Seymour also wrote a lengthy letter to Stratton in New York describing AP’s relationship with the Ministry of Propaganda and the ministry’s oversight of the media.

Seymour said it was his understanding the ministry reserves in principle the right to pass on every picture brought into or sent out of the country for publication but only exercises that right in cases where it wishes to pass judgment.

In most cases, he said, when the ministry issues permits to the AP GmbH to cover a German story, or where no permits are necessary, it’s assumed any pictures made may be exported without a stamp of approval.
Seymour said that while he was visiting the Berlin office, Josten was notified by the Propaganda Ministry by telephone, followed by a form notice by mail, that all pictures from Spain, Austria and Italy must be submitted for approval until further notice.

“This is why smartness and integrity in a Hauptschriftleiter are equally essential in dealing with the Propaganda Ministry,” he concluded. “The Hauptschriftleiter must have the wit and aggressiveness to get worthwhile pictures approved for publication without bartering away the honesty of captions in return for the publication privilege, and this is largely a matter of personal contact and personality in many borderline cases where the ministry is inclined to say so [sic].”

Two days earlier, in New York, a memo to Stratton from Hicks in New York’s photo department suggested “limited managerial powers should be vested in the Hauptschriftleiter” in Berlin and Josten “obviously is not the man to continue in this post.” There was, however, no easy solution.

In February of 1937, in a letter to Stanton, Seymour raises and rejects the possibility of returning Josten to the news department, appointing a new Hauptschriftleiter and possibly increasing supervision of Berlin’s photo operation by transferring Seymour’s deputy in London, Thomas Sears, an American, to Berlin as Geschäftsführer of the GmbH, relieving Lochner of the job.

“The only place to put a non-German in the GmbH, which we need, is in the post of Geschäftsführer, since we cannot employ a non-German as a Hauptschriftleiter or below,” he wrote. “In the present setup there is not enough work to keep a fulltime Geschäftsführer busy unless he makes a figurehead out of the Hauptschriftleiter, and the German company is in no position to carry an additional salary of say 750 marks monthly.”

Fiorello La Guardia, New York’s flamboyant mayor, would bring things to a head.

On March 3, 1937, La Guardia provoked a storm of protest in Germany after he suggested at a luncheon of the women’s division of the American Jewish Congress that the 1939 New York World’s Fair have a chamber of horrors in which a European political figure he described as “that brown shirked fanatic who is menacing the peace of the world” would be the chief exhibit.

Born in New York City to an Italian father and an Italian-Jewish mother, the sharp-tongued mayor did not stress his Jewish heritage but was a persistent critic of Nazi Germany. He had earlier denounced Hitler as “a perverted maniac,” taken part in a mock trial of the German leader at Madison Square.
Garden and urged Americans to boycott German goods.¹²eight

The speech was big news in Germany, where the papers assailed La Guardia. The severest attack came from Der Angriff, published by Goebbels, which printed the mayor's picture under the caption “Scoundrel La Guardia” and called him a “lout” and an “impudent Jew.”¹²nine

Berlin demanded and won an oral apology from Washington.

“In this country the right of freedom of speech is guaranteed by the Constitution to every citizen and is cherished as a part of the national heritage,” James. C. Dunn, chief of Western European Affairs at the U.S. State Department was quoted as telling Dr. Hans Thomsen, counselor of the German Embassy. “This, however, does not lessen the regret of the government when utterances either by private citizens or by public officials speaking in an individual capacity give offense to a government with which we have official relations.”³³zero

Once again the spotlight turned on the difficult and precarious position in which German citizens working for the AP GmbH photo service under Nazi rule found themselves. Once again, it involved Josten.

On March 5, a stock photo of La Guardia was issued for distribution to the German press by the AP GmbH with a German caption that described the mayor as “shameful” (unruhmlich) and described his talk as “a diatribe” (Hetzrede).

Copies of all photos and captions distributed in Germany went to London. An angry Seymour shot off a memorandum to Josten, marking in Lochner and Stratton, questioning the La Guardia caption.

“Why ‘hetzt’ [sic] instead of ‘spricht’ (talk). Why ‘Hetzrede’ (diatribe) instead of “Rede’ (speech)? Why ‘unruhmlich’ (shameful)? You and I talked about the La Guardia anti-Hitler incident March 4, and I asked you if you had put out a good speaking pose of La Guardia and you said you preferred not to, even though I pointed out there was no objection to your doing so over a factually honest caption.

“Why you should have put out belatedly a La Guardia stock picture with such a biased and poisoned caption as this, when there was no call to do anything but say something like, ‘This is Mayor Fiorello La Guardia of New York whose attack on Der Fuehrer has evoked an apology by the United States to the German government,’ is a mystery to me. “Are you unable to avoid scurrilous captions, or are you unwilling?”

Josten promptly replied, asking Seymour to recall “the conversation we had confidentially on situations which might arise and on the wishes of the authorities.”
Apparently, to avoid a clash with the Propaganda Ministry, Josten initially opted not to distribute the La Guardia photo in Germany at all, but the ministry insisted.

“You know that I refused to send the picture out when we spoke about it,” Josten wrote, mailing copies to Stratton and Lochner. “The caption was biased, yes, and you will agree that it would certainly not do any harm if it was sent out to our German clients only. They (the media) had similar but stronger orders. Believe me, it’s not fun to be under two fires, but don’t you think I should also try to please the authorities occasionally?”

Seymour’s response, while noting the pressures under which Josten worked, was uncompromising, complaining that “if the La Guardia caption to which we objected appeared on pictures sent to papers outside Germany — as I assume it did as the objectionable caption was on the picture I received here — there was no excuse for that even conceding, as we cannot, that you had to serve it to German papers under such a caption.”

Josten’s troubles escalated in an incident soon thereafter involving another photo from Spain that Lochner reported to Seymour and Stratton in a letter March 25 was a “patent illustration this morning of how difficult the work is at times for the Hauptshriftleiter.”

Lochner said Josten brought him the following caption and asked him whether there was anything the matter with it.

Madrid claims more advances on Franco’s forces.

Latest pictures of Gen. Miaja, Commander of the Madrid forces.

Madrid, Spain, March 20, 1937 — According to reports from the Madrid defense, commanded by General Jose Miaja, it is meeting with considerable success in driving back the nationalist and Italian besiegers.

Associated Press photo shows: One of the latest pictures of General Jose Miaja, commander of the Madrid defense forces, working at his desk at his headquarters in the capital.

Lochner said he studied the caption and found it to be “a typical example of our neutrality in matters affecting the Spanish crisis,” but added that Josten was phoned by the Propaganda Ministry’s Heiner Kurtzbein, who asked Josten how he dared put out a picture with such a caption.

“He (Kurzbein) said it is the worst kind of anti-German propaganda that any Hauptschriftleiter could indulge in and Rudi would not only hear in writing from the authorities, but would probably be summoned before the journalists court,” Lochner wrote.
“As is usual in these cases, I don’t think the consequences will be as serious as Kurzbein in his first fury indicated,” Lochner said. “Naturally it made Josten as a German citizen feel uncomfortable.”

Seymour replied, wondering why Josten had not omitted reference to “reports from the Madrid defense [of] considerable success in driving back the nationalist and Italian besiegers” and simply issued the picture showing “one of the latest of General Jose Miaja, commander of the Madrid defense forces working at his desk at his headquarters in the capital.”

“I know the Hauptschriftleiter in Berlin is often in a tight spot and we have every sympathy for him — and for every other picture editor in London, New York or wherever else, who is almost routinely caught between what he would like to do and what official or unofficial conditions will not let him do,” Seymour concluded. “But I still think ordinarily intelligent quick-wittedness will avoid such embroilments in 999 cases out of a thousand, and would have in this case.”

On April 6, Seymour wrote Stratton that he and Lochner jointly recommended Josten be returned to the AP’s news bureau in Berlin and his Hauptschriftleiter position at the AP GmbH be filled by Guenther O. Beukert, a German reporter in the news bureau. Beukert took over May 3, 1937.

The time had come, Seymour told Stratton, after he and Lochner had considered various options, “when the Hauptschriftleiter must be, subject to Lochner’s and my supervision of personnel and general administration, an operating manager and coordinator of production, sales and fiscal affairs of the department. For this task Josten is not the man.”

Beukert is recommended as Josten’s successor in the AP GmbH after long consideration of whether Josten himself could be trained to the job the Hauptschriftleiter must do; whether another in the AP GmbH could be put in the post; whether an outsider with sound news photo training could be brought in; or whether a man without news photo experience but with other qualifications for the post could best be developed into the operating head our news photo enterprise in Berlin must have. The last solution is agree on by Lochner and me, and is the one we always have come back to after approaching the matter from every angle and viewpoint over five months of study, chiefly because Beukert is available for the post.

He is young, unmarried, intelligent, ideaful [sic], energetic, understands The Associated Press and has a proper viewpoint towards the conditions amid which he must work and a personality capable of aggressiveness without impertinence in representation of the company in official circles.
Seymour added that Beukert might succeed where Josten did not because “two-thirds of his staff have had two strikes on Josten whenever he entered the darkroom or the photographers’ room or the salesmen’s room because he didn’t know what they did or how or why.”

Lochner’s immediate concern was whether Beukert would be acceptable to the Propaganda Ministry. “We’d be in a pretty mess if, after the whole arrangement was perfect, we suddenly had difficulties with the Propaganda Ministry and its subsidiary, the Reichspressekammer,” he wrote Seymour. There is no record of any objection from the ministry.

However, Beukert, in his first letter to Seymour, prior to his appointment, raised the same concerns faced by Josten. “I do not think that I need to point out to you the difficulties, handicaps and personal dangers which are attached to the position of Hauptschriftleiter in Germany under the present regime,” he wrote. “It is only to point out the additional strain under which editors under German jurisdiction have to work, as compared to their colleagues abroad.”

“I am fully aware of the responsibility which I am prepared to shoulder to meet the American and foreign requirements and simultaneously pilot a smooth course in Germany without harming AP principles, and American interests or the business,” he added.

Expressing concern about his future, he added: “Should circumstances, which can never be foreseen in a dictatorship country like Germany, ever force us to shut down the picture department to a mere picture service for abroad — which I neither believe or hope — I wish to be given the chance to return to the news side.”

In June of 1937, Lochner reported to Seymour that the Propaganda Ministry had pronounced that although an American and Geschaeftsuehrer of the AP GmbH, he [Lochner] was not exempt from the provision under which anyone associated with the ministry must produce evidence of Aryan descent back to his great-grandparents.

“Infuriated at this manifestation of racial discrimination, I asked my superiors what to do,” Lochner wrote in his book Tycoons and Tyrant written in 1954. “They replied that, so long as the anti-Semitic decrees of the present German government were the law of the land, and since our picture section was a German company, I must comply.”

Lochner then raised the possibility of discarding his status as Geschaeftsuehrer and turning the title over to Beukert, but told Seymour he was cautioned by fellow AP reporter Wade Werner that such a move would mean the entire AP
GmbH photo operation would be made up of German nationals under the control of the Propaganda Ministry.

“But I leave this to Stratton and you,” Lochner wrote. “If it is in the cards that I am to be relieved of all connection with the GmbH then now is the time to do it before I have become so steeped in climbing the various branches of my family tree that I may be lost in the foliage.”

Seymour replied there was no intention of ever making Beukert Geshaeftsfuehrer of the GmbH “however completely he is able to relieve you of routine and correspondence in connection with the company.”

He went on:

So in reply to yours of June 11, you’d better get the Wisconsin clerks of courts, their Bavarian counterparts and the corresponding ecclesiastical authorities to rummaging in the records of the Lochner forebears [sic]! That ought not to be a very strenuous task in the case of an old blown-in-the-bottle 1584 Nurnberger like you. As your third paragraph brings out, the Geshaeftsfuehrer must always be, while acceptable to the Third Reich, a non-subject thereof and a man linked directly to the GmbH parents companies (in London and New York); and in principle and practice it is desirable to have a Geshaeftsfuehrer who can counsel and broadly supervise without being expected to crawl into the bowels of the machinery with an oil can every time a bearing squeaks. Heil Hitler.

The next day, Lochner advised Seymour the “erudite investigations” about his family tree had started. “As the Nazi ban is on Jewish blood only, but not on gorillas, I do not fear the outcome,” he said.

Lochner remained defensive regarding the photo operation for years.

In December 1940, told by a fellow AP correspondent while he was visiting Budapest of unhappiness in New York about biased photo captions arriving from Germany, he wrote Kent Cooper:

The men in our picture department are, of course, in no enviable position. They must write the sort of caption that is demanded of them. And they have as their “boss” in the ministry a man devoid of all vision and of all knowledge of foreign countries. When I get back to my post [from Budapest] I’ll have to go over the head of this man and to his superior, whom I know very well and who understands the foreign point of view. I shall argue with him that if he wants any pictures whatever to go out of his country, he simply MUST permit the captions to be neutral — and I know he is anxious for picture publicity in the U.S.A.
There is little about Beukert in AP’s remaining files from the period. Scharnberg provides an illuminating account of an interview with him published in 1983 in which he spoke about AP’s photo coverage of Kristallnacht on Nov. 9, 1938, and how, to reassure staff photographers, he had sought and obtained permission from the Propaganda Ministry to cover events.132

Also known as the Night of Broken Glass, Kristallnacht refers to an organized nationwide attack by SA paramilitary forces and German civilians over two days in which at least 91 Jews were killed, some 250 synagogues were burned and over 7,000 Jewish businesses were trashed and looted. Subsequently, 30,000 Jewish men were detained and taken to concentration camps. The name Kristallnacht comes from the shards of broken glass from smashed store windows that littered the streets.

Scharnberg says some AP photographers were arrested, some more than once, and the following morning Beukert said he picked out the most “harmless” photos to send to London to assure approval by the Propaganda Ministry. He obtained a verbal release, but when word circulated AP had photos of Kristallnacht to offer its subscribers, Beukert got a call from the head of the Propaganda Ministry’s photo section. “Oh boy, did I get a shouting,” he said, but nothing came of it.133

Beukert’s characterization notwithstanding, the AP GmbH’s photos of a burning Berlin synagogue134 and broken storefront windows135 along with AP’s news stories were widely displayed in U.S. newspapers on Nov. 12. Three days later, the U.S. State Department recalled Ambassador Hugh Wilson to Washington in protest.

“In the weeks following Kristallnacht, close to 1,000 different editorials were published on the topic,” wrote Deborah E. Lipstadt, an Emory University history professor and a board member of the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, in her book Beyond Belief: The American Press & the Coming of the Holocaust 1933–1945. She said virtually every paper listed in the Press Information Bulletin, the White House’s barometer of press opinion,136 carried a series of news stories and editorials on the subject.137

“For over three weeks following the outbreak, eyewitness reports from Germany could be found on the front pages of numerous papers,” she wrote. “Practically no American newspaper, irrespective of size, circulation, location or political inclination failed to condemn Germany.”138
Beukert was dismissed from AP in April 1939, and Scharnberg says he became chief editor of the photo agency of Heinrich Hoffmann, Hitler’s personal photographer. After war broke out in Europe in September that year, the former chief editor of AP photos resurfaced as a German government censor of war photos.139

W.F. Brooks, who replaced Seymour as managing director in London in 1937, reported Beukert’s dismissal to Stratton in New York, saying that “The crowning incident was Beukert’s ignoring of messages and letters from cameraman [Franz] Roth, waiting outside Madrid for the city to fall, asking for additional film,” and that “arrangements are being made for Gerhard Meixner to assume the Hauptschriftleiter position temporarily.” One internal reference suggests Meixner held the position as late as 1940, as does a critical report forwarded to AP management regarding alleged Nazi sympathizers working for the AP GmbH and criticism of the photo coverage of Germany’s invasion of France as Nazi propaganda [see New York Photos – the gatekeepers].

Seymour’s assessment of Meixner in 1936 was mixed, seeing him as “a topnotch salesman in the German market, with vigor and dash” yet “highly erratic and irresponsible in editorial judgment and dangerous to leave on the desk, even on Sundays, Josten’s day off.”

Seymour told Stratton in New York, “His highest ambition is to become a Hauptschriftleiter, but I can’t see him in such a post with us for five minutes unless training by some competent superior not now in sight rids him of his hare-brained inspirations which make him a risk as a desk man but a fine salesman if his material and ideas are passed upon by a sound newsphoto editor.”

Seymour resigned from AP on Aug. 11, 1937 and, after a brief time with Look Magazine, would go on to serve as vice president and executive editor of the Minneapolis Star Tribune.

No explanation of his departure has come to light, but in scouring AP’s surviving records of the period he does emerge as the most vocal champion of journalistic principles, the most ardent adversary of the Ministry of Propaganda in Germany and the only critic of Lochner’s performance as Geschaeftsftuehrer.

This may not have sat well with executives in New York keen on making the AP GmbH a successful financial venture and hungry for photos.
A revealing letter to Lochner from Kent Cooper in December 1938 regarding an unspecified proposal by the German government to the GmbH sheds some considerable light on the views of AP’s top management at the time.

Lochner originally sent the proposal to Stratton. To this date, the subject of the “suggestion,” which Lochner warned against, has not been established. Cooper also sent a copy of his letter to Brooks in London.

“We will want to give consideration to the suggestion for the reason that it is a suggestion to AP GmbH which is a German company,” Cooper wrote. “If that company complied it might get a great deal of business that it does not now get. It might even get the benediction of German officials. After all that company in Germany is a German company.”

Cooper then goes on:

I would not want the contract relation that The Associated Press of New York has with it [the AP GmbH] to militate against its success any more than I would want its refusal [to accept the German proposal] to militate against the news collection service of The Associated Press of New York. My own reaction is that even The Associated Press of New York is better off in Germany if it uses its good offices with the German company [AP GmbH] to bring the practices of the German company [AP GmbH] in harmony with the suggestions of the German government.

Far from seeing the fear that you see in it, I confess I see a step that can consistently be taken and one that if refused might be construed as insolence [on the part of the AP GmbH] all of which might ultimately react unfavorably towards the German company’s ally, The Associated Press of New York, which has no business whatever in Germany, does not intend to have any and stands only in position as a news correspondent of The Associated Press of New York.

I have long wished that the German company [AP GmbH] might have at its head a competent German so that an American citizen like yourself need not lend his name to the German company as Geschaeftsfuehrer.

The reference by Cooper to having long wished a German could be made Geschaeftsfuehrer of the GmbH suggests that may have been at the heart of the proposal and, if so, would most likely have referred to Willy Brandt, then the AP GmbH’s business manager.

Lochner, rejecting a critical assessment of Brandt by U.S. military authorities in 1946, writes that in 1937 Nazi authorities insisted that Lochner, until then manager of the GmbH, relinquish his position because he was a foreigner and Lochner consequently recommended Brandt be appointed Geschaeftsfuehrer.
In 1939, just a month after war broke out in Europe, a letter from Cooper to Brooks in London about the AP GmbH’s future says: “It was agreed that Brandt should be appointed Geschäftsführer — an action we thought had been taken long since.” There is no further clarification.

Cooper’s letter is astonishing by today’s standards in several respects, but especially in the suggestion that the Associated Press might want to bring the practices of its subsidiaries “in harmony” with the suggestions of a foreign government.

Equally disturbing is the idea that The Associated Press of New York would seek “the benediction of German officials” or any other officials in its pursuit of news, or, as implied, that the journalistic principles and practices espoused by the mother company in New York need not apply at its foreign subsidiaries.

Finally, it seems disingenuous to say that The Associated Press of New York has “no business whatever in Germany” when its subsidiary’s profits from photo sales were being used to defray AP’s news coverage costs in Germany. In fact, on June 27, 1939, Lloyd Stratton, summing up the financial situation without specifics, wrote: “AP GmbH has given a remarkable performance in the last three years and all of us are deeply grateful to everyone responsible for it.”

When Beukert was appointed

Hauptschriftleiter in 1937, Willy Brandt was appointed office manager, a new title, and he quickly emerged as the critical leader of the AP GmbH.

First hired on a trial basis in 1934, Brandt joined the permanent staff in 1936 as the AP GmbH’s bookkeeper and cashier. Seymour in London was highly impressed with his work:

“He knows his complicated books backward and forward; I lay awake nights trying to think up questions he couldn’t answer about German finances, and couldn’t stump him. More able to help than Lochner or Josten in giving me an accurate fiscal picture of the AP GmbH and to interpret it. No news sense but an excellent understanding of what his bookkeeping job entails,” Seymour wrote to Stratton. “He is conscientious, thorough, a trained bookkeeper and equal to his hard job and to additional responsibilities for holding AP GmbH expenditures down.”

Two years later, with war imminent in Europe, the AP’s board of directors resolved on Aug. 23, 1939, that “it has become expedient as a matter of administration to assign the certificate, capital, assets, and control of The Associated Press, GmbH, presently held by The Associated Press of Great Britain, to the Associated Press of New York.”

Wilhelm Erwin “Willy” Brandt, who joined the AP GmbH in 1934 and became managing director in 1939. This photo appeared in the 1965–66 issue of AP World.
AP PHOTO
Then, in October, Kent Cooper reported to the board that AP had received notice the German government would take over the AP GmbH unless it was transferred to German ownership and that accordingly the photo operation was “turned over on August 28, 1939, to Willy Brandt, office manager.”

That November, Stratton wrote to Brooks to say he was in agreement if Brooks and Milo Thompson, general executive for Europe, believed Brandt should be designated as custodian of the AP and AP GmbH property in Berlin. “We are glad to know of your confidence in him,” Cooper wrote, “and that his attitude has not changed since the war began.”

A year later, in 1940, Stratton wrote Brandt to express his “appreciation of the valiant way you have conducted the service. We are quite proud of your administrative showing as well, which sustains the record on which we did with trust offer the company into your hands.”

By the end of 1941, Brandt would have his hands full, with war declared by Germany on the United States, Lochner and his fellow newsmen detained by the Gestapo and the Propaganda Ministry ready to seize the AP GmbH and its extensive photo archive for its own purposes.
4. New York Photos — the Gatekeepers

“The business of The Associated Press is impartially to gather and disseminate the news, untinged by bias or expressions of opinion. It does not engage in any propaganda for any government, organization or individual”

AP EDITORS NOTE INSERTED IN A STORY IN 1934 ABOUT NAZI GERMANY’S INTERNATIONAL PROPAGANDA EFFORTS

As early as March 1934, the French newspaper Petit Parisien reported the Nazis were secretly conducting a massive international propaganda campaign and published what it said was a copy of a pamphlet of confidential instructions sent to Nazi propagandists.

The story, picked up by AP, said the Nazi text instructed the agents to withdraw advertising from newspapers that published anti-German news agency dispatches and said it had proven “impossible” to establish relations of any sort with AP.146

“The Associated Press shows towards the new evolution of Germany and the national socialist government’s demands in matters of foreign policy, a lack of understanding which must be considered as deliberate hostility,” the story quoted the pamphlet as saying.147

The pamphlet, whose authenticity the newspaper vouched for, forbade German agents abroad from making any contact with AP’s managers and it recommended “the greatest prudence” in relations with local AP correspondents.148 The only way to penetrate North America with propaganda
was through contacts with individual newspapers, the pamphlet was quoted as saying.

In its story reporting this, AP inserted the following editor’s note:

“The relations of The Associated Press with the German government are exactly the same as they are with any other government. The business of The Associated Press is impartially to gather and disseminate the news, untinged by bias or expressions of opinion. It does not engage in any propaganda for any government, organization or individual.”

The anonymous American critics who took AP Chief of Bureau Louis Lochner’s news reporting from Germany to task — presumed to be U.S. embassy personnel in Berlin — were equally troubled by AP’s photo coverage of the Nazi thrust into Holland, Belgium and France in the spring of 1940.

Some of the criticism was aimed at photos sent by the AP GmbH in Berlin to New York and London for worldwide distribution following Adolf Hitler’s declaration that the Battle of the Atlantic had begun.

The report forwarded to AP did not provide specific examples of the offending photos, but pointed to a picture of U-boats at a naval base on the German-occupied French coast on Aug. 13, 1940.

The collapse of France in June 1940 gave Germany’s U-boats direct access to the Atlantic Ocean and now presented a far greater threat to Britain and international shipping than ever before, including U.S. vessels en route to and from Britain.

“The day after the [Hitler] speech was made,” the report said, “the Trans-Atlantic Clipper [the flying boat of Pan American Airlines] arrived at La Guardia Field with a large assortment of official German pictures distributed through The Associated Press showing German U-boats assembled in French ports for the task of which Hitler had spoken the day before and thus supporting in pictorial form the implied Hitlerian threat against the United States.”

The caption on one AP photo, published in the Aug. 13, 1940, edition of the Decatur Herald, of Decatur, Illinois, read:

U-boat raids from French port

Berlin, Germany — The German caption on this picture says it shows a Nazi submarine returning to its base in a French
port on the Channel opposite the British Isles. The occupation of French ports has given Nazi submarines a much improved operating base. Germany has greatly increased the tempo of the attack on England, both at sea and in the air. (AP WIREPHOTO)

Seeming to balance this, another AP photo from “British sources,” published the same day in The Bryan Eagle, of Bryan, Texas, shows a ship sinking “somewhere at sea” but reported a British seaplane later sank the German U-boat responsible. Under the headline, “Sinking Ship Sends Smoke Into Clouds,” the caption read:

Like a huge signal, a column of dense smoke rises into the clouds after a Nazi submarine torpedoed a ship somewhere at sea, according to British sources. Other ships appear to be part of a convoy. British say a seaplane sank the U-boat while destroyers rescued those aboard the ship.

Despite this example of balance, however, there were many AP photos and photo captions reflecting the Nazi military advances in the spring of 1940, newsworthy to be sure, but unwelcome in some quarters as news often is. A small sampling of photo captions taken from AP’s vast photo archive produced these examples:

(May 13): Nazi guns roll over emergency bridge in Holland — this picture, sent by radio from Berlin to New York today, shows, according to the German caption, a Nazi gun crossing the Ijssel river in eastern Holland on an emergency bridge. In the background is a bridge which has been damaged.

(May 20): Der Fuehrer at the front — with Reichminister Herman Goering (second from right), Adolf Hitler (left) listens to a report by adjutant Colonel Schmundt, the German caption said, adding that the picture was made at Hitler’s headquarters on the West Front. This picture was radioed from Berlin to New York May 20.

(May 25): Wreckage in wake of German juggernaut — This picture, transmitted from Berlin to New York by radio today, is said by its accompanying caption to show the wreckage of a French tank in the streets of a battle-scarred Belgian village.

There also was criticism in the report that the AP GmbH’s photo salesmen, Gerhard Meixner, was “known to be an ardent Nazi,” and that AP photographer Eric Borchert was currently engaged by the Wehrmacht as a war photographer for the Propaganda Companies.

It registered concern about Austrian-born photographer Franz Roth, hired by AP to cover the war in Ethiopia in 1935 but who later left AP’s employ and was
freelancing in 1938 when he was named the official Nazi party photographer for Austria.\(^\text{155}\) He later enjoyed some fame as a Waffen SS war photographer with the Leibstandarte “Adolf Hitler,” the notorious SS unit he covered from 1941 to 1943, the year he was killed in fighting near Kharkov.

Roth, apparently interested in putting his relationship with AP on a firmer footing, told AP at the time his Nazi obligations in Austria would not interfere with his accepting a fulltime job with AP, and Lochner planned to rehire him, but Brooks in London stepped in and pointed out “it would not be good business for AP to have on its staff the official S.A. photographer.” The S.A. or Sturmabteilung served as the paramilitary wing of the Nazi party.

Writing to Lloyd Stratton in New York, Brooks proposed a freelance arrangement with Roth for right of first refusal of his photos, arguing AP should not make a bad situation worse. “We can’t get any coverage of anti-Nazi doings now to speak of,” he wrote, “and you can imagine what it would be with the official party photographer as a staffer.”

“I agree wholly with your original reply respecting the employment of Franz Roth,” Stratton replied. “I also agree with the contractual method of obtaining Roth’s product, assuming that the contract is approved by counsel.”\(^\text{156}\)

As for Meixner, while considered a top-notch photo salesperson, his political leanings were well known to AP and raised red flags when the possibility of his being promoted to the position of Haupschriftleiter or chief editor at the GmbH came up. As early as 1937, Seymour, then managing director of The Associated Press of London, wrote that Meixner’s full attention to sales was “indispensable in the maintenance and augmentation of AP GmbH revenue,” but, he added:

... Meixner has Nazi sympathies which make him a more effective representative of our cause in certain official quarters than a passive anti-Nazi dare be, but which make it profoundly unwise to put him into a position as powerful and independently responsible to the government as the Haupschriftleitership, no matter who is over him or how actively his work is supervised. We cannot and will not risk Nazifying our Berlin plant by naming a Haupschriftleiter, who, although he is not now a member of the Nazi party, leans toward it and might sometime join. Lochner and I are in absolute agreement on this.

The report criticizing Lochner’s reporting and AP’s photo coverage was sent to Frank B. Noyes, president of the Washington Evening Star and a former president of The Associated Press, who forwarded it to senior AP officials.

The report, its authorship concealed by providing only a few pages of the entire document, said:
While the Associated Press is thus used by the Nazi propaganda machine to plant useful propaganda material in the United States, Louis P. Lochner honestly strives at impeccable neutrality and is loyally serving American interests.

However, in the light of information contained in this memorandum it is highly questionable whether these American interests can be well served by maintaining an allegedly American news agency in Berlin which employs predominantly German staff both in its news and news picture departments and thus exposing itself to the direct influence of the Propaganda Ministry.

The claim that Germans made up a majority of AP's Berlin news staff, which AP records put at seven Americans and two Germans at its prime, appears to be an error but reflected the makeup of the AP GmbH staff accurately.

The report also took a personal swipe at Lochner, saying that despite his “unquestioned Americanism and loyalty” he “has on occasion gone somewhat too far in his attempt to win the favor of the Nazis.” It said he had permitted his stepdaughter, Rosemarie, to join a labor camp of the Alliance of German Girls, an official Nazi organization, in 1935.

Even today, more than 75 years later, the AP's distribution in the United States and internationally of government-supplied photos from the German war fronts remains a concern, as the study by Scharnberg makes clear.

The focus of her study, “The A and P of Propaganda: Associated Press and Nazi Image Journalism,” is on the deliberate misuse of AP photos appearing in the tightly-controlled Nazi media to further the regime's virulent anti-Semitism, to portray what it saw as the moral decadence of the United States, a country riven by class conflict and violence, and to promote other propaganda objectives.

A prime example was “Die Juden in USA,” or “The Jews in the USA,” a propaganda pamphlet first published in 1939 by the Zentralverlag der NSDAP, the central publishing house of the Nazi party, and reprinted in the early 1940s.

It begins with an unflattering picture of New York Mayor Fiorello La Guardia eating with his hands and moves on to stock photos of celebrities and politicians emphasizing their Jewish connections. The mayor, an Episcopalian whose mother was Jewish, was an object of hate to the Nazis for his forceful criticism of Hitler.
Secretary of State Cordell Hull is shown next to his wife, whose maiden name was Rose Frances Witz, over a caption saying he had allegedly “married Jewish.” Film star Claudette Colbert, a Catholic, is captured dining with her husband, physician Joel Pressman, under the overline, “Filmstar’s Racial Shame.” A total of 59 of the 105 photographs came from AP, according to the mandatory credit on the inner cover.\(^\text{657}\)

The Nazis used 16 AP photos in “Der Untermensch,” “The Sub-Human,” an SS indoctrination handbook published in early 1942. The term was used to describe people of non-Aryan origin, Jews, Roma and Slavs. At that stage AP had already been ousted from the country and was in no position to object.

To date, no records have surfaced to suggest AP objected to such practices at the time, but by the 1960s, perhaps earlier, standard AP news and photo contracts contained language that allowed subscribers to edit AP news and photos so long as the changes did not distort content so as to impugn the integrity of The Associated Press.

Given the magnitude of events in Europe and the Propaganda Ministry’s total control of the press, whether such an injunction could have been enforced by AP in Nazi Germany seems doubtful.

A threat by AP to close down its photo service because of such abuse could have led to AP’s expulsion or AP might have been denied access to all German photos, propagandistic though they may have been, from Germany and, after war broke out, German-occupied territories.

Termination of the photo service going to German subscribers would also have cost AP some revenue.

As for war coverage, Scharnberg cites as one example of propaganda an AP photo appearing in the Washington Post of May 15, 1940, showing Belgian prisoners of war running by the German photographer, over the following caption:

> Belgian soldiers are shown running towards the German lines after their surrender yesterday, according to the Nazi censor-approved caption accompanying this picture. (Photo radioed from Berlin)\(^\text{159}\)

She wonders what readers would make of this. Is it simply a news photo, she asks, reflecting Germany’s rapid advance, or is it part of a “cosmos of crafty Nazi propaganda” using a staged image to demoralize Germany’s enemies?

“The practice of distributing and publishing the German propaganda pictures as news images on the one hand, and, at the same time, to cast doubt about their meaningfulness by reference to their Berlin origin and thus to possible political intentions, can be interpreted as an attempt to establish a democratic and transparent handling of the propaganda-influenced materials of the countries at war,” she writes.\(^\text{660}\)
This practice, she says, often reflects “a certain helplessness” by AP editors regarding how the picture should be viewed, which is passed on to newspaper editors and finally to the reader. The implication seems to be that caption writers should adopt an editorial position regarding the photos they distribute.

A greater familiarity with how news agencies function or with the press restrictions imposed by all countries, including democracies, in wartime, could enhance such studies. News agencies, unlike newspapers in the pre-internet era, updated news stories constantly to provide newspaper editors on deadline across multiple time zones the ever-changing context for briefly captioned photos.

On the occasions AP could rely on its American staff to cover events in German-occupied territories, albeit on official guided tours, it could provide a more independent perspective, not just with stories but also photographs.

The Berlin news bureau’s Alvin Steinkopf visited Warsaw in October 1940 as the first and only non-German correspondent permitted to make an exhaustive inspection of the area known as “the General Government of Poland,” as distinguished from the parts of the country annexed outright by Russia and Germany. The “General Government” was under German domination and German-occupied.

He reported that a year after the German conquest there was “ruin everywhere,” that “Jews walk down the streets in white and blue armbands” and that “there is a concrete wall around the [Jewish] ghetto.”

He quoted German health officials as claiming the wall was not anti-Semitic “but simply a desperate measure necessary to protect Pole and Jew alike from the pestilences which are likely to follow in the wake of total war.” Steinkopf added: “The wall is eight feet high and so tight a cat couldn’t get through it.”

He returned to the ghetto two and a half months later to report German occupation authorities had almost completely segregated more than 500,000 persons behind an eight-foot wall cutting across 200 streets and streetcar tracks which lead to the central ghetto district.

More significantly, on that trip he made what is believed to be one of the first photos of the completed ghetto wall, an image splashed across four columns on the top of Page 3 of The New York Times on Jan. 3, 1941, above the headline: “A Wall in Warsaw Built by Hitler.”

Most of the nearly 500,000 inhabitants of the ghetto were sent to die in the Treblinka death camp. Thousands of others died of disease and starvation.

Nevertheless, a review of AP photo captions from German-occupied Poland in 1940 begs some explanation. One, for example, used in AP’s mail service, shows a picture of a Polish policeman in Cracow with the following caption:

“A section of the newly built Warsaw Ghetto wall in 1940, taken by American AP Berlin-based correspondent Alvin Steinkopf. This image was used by U.S. newspapers, including the New York Times. It is thought to be among the first photos of the wall to be circulated internationally.

AP PHOTO
Keeping his eye on things is this Polish police captain of Cracow, German-occupied Poland, where he and his men are working hand in hand with the German police, according to the German censor-approved caption. Picture by boat mail, March 14.163

While signaling the Propaganda Ministry has approved the photo for distribution, the caption as written in New York, based on a caption originally written by an AP GmbH editor in Berlin, strongly suggests the occupied Poles and their German overlords, even the police, are happily working “hand in hand.” Is the reader expected to believe this or is it to be understood that AP is telegraphing that this is unlikely? Why not a caption simply saying the photo shows a Polish police captain keeping his eye on things in the streets of Cracow?

On the other hand, a sophisticated reader might simply view such a feature photo and how it was presented (and others like it) for what it was, a publicity photo issued by a country at war, not dissimilar to official wartime handouts by Britain at the time, or, later, the United States, all seeking to promote their cause.

Anyone searching AP’s photo library will find hundreds if not thousands of photos from Germany and elsewhere sent by AP’s German photo editors to New York that were rejected, some marked “propaganda” by hard-nosed AP photo editors who were not taken in by the “crafty” Propaganda Ministry.164 To be sure, numerous images may have been regarded as un-newsworthy, technically inferior, or unusable because of transmission or censorship delays.

Scharnberg also writes how Germany could “score in the short term and win long-term credibility” thanks to the “image channel run by AP” when accusations or rumors surfaced that historically important monuments had been damaged in fighting.

“American newspaper readers could quickly convince themselves of the integrity of the Black Madonna of Czestochowa (in Poland),165 the (World War I) Canadian War Memorial Vimy (in France)166 and of the tomb of the Polish national hero Józef Pilsudski with German honor guard in Krakow Wawel Cathedral167 thanks to the images transmitted by AP from Berlin,” she writes.168

Scharnberg appears to give no consideration to the thought that, with truth often the first casualty of war, dispelling rumors with photographic evidence for interested readers would seem a natural undertaking for any news organization, although relying entirely on official sources when unable to independently verify a claim obviously poses risks.
Human error? Perhaps. Lapses in judgment? Possible. Generally speaking, however, New York photo editors were not blind to the Nazi slant on events as they sifted through the many photo shipments arriving from Germany.

In August of 1939, as Hitler prepared for war, a series of photos arrived in New York from the AP GmbH purporting to illustrate the dire conditions of Germans living in Poland in an obvious effort to justify the Nazi invasion on Sept. 1.

One photo caption was headlined “Germans flee from Polish terror” and the other was said to show women “running for their lives ... seeking a hole in the barbed wire fence to cross the border” into Germany.

New York editors rejected the photos for distribution but placed them in AP's photo archive for future reference. Almost 80 years later, they are still there, the first bearing an unknown editor's penciled notation “Nazi propaganda” and the second described as “More Nazi propaganda.” The latter’s caption was written by an editor at the AP GmbH. The photo credit was given as BER/BO signifying the photo’s origin was Berlin and the photographer was AP’s German shooter Eric Borchert.

The onslaught of propaganda was also a factor in news coverage.

AP Executive Editor Byron Price, addressing a query from a domestic chief of bureau in January 1940, said wars were notorious for promoting propaganda and breeding rumor.

“One of the common occurrences in this war has been the publication and circulation, in belligerent countries, of reports which may be damaging to the enemy,” he wrote. “The Management of the Associated Press has felt it had a responsibility not to give wider circulation to these reports when there was no evidence to substantiate them.”

AP’s highest ranking authority in the news department continued:

More recently wide publication was given to a report of disagreement between Hitler and Goering. That was published by newspapers in enemy and neutral countries which could not possibly have had correspondents at the place where the developments were reported to have occurred. Soon afterward, the same circulation was given this quite different report, namely, that Hitler was preparing to retire and entrust authority to his friend Goering. None of these things has happened. There have been many other rumors and reports of similar nature emanating from places other than the proper and natural source. At a time when more people than ever before within my knowledge are saying that newspapers are not dependable, it seems especially important that the Associated Press should keep...
Many of the details of how The Associated Press photographically covered Germany and German-occupied territories before and during World War II are missing, the bureau records lost, photographs and negatives incinerated, all casualties of the bombing of Berlin and London that destroyed the AP offices in both capitals. The AP GmbH office was destroyed by Allied bombing on Nov. 22, 1943. AP's London bureau was destroyed during the Blitz in October 1940.

Substantial records survive in the AP's Corporate Archives and a rich visual record resides in the Photo Library of The Associated Press in New York, including negatives and prints of black and white photos and their captions, silent witnesses of the past that tell a ghostly and only partial tale of AP efforts to cover the most significant story of the 20th century.

The photographic holdings consist of more than 25 million images accessible online and another five to 10 million more filed in the print and negative libraries in New York and London, making it one of the world's largest collections of historical and contemporary photography.

Research on photos for this project focused on the negative and print library at AP's New York headquarters, where negatives and prints are filed in thousands of folders.

A preliminary sampling of images in World War II files covering the years from 1939 to 1945 is hardly an exhaustive study but it does unveil the basic workings of the New York photo desk as thousands of images poured into AP's offices then located at 50 Rockefeller Plaza in the heart of New York City.

Some photos arrived by sea, a few by air and those of highest priority by radio transmission from around the world. Some of those mailed included original negatives but most arrived as prints. In both cases they were accompanied by captions. Photos transmitted by radio arrived as prints, including a caption below the image.

Selected photo prints and negatives were then used to make multiple print copies for redistribution by mail to more than 800 photo subscribers in the United States. If urgent, the photo would be transmitted over telephone lines to the far fewer subscribers with Wirephoto receivers. In 1935, when Wirephoto was launched, just 47 newspapers initially signed up.
The captions accompanying all photos from abroad were rewritten by New York editors.

Photos arriving from Berlin would be accompanied by an English caption written by the German editors at the AP GmbH. If the photo was used, the original caption was rewritten. One caption was written for photos going to subscribers receiving the AP photo “mailer” service and another caption was written for photos being distributed by AP Wirephoto via telephone lines in the United States.

For example, a June 1941 photo of Ukrainian refugees made by Franz Roth, the Waffen SS photographer also freelancing for AP, arrived in New York with the following AP GmbH caption:

To the East again!

For main caption see BER 59 500

German [sic] came across a so-called [sic] “ditch of terror” in the vicinity of a town. The populace fled to such ditches to hide from Russian terror — and from here they saw their property go up in flames.

BER/ROTH 59 500 (2) 27.6.41 ACC

Exclusive

A New York photo editor appears to have followed one of AP Executive Photo Editor Francis Alvin “Al” Resch’s cardinal rules on caption writing issued six months earlier: “Avoid anything smacking of editorial comment in captions. If the available facts are not extensive, say what we know is true and quit.”

The editor rewrote the incoming caption for both AP’s domestic and international mailed photo services and for Wirephoto, eliminating the reference to “Russian terror,” a subject dear to Nazi propagandists.

The editor also removed the reference to a “ditch of terror” that was linked to “Russian terror” and discarded mention of property going up in flames not shown in the image. Here is the New York caption for the mailed service:

Associated Press radiophoto from New York

Caution: use credit

Seek shelter in ravine

Refugees from the Ukraine district of Russia seek shelter and rest in a ravine, according to the caption received from Berlin, which did not locate the district. This picture was radioed to New York from Berlin June 27.
The caption of the photo delivered to U.S. member newspapers via Wirephoto read as follows:

(NY16-June 27) Ukraine refugees seek shelter in ravine – refugees from the Ukraine seek shelter from the storm of war as they huddle in a ravine. Location of this scene was not given in the German caption. (AP Wirephoto via radio from Berlin tonight) B6185PW2.jpg

Roth provided another photo, dated July 3, 1941, of a disabled Soviet tank on the road to Lviv, known as Lemberg to the Germans, a town in Russian-occupied Poland captured by the Nazis.

The original caption, sent to New York from the AP GmbH in Berlin, said:

Giant Soviet tank disabled

The road to Lemberg was lined with disabled Soviet Russian tanks and armoured cars.

Our photo shows a Soviet tank of heaviest caliber on the outskirts of Lemberg

BER/ROTH 59543 3.7.41 ACC “FZ”

AP editors in New York were unwilling to validate Nazi claims of multiple destroyed tanks. The caption was rewritten.

Germans inspect big Russian tank: German soldiers inspect a big Russian tank that was disabled in the outskirts of Lwow, Russian-occupied Poland, when the invaders advanced. Its size may be judged by comparison with the horse-drawn vehicle beside it. Wirephoto via radio from Berlin tonight

Earlier that year, Roth was in Greece accompanying invading German forces when a battle erupted while attempting to take a well-fortified mountain pass and a bullet grazed his skull. Nevertheless, he sent rolls of his film to the AP bureau in Berlin with a long account of the engagement and his ordeal. It prompted a story cabled to New York and written by Ernest Fischer dated April 23, 1941, that began this way:

fischers 11530 exclusive stop associateds war photographer
franz roth suffered head wound fighting in Greece after
snapping camera with one hand firing pistol with other
paragraph in letter from hospital roth advised berlin bureau
he recovering stop he enclosed picture of self bandaged head
to prove story stop then as indication he still on job as
cameraman although laid up as soldier comma rooh [sic] [rose] from hospital bed snapped pictures exploding british bombs.

fischers 21530 twentynine year old married photographer german citizen german soldier but still active as cameraman for associateds photo service stop roth saw action in Abyssinian conquests spains civil war polish and western campaign stop this first time he had mishap stop his report to berlin bureau follows 175

Roth was a controversial and dramatic figure in the world of Nazi photography. He combined a career as a Nazi activist and propagandist for the Waffen SS with his work as a photographer for The Associated Press that took him to Ethiopia, Austria, Poland, Finland, Greece and the Soviet Union. He served the AP early on as an employee and later worked on contract as a freelance photographer but there are gaps in the records regarding his precise employment status from one time to another.

It is impossible to establish how many photos originating from Germany and German-occupied territories between 1933 and 1945 were sent to New York and London, how many of those AP rejected, how many were used and how many of those distributed contained images that some might view as having served Nazi purposes or German war aims.

AP’s internal survey of its photo library while certainly not a scientific sampling, found many envelopes containing negatives and prints from Germany and German-occupied territories seemingly unused, the file showing the original caption from Germany but no corresponding U.S. caption for either the mailed services or Wirephoto.

After war broke out in Europe in 1939, wartime photographs were officially supplied to AP and other news organizations in Germany, including domestic publications and agencies, through the Propaganda Ministry.

It shared its harvest of photos among all news outlets. The photos were produced by photographers drafted into the Propaganda Kompanien der Wehrmacht or PKs (The Armed Forces Propaganda Companies), such as AP’s Eric Borchert and Gerhard Baatz, and the Waffen SS’ Kriegsberichter-Kompanie (SS War Correspondents Company), such as Franz Roth, working in conquered territories. The German war photographers were subject to military discipline.
AP also had access to other photos from officially sanctioned German sources, including images of Hitler taken exclusively by his personal photographer, Heinrich Hoffmann. There are numerous photos of the Nazi leader in AP’s photo archives credited to Hoffman [sic], presumably a misspelling. Almost to the very end, Hitler allowed no one but Hoffmann to photograph him.

While some volunteered to join up, as Roth did, many German photographers were compelled to join either the Wehrmacht’s propaganda companies or the Waffen SS at the front. Roth covered a single unit, the elite Leibstandarte of the Waffen SS, and was killed in fighting between German and Russian forces on March 17, 1943, near Kharkov, Ukraine.

Explaining wartime procedures in Germany in October 1939 to Brooks in London, AP GmbH office manager Willy Brandt wrote:

> With regard to the fact that every firm has to send their own representatives as photographers or darkroomers to the front, I ordered that Baatz go as cameraman and (Kurt) Hilges as darkroom man. In addition to this, considering the importance of having our cameraman at the front from various standpoints, I have engaged Borchert who as you know already belonged to our firm once, and who has become the photographer in Germany, and have also sent him along with the troops.

In reply, Lloyd Stratton, AP assistant general manager in New York, wrote Lochner and Brandt, “We quite understand the regulations requiring that procedure” but grumbled that AP was not receiving exclusive photos.

> “It does seem peculiar that you furnish the man, pay his salary and expenses and then have his production distributed to all,” Stratton wrote. “We can but trust that for quality and number of men this provided, you are receiving at least a better volume. We have received nothing from Roth made at the front exclusive for our service.”

Lochner’s U. S. critics were troubled that the AP GmbH used photos by these photographers during the German invasion of Poland, Belgium and France and were especially concerned about AP’s employment of Borchert, Baatz and Roth.

Thousands of photos from the German frontlines and occupied territories were on offer in the 1939–1940 period thanks largely to two factors, according to Scharnberg, the historian.

The first was that only the Germans could offer reporters and photographers access to the fighting and conquered territories. The second was heavy-handed British censorship that actually made the British press dependent on German photos to illustrate events on the continent.

Scharnberg says in 1941 Cyril Radcliffe, director general of the British Ministry
of Information, was assigned to analyze why American newspapers were
generally filled with what he referred to as photographs of “our enemies.”

“His conclusion was clear,” she wrote. “German documentary photographs
were ‘immediate,’ ‘alive,’ and depicted ‘vivid and exciting incidents’. Radcliff
also cited photos from Operation Barbarossa, the Nazi invasion of the Soviet
Union in 1941, “which showed German soldiers in action.” She added:

The German photographs Radcliff referred to were mainly
images of the German propaganda companies (PK). Such
propaganda units consisting of recruited journalists were
initially established in cooperation with the High Command
of the Wehrmacht and the Propaganda Ministry to organize,
monopolize and control the German war reporting.

Indeed, Price, AP’s then executive editor, furious about the “unbelievable”
British censorship, cabled Brooks in London to make “the strongest possible
representations” to British authorities and complained that “German news
and pictures (are) available and being published in such quantities that AP
papers are subjected to criticism that they are giving disproportionate
publicity to Germany.”

AP distributed a story to its newspaper members in the United States about
the British action, which concluded:

As a result of the censorship imposed in Britain, the vast
majority of pictures received in the United States within the
last several days have been from Berlin, representing copy
which has been passed by the German Ministry of
Propaganda.

On Dec. 12, 1940, at the end of the first full year of war in Europe — the United
States still a non-belligerent — Al Resch, the executive photo editor, set down
guidelines in a classic one-page memo to the photo staff in New York on
do’s and don’ts when writing captions.

Resch became chief of the photo service in 1938 and remained in charge for 30
years.

“A prime example of what not to do was the caption on a picture of an Italian
plane downed in Britain,” Resch wrote. He added:

The caption, as written, said: “British Bag 13 Italian Planes
in One Day.” That did NOT describe the picture, which
was sufficient error in itself; additionally, it did NOT
state anything any of us knew to be true, but rather was
a reiteration of what the British ministry claimed at the time.
As such it was rank propaganda. The plain statement “Italian
Plane Downed in Britain” described the picture at hand
adequately and completely.
There were problems with captions in London as well where at least one AP editor apparently failed to absorb Resch’s memo fully. With anti-German sentiment high in the British capital, the caption writer clearly violated the rule to avoid editorial comment.

Two photos taken just seconds apart on July 2, 1941, and sent from Berlin to New York and London, both show the same scene of German soldiers in a truck rolling through Lviv, known as Lemberg to the Germans, with people waving to them on both sides of the street. Some people in the crowd can be seen smiling and the soldiers are waving back. The photographer is not identified.\textsuperscript{184}

The first photo, distributed to U.S. newspapers by New York, carried the following caption:

German troops are welcomed by a portion of the population of Lwow, Russian-occupied Poland, as the town fell to invaders, German sources reported. This photo was sent from Berlin to New York by radio.\textsuperscript{185}

The London caption for the very similar second photo, distributed to AP’s European subscribers — it survives in the AP’s legal photo archive today — reads as follows:

Fear-inspired Lemberg population think it wiser to give the Germans a “hearty” welcome as they enter the city. They know how the Germans treat the people in occupied territories and don’t wish to be on the Gestapo’s black list right from the beginning.\textsuperscript{186}

Resch’s memo also expressed dissatisfaction with the way some editors sought to attribute information in captions. He wrote:

Applying especially to captions on foreign pictures, the phrases “According to British censor-approved caption,” or “German sources say this picture shows,” have been vastly and needlessly overdone. Plain everyday judgment will dictate when reference properly should be made in a given caption to the source when occasion warrants, and it long since has ceased to be news that pictures from belligerent countries are passed by censor.\textsuperscript{187}

America’s entry into World War II introduced an entirely new dimension to the news demands placed on The Associated Press and other American news organizations grappling with ways to cover global war and offer its subscribers something “exclusive.”
Less than two months after Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor, a still photo pool proposed by the U.S. War Department and the U.S. Navy was organized to cover all major theaters of war, with AP, ACME, the International Photo Service and Life magazine as its first participants. By the end of 1942, there were some 28 American pool photographers stationed with U.S. military forces around the world. The pool was no source for anything exclusive.

In addition, official news pictures from governments abroad were distributed to all photo agencies as was material from newsreel companies.

“The sad part of it is, the last three weeks has witnessed a growing pace in the transmission of official stuff only,” Stratton wrote to Basil L. Walters, editor of the Minneapolis Star-Journal, in May 1940. “It is becoming increasingly difficult to get an exclusive through and the enterprise of many of our photographers abroad has been virtually snuffed out.”

Stratton attached part of a letter from “the head of the AP news photo company in Berlin,” presumably Lochner, which lamented, “All in all every German agency receives similar shots from one and the same source of all war events,” adding, “We will keep a close watch for exclusive material. Under the present conditions it is most difficult.”

New York’s push for exclusives, however, appears to have eventually won results. In 1941, possibly earlier, captions for photos from Franz Roth, travelling with German forces, start to appear marked “exclusive.”

On July 2, 1941, just 10 days after the launch of Operation Barbarossa, the code name for Hitler’s invasion of the Soviet Union, Roth offered this “exclusive” from the Russian front via the AP GmbH in Berlin:

Lwow residents search ruins — residents of the city of Lwow in Soviet occupied former Poland search among the ruins of gutted homes after Nazi troops had taken the city. This picture was transmitted by radio from Berlin to New York July 2.

Then, on July 6, AP distributed a bombshell: two gruesome and similar photos of a massacre at Lviv, photos showing rows of bodies laid out on the ground to be identified, photos without a paper trail in AP’s photo archive.

Both Roth and, separately, Berlin AP Correspondent Alvin Steinkopf, on an escorted tour with German military authorities, were at the scene, but a search shows one of the photos distributed by AP in the United States was also credited to Central Press, International News Photos, and Acme among other photo services. It is also available in the archives of Getty Images and Germany’s Bundesarchiv in Koblenz, Germany.

No photographer is identified by any of those archives, although Yad Vashem, Israel’s Holocaust Memorial, provided a copy it obtained from Russian archives identifying the photographer as “Fremke.” A Heinz Fremke is listed...
as a German propaganda company photographer by the Bundesarchiv. It was sensational but clearly not an exclusive. The AP caption of one photo read as follows:

(NY11 — July 6 — Germans say these are victims of Soviet police — The bodies in this row, say German sources, are those of persons slain by the Russian secret police in the Soviet-occupied former Polish city of Lwow. (AP Wirephoto via radio from Berlin) (w11630pw-2) 1941

There were multiple killings in Lviv, of political prisoners and of Jews, and conflicting narratives of who was responsible, The People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs (NKVD), or Soviet secret police, Ukrainians, Germans or all of them at various times.

Steinkopf’s story described Lviv as a city of funerals, “in the wake of mass killings accompanying the Russian withdrawal from the region occupied by the Red Army for a year and a half.” He went on: “The whole ghastly scene is a situation which any experienced correspondent would view with the greatest suspicion. It is a grisly episode which could be exploited by organized propaganda from one side or the other.”

On July 5, Steinkopf cabled this grim scene to New York:

story told by Germans and confirmed [by] many civilians was that last few days [of the] Russian occupation hundred Ukrainians rounded up stop Lwow citizens charged they shot in one of three prisons paragraph eye [I was] shown blood spattered walls in military prison where executions took place in room used for washing automobiles stop blood drained into sewer paragraph at city prison eye saw basement in which there were still uncounted number massed bodies.

Later in his account, Steinkopf describes the city’s population as “utterly crushed by events comma somewhat indifferent to anything which might happen” and adds that the “sale [of] alcohol prohibited and notices posted [by] german authorities threatened death penalty any interference with german occupation paragraph especially terrified group are numerous jews who don’t know what to expect.

Roth photographed heaps of bodies in the courtyard and hallway of a Soviet prison in Lwow and the pictures were widely published in Germany at Hitler’s express command as part of a campaign to expose the crimes of Bolshevism and portray Stalin’s government as barbaric.

Two pictures of corpses appeared on page three of the July 9, 1941, edition of the Voelkischer Beobachter along with a series of photos also made by Roth portraying faces of nine Soviet prisoners of war. A photo credit line reads: SS-PK-Roth-Associated Press. Historian Scharnberg quotes from an
unpublished Roth manuscript as saying “Even most foreign newspapers featured them.”

A gruesome photo credited to Roth of three corpses in the courtyard of the Lviv city prison dated June 30, 1941, is on file at the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum and shows the same scene as the one published in the Voelkischer Beobachter but from a different angle. The second photo in the newspaper is of bodies piled up on top of one another.

Neither resembles the photos found in the AP Photo Library and in the other photo agencies’ archives showing long rows of bodies set out on the ground for family members to identify.

While the Roth portraits showing the faces of Soviet prisoners were distributed in the United States, no copies of the horrific photos of prison corpses have been found in the AP Photo Library or in a digital search of U.S. newspapers which suggests they were either not sent to London and New York by the AP GmbH or they were simply rejected by AP in both cities as too ghastly for distribution.

“These images [of prisoners] were perhaps the most often printed propaganda photos in Nazi Germany,” according to Scharnberg, appearing in newspapers across the country under the title “The Ugly Mug of Bolshevism.”

“When taking these shots, Franz Roth was simultaneously AP photographer, SS-PK Oberscharfuhrer (SS Senior squad leader) and photojournalist in the SS Propaganda Company,” she wrote.

On July 24, 1941, six of the POW portraits credited to AP were published in the Atlanta Constitution, and four of them appeared in the Los Angeles Times a day later. Scharnberg says the Los Angeles Times, when asked, “had no convincing answer to the question of what was really to [be] achieve[d] in America by publication of such ‘type images,’ which were intended to spread fear in Germany and strengthen the will of war.” The AP caption read: “Red Fighters? — Nazi sources released and identified these close up photographs as those of types of Russian soldiers taken prisoner by Germans in battle of Lviv (AP Wirephoto).”

To Hitler and his followers, the depictions of ethnically diverse, unshaven and hollow-eyed prisoners were evidence of their enemy’s low racial status. However, a U.S. editor would be hard pressed to read them that way. Rather, they appeared as human interest photos: luckless POWs captured fighting against the Nazis. A number of U.S. newspapers published the images in that vein. Scharnberg sees this as simple Nazi propaganda.

Scharnberg’s conclusion was this: “Basically, Roth produced German propaganda images on American account and also for the American newspaper market, to the extent AP and its editors were interested in the images.”
Whether Roth took the uncredited massacre photos that were distributed in the United States by AP or not, Scharnberg’s concern, voiced in an interview March 30, 2016, with Britain’s The Guardian, was this: “Instead of printing pictures of the days-long Lviv pogroms with its thousands of Jewish victims, the American press was only supplied with photographs showing the victims of the Soviet police and “brute” Red Army war criminals.”

While certainly true, it is unclear whether she meant to suggest that AP should not have distributed the photos it did. Nor is it known whether photos of Jewish victims murdered at Lviv after the German occupation were available to AP or others at the time. AP had no independent access to German-occupied territory. It seems inconceivable that AP would have ignored such photos were they available.

On Aug. 8, 1941, AP reported in its news service that a Russian communiqué blamed the deaths of hundreds of civilians shot at Lviv on the Nazis. The Soviets said the dead were victims of “Fascist terror” who were killed just after the German occupation of the city.

“German cinema operators and photographers took photos of these heaps of corpses and fabricated facts about ‘Bolshevik atrocities,’” the communiqué said. There was no mention of Jews being killed.

Paul Shapiro, director of international affairs and founding director of the Mandel Center for Advanced Holocaust Studies at the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum, speaking in 2007 about German atrocities in Ukraine during the war, stressed that the refusal by the Soviets to acknowledge the specific targeting and massive and systematic killings of Jews reflected both Stalinist anti-semitism and official resistance to singling out the suffering of specific ethnic groups in what Soviet wartime propaganda presented as a unified Soviet people.

The fate of the Jewish population became clearer more than two years later when an AP story of Oct. 28, 1943, reported the Polish Telegraph Agency as saying the Jewish population of Lviv, then one of Poland’s largest cities, had been annihilated by the Germans. The Polish Telegraph Agency, then based in London, was the news agency of the Polish government in exile.

“The agency said the Ghetto was destroyed and fleeing Jews were slain in the streets. The remaining Jews, except for 4,000 who were sent to the Janow concentration camp, were put to death in gas chambers, the agency asserted,” AP reported. “A Polish underground newspaper, the agency said, estimated there were 35,000 Jews in Lwow at the beginning of this year.”
In August of 1941, Steinkopf, still based in Berlin, traveled to Smolensk, Russia, joining another tour for foreign correspondents of Nazi-occupied territory conducted by German military authorities.

He delivered yet another “exclusive” in text and photos as the first American correspondent to reach Smolensk since the Germans announced its capture July 16.

“Minsk and Vitebsk — our plane flew low over both places — appeared desolate enough, but not so utterly devastated as Smolensk,” Steinkopf wrote. “Standing in the expanse of devastation, I was told by a German officer that fully 90 percent of the city had been destroyed and that most of the destruction had been wrought by the Russians under orders of Premier Joseph Stalin for a ‘scorched earth in the face of the enemy.’”

His photos of the destruction included an overview of the destroyed town and an eye-catching shot of three women walking through rubble past a destroyed church.

AP General Manager Kent Cooper, however, was not satisfied, and he demanded more in a September 1941 letter he described as “some rambling thoughts about pictures” sent to Stratton, his assistant general manager, and Paul Miller, his executive assistant.

“I want to spend more money for pictures — but not for more of the same kind of pictures,” he wrote.

Just some three months before Germany declared war on the United States, Cooper was hoping for greater cooperation with the Germans.

We don’t know what we could get from Germany under proper representations. Never to have tried is a bad record. We might be amazed at what we could get in the way of news, if not pictures, if we did press for pictures the way we are in the habit of pressing for news where access is not denied us.

I want it remembered that the AP so far is not domiciled in a country that has declared war. It remains international in its aspects. A good talker ought to be able to sell this idea to anybody — even Hitler, who has much at stake in this matter, so far as America is concerned, not because America loves him more, but because it hates war more and hopes not to be driven to it. To do all of this, you have to have cameramen with personality. They’ve got to be diplomats besides being artists.

It does not take a large stretch of the imagination to believe Cooper’s push for more exclusive photos could lead to his approval of an arrangement to continue receiving photos from official German sources through a third party after America went to war.
5. The Bureau Laux

The U.S. Office of Censorship “has no objection to such an exchange, with all hands understanding that the pictures, as usual, and like all others, are subject to the censorship regulations.”

N.R. Howard, Assistant to Chief of Censorship Byron Price, July 18, 1942, to AP Executive Editor Alan Gould.

Lochner and his family were the guests of honor at a Berlin dinner party enjoying dessert and coffee when the phone rang. It was Eddie Shanke in the bureau calling. “Is the chief there?” Shanke asked. “We just got a cable from New York. The Japs have bombed Pearl Harbor....”

Shanke remained in the bureau overnight, filing what official German reaction he could get, some provided by Lochner, who hurriedly called contacts from his host’s home.

Three days later, on Dec. 10, Lochner, ejected along with other Americans from a press conference at the Foreign Ministry, ran into the office where Shanke, Steinkopf and Angus Thuermer were waiting. “Get Bern,” Lochner called out, as he peeled off his coat and shot into his office. The AP bureau in the Swiss capital was the bureau’s telex link to the outside world since connections to New York through the Netherlands had been shut down after the Nazi occupation of Holland on May 10, 1940.

Lochner hammered out the story on his typewriter, telling the staff that Foreign Ministry Spokesman Paul Schmidt had barred all American correspondents from attending the press conference. Lochner said Schmidt, whom he had once described as Ribbentrop’s “chubby, youthful press spokesman” with a “stentorian voice filled with self importance,” had ordered them to go home and consider themselves under house arrest until further notice. Lochner said longtime German reporter Rudi Josten and the manager of AP photos, Willy Brandt, would carry on until the situation cleared.

German Foreign Ministry spokesman Paul Schmidt in 1940.
AP PHOTO / POOL

NOTE
When this report was first published by AP, it included an incorrect image for Paul Schmidt, the foreign ministry spokesman. That image has been removed and the correct image is above.
That evening, all American journalists were rounded up and taken to the Gestapo Headquarters at Alexander Platz where they spent the night sprawled out on vacant desks or on the floor. A Propaganda Ministry official told the detained newsmen they were being arrested for their own protection from “die wütende volksmasse,” the “outraged masses.”

The following day, Dec. 11, Hitler declared war on the United States and a brief time later the United States declared war on Germany. That morning, AP’s five reporters, Lochner, Steinkopf, Thuemer, Shanke and Ernest Fischer, and 14 other American correspondents, were temporarily taken to a vacant estate in Berlin’s exurban Wannsee summer holiday area and later spent four days in a train parked on a siding outside the resort town of Bad-Nauheim, known for its salt springs. They eventually were joined with American embassy staff and families under Gestapo guard at the Grand Hotel, which Thuemer rated as “a very excellent hotel, I must say, but rather shabby food.”

Boredom prevailed. A newspaper was published for a time. AP’s Fischer, Shanke and Lochner were reporters, Thuemer “rolled the presses” with the hotel’s mimeograph machine and Steinkopf was a sort of executive assistant to Ed Haffel of the *New York Herald Tribune*, who was the editor.

The day Hitler declared war on the United States, AP General Manager Kent Cooper cabled a message to Bern for Lochner and for Richard Massock in Rome:

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Associated Press Bern

If ever possible notify Lochner Massock everything being
done for their relief resulting assurances State Department
and Department of Justice that all German Italian
newspapermen will be accredited to leave country with their
diplomatic missions in exchange for same courtesy by
German Italian governments that meanwhile German Italian
newsmen being comfortably housed in hotels with
understanding same be done for all our men by German
Italian governments give this as authoritative news story to
Swiss agency for publication Berlin Rome

Kent Cooper Associated Press
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They were interned for five months.

Germany, Italy and the United States agreed to exchange detained journalists and diplomats in Lisbon, capital of neutral Portugal and a city of intrigue, where British, French, German, Italian and Spanish passenger planes were being serviced on the same airfield and where Allied, Nazi and Fascist diplomats and spies mingled at cafés and restaurants, trading gossip and information.
A train, sealed by the Gestapo, left Berlin on May 12, 1942, with all American detainees aboard. It stopped overnight in Biarritz, France, where the group stayed in an empty French holiday hotel. It resumed its journey to Portugal the following day, overnighting again in Medina del Campo, Spain. When they finally arrived in Lisbon May 14, wrote Thuemer, “we proceeded to gorge ourselves on lovely Portuguese food and sop up the sun on the beach at Estoril.” The AP reporters later boarded the Swedish ship Drottingholm, arriving in New York on June 1, 1942.

From the moment the AP reporters were arrested, rival centers of power in the Nazi hierarchy maneuvered to take over AP’s photo operation, including the extensive photo archive.

The Propaganda Ministry; the Foreign Ministry; the photo agency of Hitler’s personal photographer, Heinrich Hoffmann; the Waffen SS, and Welt Bild, the photo arm of the Reich national news agency, Deutsches Nachrichtenbuero (DNB), all wanted control of the AP and its photo archive. Ultimately, the Foreign Ministry would win out.

Joining the Americans on the train to Lisbon that May of 1942 was Helmut Laux, an ambitious photographer with high-level connections authorized by the Foreign Ministry to cover the exchange of detainees in Lisbon for the weekly Berliner Illustrierte Zeitung, Germany’s first mass-market illustrated magazine. He carried letters of introduction from Brandt, with whom he had been discussing the AP GmbH’s future, to Lochner and Luiz C. Lupi, AP’s correspondent in Lisbon.

He had a proposition to make.

On the day Lochner and the other Americans were put under house arrest, Willy Brandt was told, “Machen Sie Ihren Saftladen su” (“Close your juice shop”), a derogatory German term for a disreputable business, by Heiner Kurzbein, head of the photo section of the Propaganda Ministry. The Reich Association of the German Press — without waiting for Hitler to complete his address declaring war on the United States — gave Brandt notice the AP GmbH had been expelled from the organization, preventing the German company from undertaking any press-related activities.

The Waffen SS, with photographer Franz Roth as middleman, quickly recruited two members of the AP photo staff, Gerhard Meixner and Artur Meyer, in hopes of ultimately taking over the entire photo operation. Roth wanted them to join the Waffen SS photo service, which he said would protect them from “Heldentod,” a Hero’s Death, at the front, or what Brandt later described as “disappearing into the mass of Hitlerian cannon fodder.”
Meixner and Mayer, “who quickly overcame his antipathy to the SS,” signed up, Brandt said in a letter he presented to Lochner after the war. Brandt said he refused to join them, “out of my feelings against everything connected to the Nazi regime and the SS.”

Brandt’s letter, 73 hand-written pages long in its original German which he called a “confession,” reflects the wartime intrigues and jockeying for power Brandt confronted within the Nazi hierarchy and also the torments of conscience and the torturous route people must sometimes take for their own survival in a totalitarian dictatorship.

“You know my political past and know that as a honorable democrat, as a young man especially enthusiastic about the democratic ideals, [I] suffered unspeakably under the events which unfolded under the Hitler dictatorship, under the restrictions of conscience and more such things,” Brandt wrote.

“I could call this account of my experiences since that historic Dec. 7, 1941, ‘The Archive,’ since the archive and the effort to save it from theft and destruction made up all my thinking and feeling,” he added.

“Being able to serve the AP meant to me the promotion of democratic thought, meant helping in the battle against the dark forces of the evil spirit which had risen with Hitler,” he said. Referring to the photos in the AP GmbH archive, he added, “I coupled the idea that my battle for their preservation and protection amounted to taking part in the battles of the Allies.”

Under pressure from all sides, Brandt finally agreed to an arrangement whereby Welt Bild, the photo service of the national news agency DNB, would have a 50 percent participation in AP’s former photo operation. “I told myself this would be the best way for me to keep others away, and agreed,” Brandt wrote. “Since the archive remained in our offices under my supervision, I had a certain influence over the photos which Weltbild called for for use in the German press.”

Meanwhile, the Foreign Ministry named its own Herr Von Levinsky, a former German Consul General in New York, state manager of the AP GmbH “to avoid an uncompensated move against American property despite the state of war” and “in the hope of undermining the Promi [Propaganda Ministry] as a detested rival,” Brandt wrote.

Then, called to military duty, as were others on the AP GmbH staff, Brandt reported as a driver to an intelligence regiment of the Luftwaffe on Jan. 25, 1942. He remained in phone contact with Levinsky at the Foreign Ministry and with Else Thieme, an American working at the AP GmbH as a bookkeeper who stayed on to take care of all managerial assignments and helped run the abandoned photo office.
Laux, politically connected, had traveled widely as Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop’s personal photographer and later served as official photographer for Hitler’s headquarters and photographed many diplomatic meetings. He planned to run a private photo agency called “Bureau Laux” and work as an agent for the Foreign Ministry’s newly established Intelligence Special Command, among other clients.

The command was financed by the Waffen SS, the military wing of the Nazi Party, whose units served at the front alongside the regular army, according to Brandt. 229

The command would keep military commanders in the field updated on Foreign Ministry perspectives on politics, diplomacy and Ribbentrop’s activities. Laux eventually became an agent of the command, supplied it with photos and was given the rank of Untersturmfuehrer (second lieutenant) of the Waffen SS. All Laux needed was photos.

Laux told U.S. military interrogators after the war that he and Brandt held several conversations in early 1942, while Lochner was still interned at Bad Nauheim, on how the AP photo service might be continued in and out of Germany with the AP GmbH’s existing staff under a new name for the duration of the war. 230

Brandt and Laux were likely aware of Lochner’s suggestion to AP General Manager Kent Cooper and to German officials — as described in Lochner’s letter to Cooper of July 30, 1941 — proposing to use the existing AP GmbH staff to provide a service through a neutral third party if AP’s offices were closed down.

“Because of my (photo) business, I was strongly connected with the AP and my point of view was in accord of that with Mr. Lochner of the AP,” Laux told the interrogators. “The next step was to begin negotiations with Mr. Lochner.” 231

Laux, already a member of the Waffen SS, first met Lochner in 1940 on a five-day trip from Germany to Finland arranged by the German Foreign Ministry.

Laux gave this account to the U.S. military authorities of his discussions with Lochner as they rode the train together from Bad Nauheim to Lisbon:

On the journey in a special train it was possible for me to speak with Mr. Lochner; he seemed very well pleased with such a plan; providing that he received the consent of his central office in New York. He requested me to make an outline of the agreement with Mr. Luiz Lupi, the AP agent in Lisbon, and told me I should continue on in the interest of the AP and try with the help of the American, Miss Thieme, and the former German staff of the AP to hold together and continue the European Photo Service of the AP (in which the AP was very interested). Lochner further requested that either Brandt or I should give concern to his mother-in-law,
on Giesbrechtstrasse, and through this courier service transmit messages. In Lisbon, a final contract was formulated with two languages, English and Portuguese, and, after the approval of the New York Central office had arrived, it was signed by us. One of the articles of this agreement stipulated for the photo exchange of the Bureau Laux through diplomatic courier of the Foreign Office, the exchange to be made twice a week.

Brandt tells a critically different story.

“So Laux went to Lisbon and brought back, in addition to a mountain of foods and pleasure goods ... a signed document confirming an agreement between Laux and the AP on an exchange service,” Brandt wrote.

However, Brandt added, while Laux went about showing off the document bearing Lupi’s signature, he concealed from his boss, the foreign ministry spokesman, “what Lupi had told Laux by telegraph, that the AP in New York had refused to enter into a contract with Laux.” The exchange would be through a Portuguese intermediary, a cordon sanitaire.

“He concealed the telegram from Lupi and let the whole world believe that he was the only authorized representative of AP in Germany,” Brandt said.

No copies of this agreement have been found in the AP Corporate Archives in New York. A folder “out sheet” for a Corporate Archives file for Lisbon dated Jan. 22, 1946, describes the content as “Arrangement whereby exchange of news pictures undertaken by AP + Berlin thru Lisbon (Marques Da Costa photo agent in Portugal).” The sheet says the contents was taken by Lloyd Stratton and “delivered by hand by Mr. Kelly.”

Laux said a verbal agreement also was reached that neither the photos nor the photo captions would be changed when published, “for this was the foundation of the contract, otherwise this service would be ended by their governments.” In this, Laux was to prove highly unsuccessful, later claiming he fought many battles over changes in the captions with the Propaganda Ministry.

On the morning of May 7, 1945, Chief of staff of the German Forces High Command Gen. Alfred Jodl unconditionally surrendered to the Allies.

In the ruins of the Reich, Laux first contacted American authorities on June 1, 1945, in Memmingen, Bavaria, to inform them about the location of AP’s print photo archive.
According to Col. Eugene P. Walters, the author of the official report of the meeting, he was “carrying credentials believed by the undersigned to authenticate his receipt of authority from Associated Press, an American firm with headquarters in New York City, to take charge of the firm’s Berlin equipment, staff and archives.”

A copy of those credentials has not been found, but on Sept. 18, 1945, James F. King, AP’s correspondent in Wiesbaden, took Laux to a U.S. counterintelligence unit and accused him of passing himself off as an AP photographer and having seven cans of U.S. Army gasoline in his car.

Laux carried a letter signed by Walters dated Sept. 14, 1945, identifying Laux as “a photographer of the Associated Press.” This letter was confiscated as evidence, the AP reference was crossed out and King signed a statement at the bottom that said, “When I first saw this paper on Laux there were no deletions.”

“Subject claimed that the purpose of his visit to Wiesbaden was to contact Mr. Louis P. Lochner, AP war correspondent, in order to make a complete report concerning the documents [print photo archives]. Subject further stated that Mr. Lochner knows all about the history of the documents and can vouch for subject,” the U.S. Army investigators reported.

Laux briefly described his role during the war to his interrogators and was released after a check with U.S. Army headquarters in Frankfurt revealed Laux was not wanted by U.S. authorities at the time.

Laux, however, gave the most detailed account of his wartime exploits to U.S. Army counterintelligence agents after he was arrested again in Memmingen on Jan. 7, 1946, because of his previously undiscovered Waffen SS membership.

He underwent numerous interrogations by the Special Investigative Squad, Counter Intelligence Corps, Detachment 970, Headquarters, United States Forces, European Theater. The transcripts were recently consulted by AP following a search at the U.S. National Archives in College Park, Maryland.

Laux said he received training at the photo department of the Hitler Youth in 1937–38 but was never a member of the Nazi Party. His interest in foreign travel led him to occasionally work for the Foreign Ministry. As a photographer, he accompanied von Ribbentrop to Moscow in 1939 and eventually became his personal photographer. He made an eight-week tour through Russia in 1940, but he said a majority of his photos were suppressed. He also served briefly as a war photographer on the Eastern Front at battles in the Kharkov area and at Ramagen in January of 1945 during the Allied invasion of Germany.

Laux gave a detailed description of how the photo exchange agreement with AP worked in practice.
He told the investigators that the news photos sent to AP's representative in Lisbon from Berlin were prepared in duplicate, with the German captions translated into English. One set of photos was addressed to WURZEL244, the code name for the AP in London during the war, and was flown to Britain via Lisbon as soon as possible. The second set of photos was scheduled for flight to New York “as expeditiously as conditions permitted.”245

According to Laux, photos from The Associated Press in New York were sent to AP correspondent Luiz Lupi who delivered them to the German embassy, which forwarded them to the Foreign Ministry in Berlin by diplomatic pouch.246

“Six copies were made immediately by Laux and distributed as follows: Two (2) copies to HITLER, two (2) copies to the SS Fuehrerhauptamt and two (2) copies to the Press Section of the Foreign Office. The original was then sold by Laux to the periodicals in which the pictures were published, after appropriate alterations by the Propaganda Ministry,” U.S. military investigators who interrogated Laux reported after the war.247

Laux estimated that approximately 10,000 news photos passed through the Bureau Laux office in Berlin and the AP office in Lisbon via diplomatic courier pouch during the war, of which 3,000 were from the United States. He told his military interrogators that often the text accompanying AP's photos was altered as many as four times before the approval of the Propaganda Ministry was obtained to release them to the German media.248

U.S. Army investigators who visited the photo archive of the Deutsches-Verlag publishing house in Berlin on Jan. 16, 1946, found after a considerable search “twenty-some odd original Associated Press news-photos which had been purchased by this firm and published in either its Berliner Illustrierte or Reich during the time when the United States was at war with Germany.”249

In reviewing these 20 examples, the manipulation of the AP photo captions by the Propaganda Ministry seems bland, almost juvenile from today’s perspective. Take, for instance, this caption issued by the Allies in Britain:

Passed by the censor — No. 212000

Joint Anglo-U.S. raids on Germany coming: giant flying fortresses preparing in Britain

General Carl Spaatz, commanding general air forces, European theatre of operations, United State Army, had some good news to tell this week. He said that “within the immediate future” joint operations between the British and American air forces will commence: the preparations for the joint Anglo-U.S. aerial offensive against the enemy have made such fine progress that “we are now proceeding ahead of actual schedule”. These pictures show how advanced the preparations are in this country, with the American flying fortress playing a leading part.

A United States Army Air Force Flying Fortress soars over the head of cheering members of ground crew at an American bomber station in Great Britain in July 1942. In Germany the caption was rewritten to reflect German war aims. AP PHOTO
The English translation of the German caption approved by the Propaganda Ministry read as follows:

The first picture of the “Flying Fortress”

With planes of this type, the construction of which requires two million hours of labor, Roosevelt wants to win the war in the air. The appearance of the plane was celebrated with typical American bluff. The picture on the right shows the plane taking off, the picture below shows it landing somewhere on the continent. Everywhere, where these giant planes appear over Europe, they become most welcome targets of our gunners.

The U.S. investigators found that on the reverse side of 17 of the 19 of the photos, “nearly all bearing Associated Press markings,” there was a stamp that read:

F. MARQUEZ DA COSTA – Fotografias – Reportagens Jornal
“Comercio do Porto”

A DO ALECRIM, 81

E.F. 27492 – LISBOA

Laux identified the stamp as one used by Luiz Lupi in transmitting photos from Lisbon to Berlin and said that “Comercio do Porto” was either a publishing house engaged by Lupi or it was a means of camouflaging Lupi’s identity. A now deceased Portuguese photographer by the name of Firmino Marques da Costa, who was a contemporary of Lupi’s, has been identified, but whether he is the same person could not be definitively confirmed. Laux said his contacts with Lupi took place at La Prensa Asociada [The Associated Press], Rua de Pedrouces 73, Lisbon. Similar stamps are clearly visible today on many photo prints in the AP Photo Library in New York.

When the investigators compared the original AP photo captions to the published German captions they found “that practically every text was altered before release to the German public.” Their report added: “The changed text constitutes each news-photo a sample of Nazi propaganda, in that the German text cast an unfavorable light upon the United States or the Allies or was presented to the German public as a morale booster.”
The earliest evidence of the photo exchange agreement found in AP Corporate Archives is an undated 1942 cable, sent by Executive Newsphoto Editor Al Resch in New York to Lupi in Lisbon that also refers to photos from Benito Mussolini’s Italy:

Lupi informative Rome instructed send you duplicate pictures each plane of which relay one set to Wurzel [in London] second Newyorkward preferably passengerwise otherwise clippermail Stop Berlin instructed send pictures in triplicate daily via new airline of which send one set Wurzel second Newyorkward clippermail third Newyorkward clipper passengerwise when possible otherwise boat crew Stop Advise in few days how Berlin Lisbon relay working Stop Deeply grateful you fine work Resch

The U. S. government was initially informed of the photo exchange agreement in a phone call July 13, 1942, followed by a letter the next day from AP Executive Editor Alan J. Gould to N.R. Howard, assistant to Byron Price, the director of the U.S. Office of Censorship, in Washington, D.C. Price, who was named AP’s first executive editor in 1937, was plucked from the news agency by President Franklin D. Roosevelt 10 days after the Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor to head America’s wartime censorship efforts.

That same day, Howard wrote an internal office memo outlining his conversation with Gould who he said called to ask “if I could think of any reason why the AP should not make and/or renew loose photo exchange agreements with syndicates in Elizabeth [sic], Portugal, Berne, Switzerland, and London, England, — none of them enemy countries.”

“Told him I could think of none as long as censorship operated on the news photos sent out of this country,” Howard added. “Mr. Gould said that was his expectation and he supposed the enemy countries would exercise censorship on what pictures they allowed to fall into the neutral syndicate hands.”

On July 14, 1942, Gould wrote to Howard:

This refers to our conversation of yesterday and outlines for informative purposes, as suggested by you, the gist of an experimental arrangement whereby an exchange of news pictures is being undertaken by the Associated Press with Marques Da Costa, a photographic agent in Portugal, whose address is c/o Comercio do Porto, 81 Rua Alegrim, Lisbon. Da Costa furnishes news pictures from time to time, including pictures from Axis territories, for mailing to us here, in return for which he receives news photos by mail from this country, on a reciprocal exchange basis. It is understood of course, that the handling of all pictures under this arrangement is subject to the censorship regulations. My further understanding, based on our talk, is that you see
First of three letters between The Associated Press and the U.S. Office of Censorship in which the AP is told that the U.S. government had no objection to a photo exchange through neutral countries with Nazi Germany, subject to censorship.

U.S. NATIONAL ARCHIVES
In this letter Army Maj. N.V. Carlson said the photo exchange "should be encouraged for the information value that may be derived."
U.S. NATIONAL ARCHIVES
The U.S. Office of Censorship says it has “no objection to such an exchange, with all hands understanding that the pictures ... are subject to censorship regulations.”

U.S. NATIONAL ARCHIVES
no objection to this arrangement, and I should appreciate a note of confirmation thereon for our file.  

Acknowledging Gould’s letter, Howard said the Office of Censorship, including its postal, cable and press divisions, “has no objection to such an exchange, with all hands understanding that the pictures, as usual, and like all others, are subject to the censorship regulations.” Indeed, the acting chief of postal censorship, N.V. Carlson, said the exchange “should be encouraged for the information value that may be derived from the arrangements.”

The censorship regulations allowed immediate passage of photos of enemy origin into the United States, but there were restrictions on such photos being subsequently relayed outside the country.

In March of 1944, Paul Miller, AP’s assistant general manager based in Washington, wrote to Jack Lockhart, assistant director of the Office of Censorship, questioning objections raised by U.S. censors in San Francisco to an AP picture destined for subscribers in Australia and New Zealand.

The photo’s caption read:

Bomb damage at Castel Gandolfo, Germans say — German caption accompanying this photo, distributed by Pressens Bild, Swedish photo agency, describes it as showing damage from Allied bombs at Castel Gandolfo, summer residence of the Pope (APWirephoto via radio today from Stockholm)

Harold Turnblad, the AP news editor in San Francisco, wrote Miller saying other pictures showing damage to churches also had been suppressed “on grounds that such pictures make good enemy propaganda and we should have no part in giving them distribution.”

Turnblad added: “As the war in Italy progresses we probably will have a lot of pictures of churches damaged which will have wide interest in Australia as elsewhere. Therefore, I’d appreciate it if you would determine from the Office of Censorship whether suppressions of this kind are in keeping with its general policy.

Miller’s subsequent letter prompted an internal review of policy at the Office of Censorship.

On March 11, Byron Price wrote to John S. Knight, his liaison officer in London, to establish what policy the British censors followed in such cases.

“We have followed a policy of not permitting these pictures to be sent from the United States to other nations (such as the Latin American countries, Australia and New Zealand) on the theory that we did not think it appropriate in wartime for United States picture agencies to be the sole distributing agency for photographs furthering German propaganda,” Price wrote.
Price explained the policy had been challenged and said the answer seemed to lie in whether the British censors allowed the export of such pictures that could “only come from German sources through neutral capitals to the United States and England.”

“If the British do permit export, then we only place the United States agencies at a disadvantage by our policy,” Price wrote. “If the British do not permit export of such pictures, then we think our policy is correct.”

“Of course, any pictures taken in Italy by Allied agencies and which are sent through censorship back to England and the United States are not involved,” he added.

Knight checked with George P. Thomson, Britain’s chief press censor, who said the general practice of British censors “is not to interfere with the use or transmission of such pictures.”

In a letter dated March 25, 1944, Thomson wrote:

“There are no security grounds on which objection can be taken to them and so far as propaganda is concerned we have always left it to the good sense of the agencies involved not to help the enemy unnecessarily. Anyway, propaganda and counter-propaganda is not the concern of the Censorship and I would not like to embark upon an argument as to the merits or demerits of our practice, which is, as I have already indicated, not to interfere with the use or transmission of German photographs.”

On April 6, less than two weeks later, the U.S. Office of Censorship issued the following directive:

“Henceforth all news pictures of enemy origin offered for export from U.S. are passable regardless of propaganda content. Only consideration for questioning passage of such pix must involve U.S. or Allied military security and these instances will necessarily be rare even if existent. This cancels paragraph six our 136127 of 19 July 43 x the policy of immediate passage of incoming news pictures is not affected.”

At the height of the war, the Office of Censorship employed more than 14,000 people, but Price, who reported directly to Roosevelt, imposed a mostly voluntary regulatory code that sought to balance press freedoms with wartime security needs.

A postwar memorandum by Stratton on Feb. 14, 1946, summarized the photo exchange arrangement from AP’s perspective this way:
... so far as anyone in AP was aware, the only arrangement that AP had entered with regard to an exchange of newpictures was that which was first submitted to the proper authorities in Washington in writing and which was approved by Washington. Copies of these letters were sent to [Wes] Gallagher [postwar chief of bureau in Germany] some time ago. That arrangement centered at Lisbon, where a Portuguese national received and forwarded pictures to Germany and in turn handed AP pictures from Germany and German-controlled countries to AP in Lisbon. London forwarded its news pictures to Lisbon for the same exchange.

Upon his return to Berlin from Lisbon, Laux faced the business of establishing the Bureau Laux, re-assembling some of the AP GmbH staff serving in various branches of the Wehrmacht and managing for all of them to voluntarily join the Waffen SS, which provided the needed escape from active military duty. He told his American interrogators:

I had a long conversation with Mr. Brandt over the possibilities of his being deferred, as entering the Waffen SS appealed to him no more than it did to me; further, we wondered if this action would be ratified by the AP, realizing this was the only solution by which we could accomplish our purpose. In connection with this, Brandt, [Gerhardt] Baatz and [Arthur von] Brietzke entered the Waffen SS and were immediately deferred for service with Bureau Laux, a masterpiece, because I believe my connections brought results, in which I alone could write ten pages. These three wore their SS uniforms not more than one day during the entire war, which was only achieved by my rank. I would like to make a point of the fact that the spirit of the Bureau Laux was anything else but National Socialist. These three men were absolute rivals of National Socialism, they expressed themselves clearly and quite often as such in my presence. They were not members of the party or of any other organization connected with the party.

Laux said he also obtained property custodianship of the AP photo print archive with the support of the Foreign Ministry from the Reichs Kommissar on grounds the photos could be exploited for propaganda by Bureau Laux but, he added, “None of the archive photos were [ever] used for German propaganda purposes.”
Brandt said he and the Foreign Ministry’s Levinsky agreed it would be best to give Laux control of the AP photo prints [rather than others] but not the thousands of glass plate negatives, which were stored separately, because that way Brandt could keep an eye on the prints. “Laux was also the right person to keep uncomfortable suitors off our necks,” Brandt wrote.\(^{271}\)

“Our decision paid off,” he added. “Since Laux was not interested in personally working with the archive and I could take on the assignment, claiming a lack of customer interest, the archive remained as good as untouched throughout the war.\(^ {272}\)

Joining the Laux Bureau was tempting, Brandt wrote, especially the prospect of staying out of the army.

This was the first benefit provided by the Intelligence Special Command. Baatz and Brietzke let themselves be taken into the Waffen SS and were sent immediately, without military training, to the Intelligence Special Command, a military unit that was intended exclusively for members of the press department of the foreign ministry. With that, they were relieved of all military duties, although this was dependent on the goodwill of Laux and Schmidt. They continued to wear their civilian clothing, lived at home, received civilian rations and went about their normal work in the Laux office — Baatz as photo reporter and Brietzke in the laboratory — as if nothing had happened.\(^ {273}\)

Brandt, still officially director of the AP GmbH, was seconded to the Bureau Laux by the Luftwaffe for about half a year when Laux told him the Luftwaffe would not extend his leave but that Laux had requested his transfer to the Intelligence Special Command. There was already a ruling that Luftwaffe members could be transferred to the SS without their agreement, Brandt said.\(^ {274}\)

“You can imagine, Chief, what effect that had on me,” Brandt wrote to Lochner, adding:

I could see in the examples of Baatz and Brietzke that a connection to the Intelligence Special Command was harmless and did not expose a person in political or military ways. But the idea of being taken over by the SS, which I detested, hated from the depth of my heart, was terrible. At the same time I saw that a further stay in Berlin, which the transfer to the Waffen SS would guarantee, was in terms of further keeping an eye on Laux’s activities against the
AP GmbH, was [sic] preferable to service on the front with
the Luftwaffe. 275

Brandt said he sought but failed to simply obtain an extension of his leave
from the Luftwaffe.

Even if I have to admit today that the transfer to the SS may
have saved my life and that it in any case made it possible for
me to continue to watch over the interests of the AP, I still
cannot shake the uncomfortable feeling that for quite a
while I was carried on the rolls of the Waffen SS. The fact
that the transfer was involuntary does not allow any doubt
on my political reliability as an upright democrat, which I
have always been. Still the change was a heavy burden to my
spiritual balance, and I was able to offset it only through
greater efforts within the framework of my responsibilities
to the AP property which had been entrusted to me. 276

Laux now suggested Brandt give up his title as director of the AP GmbH,
arguing that Brandt’s position as managing director of the “Bureau Laux”
— although Brandt said no such employment contract had been signed — was
incompatible with his AP role. Brandt refused. 277

“From this moment on we were irreconcilable enemies,” Brandt wrote. “The
only thing keeping us from a complete break was our joint interest in keeping
the operation we ran going. Laux had no interest in losing me. He needed me
to continue cooperation with the AP and for the handling of all questions
related to that.” 278

Brandt said the distribution of AP’s photos inside Germany gave him no
concerns because the incoming photos were cleared by British or American
censors or had already appeared in foreign magazines the government
received.

“By the time the Bureau Laux began its work, the glory days of German success
news was already over,” Brandt wrote. “As a result, the photo production was
not useable for propaganda purposes any more unless you resorted to faking
photos.” 279

He said he was aware of one case in which an AP photo had been altered and
published in the Berlin Illustrierte Zeitung much to ministry spokesman
Schmidt’s great satisfaction. Brandt wrote:

It had to do with the raising of a flag after the Anglo-
American landings in North Africa. Schmidt intended to use
this fake to show that the intention of the Americans was not
the liberation of Europe but the expansion of American
“imperialism.” The British Union Jack and French tricolor
therefore had to be removed by retouching, so the German
reader could be convinced that the French and British

In the one known example of the Germans altering AP photo content,
a German propaganda specialist removed the Union Jack flag from this
image in North Africa, making it appear that the U.S. was planning
imperial expansion on its own. Brandt discusses this incident in his
letter to Lochner after the war.

AP PHOTO (ABOVE)
BERLINER ILLUSTRIERTE ZEITUNG (BELOW)
troops were saluting just the Star-Spangled Banner. This would show their obedience to “dollar imperialism.”

Baatz was mainly engaged in tracking down photos in the Nazi-controlled countries of the Balkans, Brandt said. The list of commercial customers was small and only the Foreign Office subsidy [from the Waffen SS] kept the operation afloat, according to Brandt.

Brandt’s job was to find suitable photos to send AP.

“I did this with the help of the photo specialist in the press office of the Foreign Office, who received print copies of the complete production of the various photo companies,” he wrote.

“Out of this material I picked appropriate photos and put together a daily photo shipment to the AP. I did the English texts based on the original caption material and sent the service by courier to Lupi in Lisbon,” Brandt wrote.

Brandt says at one point, Schmidt, the ministry’s spokesman, on whose largesse the Laux Bureau operated, threatened to close the Bureau Laux operation because AP’s photos “hardly ever showed anything new” and for some reason the magazines and newspapers from England always arrived containing photos earlier than the AP originals arriving in Berlin from Lisbon.

Laux accepted Brandt’s suggestion that photo delivery from AP might be faster coming via Sweden, also a neutral during the war, using the Swedish photo agency Pressens Bild as a go-between.

Brandt says Laux agreed he should travel to Stockholm, where he quietly contacted his former AP Berlin colleague Ed Shanke, now AP’s correspondent in Sweden, who quickly worked out the new photo exchange agreement with AP in London and Pressens Bild.

Brandt tells a story of office politics, Nazi intrigue in the Swedish capital and the fear of being picked up by the Gestapo. He wrote:

So I went to Stockholm, to work out the exchange agreement with Pressensbild. Our agreement was made possible by Eddy [sic] Shanke, who got in touch with [Joseph J.] Wurzel [AP’s directing news photo editor for Europe.] To avoid the suspicion of a conspiracy with the AP, I stretched my time in Stockholm out longer than was necessary. I hinted that the negotiations had taken time because of the necessary
telephone and telegraph consultations of Pressensbild's [sic] go-between and that the AP had only step by step become convinced of our good intentions. Even a dyed-in-the-wool Nazi could not have conceived less complicated negotiations with the “enemy.” I could not emphasize my connections to the AP through negotiations that were too smooth and fast. A longer stay was necessary for my personal security.

In Stockholm I had to inform [German] Press Attache Hepp about the progress of the “negotiations.” He had warned me right at the start of my time in Stockholm against coming into direct contact with the AP. Earlier, when I was introduced to him for the first time in Berlin, he boasted about his friendship with [AP Foreign Editor] John Evans and [AP General Manager] Kent Cooper. This friendship of course did not keep him from forbidding me most specifically [of endangering] German interests, because the Americans would not hesitate to portray my contact publicly as a German attempt to put out peace feelers. I had every reason in view of this warning to expect Hepp to have me watched. And information I gradually got over the activity of the Gestapo in Stockholm convinced me that my idea of visiting Eddy [sic] Shanke in his apartment was a great risk for me in a certain sense. Still, it was a great experience after so long a time to take Eddy [sic] Shanke in my arms as part of my beloved AP. I held back no information involving me, involving Laux, involving the [Foreign] Office and especially involving Germany in the fifth year of the war. I used the opportunity to finally pour my heart out in the right place.

With a pounding heart, then, I later passed the passport and Gestapo checkpoints on my return to Berlin, and had similar feelings in my first meeting with Herr Schmidt, in which I gave him a short outline of my success. I made a special point in this report of saying I had been able to work out a deal for the exchange service with the Bureau Laux, that Pressensbild had gotten assurance of AP approval, that the problem of an exchange of telegram and radio photos had been resolved satisfactorily and that the sale of German photo material in Sweden by Pressensbild had also been agreed. I did not forget to mention all the appointments through which I had been able to arrange the greatest possible speeding-up in the supply of AP photos via the German mission in Stockholm. Now AP material could be in Berlin faster than the English magazines in which they were printed. That spoke to an issue Schmidt had always used to threaten the closure of the Bureau Laux. With that, I achieved an unimagined success, in that he suddenly forgot the accusations he made about my overstaying the agreed-upon time in Stockholm. Instead, he said he was arranging
the War Service Medal Second Class for me, to be awarded as part of a general round of honors. I had prepared myself for an inquisition about my Stockholm stay and now saw that my thoughts had gone a bit too far. This new realization did not, however, shake me from my rule to use the greatest caution when dealing with Nazis.284

The Swedish connection did provide the Germans quicker access to a rare, perhaps only photo of a German V-1 buzz bomb falling on downtown London, a morale booster for the Nazis. It was made by AP’s Michael Nash from the roof of the Reuters building where the AP had moved its offices after its Tudor Street office was gutted by German bombs.

Nash said British censors initially trimmed the pictures down to show just the flying bomb and the top of a flagpole, an image published on the front page of the London Daily Mail on June 21, 1944.

“Two months later, when the campaign in Europe was well under way, the British censors released the rest of the picture showing that the bomb had fallen well and truly in Central London (on the Daily Herald Building in fact),” Nash wrote.285

When the photos showing the full impact of the bomb arrived in Germany, the Berliner Illustrierte Zeitung promptly filled the entire front page of its Aug. 31 edition with two photos of this display of Germany’s most feared weapon. The photo was simply credited to “Büro Laux.”286

But the quicker link to AP photos via Stockholm also brought images that could not be published in Germany.

“This way,” said Arthur von Brietzke in an interview in 1983, “we also received pictures of the advance of the Allies, which were immediately forwarded to the German [government] offices. I still have a picture with the stamp on the back saying ‘Büro Laux’ showing U.S. soldiers on the streets of the shot up and captured city of Cologne. This one reached us via Stockholm at the beginning of 1945. So I worked at the Büro Laux until the bitter end.”287

Laux accordingly traveled to Lisbon to update his contract with Lupi and conduct other business. While there, he said he asked whether Lupi could obtain a Walt Disney film about Hitler for the German Foreign Ministry.288 This was an apparent reference to “Der Fuehrer’s Face,” an animated anti-Nazi propaganda film released in 1943 in which Donald Duck has a nightmare that he’s living in Germany slaving under the Nazi regime. The eight-minute short won the Academy Award for Best Short Film (animated) the same year. Laux
told interrogators that as far as he knew Lupi was unable to obtain the film. During the same trip, The London Daily Mail published a Reuters report May 5 from Lisbon under the headline “German Arrested at Lisbon Airport,” which said “Customs officers at Sacavem airport (Lisbon) arrested Laux, Helmut, a German, today as he was trying to smuggle in two Leica cameras and special lens and films. Laux, who arrived by a German plane, brought the cameras in a leather hand-bag, which he tried to pass through the Customs without examination. He was stopped, however, at the exit.” There were no further details.
6. War Photo Exclusives

“In addition to the heavy volume of newsphoto copy from pool and official sources on Allied operations, AP newsphoto service also provided — exclusively for the most part — many pictures from Axis-occupied areas, obtained through neutral sources.”

KENT COOPER TO AP’S BOARD OF DIRECTORS, DEC. 31, 1942

There is evidence to suggest the exchange of photos between Germany and the United States through Lisbon may have begun informally, perhaps as a test run, even before the release of the detained journalists at Bad Nauheim in May 1942.

In April, a package of German photos arrived in New York via Lisbon, which contained a photo of Hitler that was distributed by AP and featured by the New York Post with the following caption:

“This picture of the world’s no. 1 scourge shows him studying a field map at his headquarters. Herr Hitler is in a bomb-proof room. The photograph, latest of the Fuehrer to reach this country, was passed by censors of Germany, Britain, Portugal and the United States.”

Gould sent the newspaper clipping to Kent Cooper, along with a brief note. “This Hitler picture is the first batch we received via Lisbon, as a result of recent re-establishment of the relay arrangement there,” he wrote. “This first sentence of the caption, of course, was changed by The Post. Mostly the shipment was innocuous, but a few others also are useable.” No clarification regarding “the recent re-establishment of the relay arrangement” has been found.
But the Laux exchange allowed Kent Cooper to report to the board on December 31, 1942, a full year after Hitler declared war on the United States, on AP’s superior performance in war picture coverage, including from German-occupied territory:

In addition to the heavy volume of newsphoto copy from pool and official sources on Allied operations, AP newsphoto service also provided — exclusively for the most part — many pictures from Axis-occupied areas, obtained through neutral sources. Notable beats were scored on first pictures of the German occupation of Vichy France and first pictures from the German side of the Stalingrad front.294

Cooper may have been referring to an AP photo published Dec. 7, 1942, in The New York Times under the headline: “A city that defies the Nazis: Stalingrad after attack by Stukas.” The caption read:

Smoke billows from an industrial area of the Russian city following an air raid, according to caption accompanying this German photo, which reached here via neutral Portugal.295

Another photo, initially received by AP in London “from a neutral source” and relayed to New York in October 1942 showed German infantry capturing “Hill 102” — a battle zone that “changed hands daily, sometimes hourly” — in the industrial suburbs of Stalingrad.296

Or perhaps he was referring to an iconic photo distributed Dec. 18, 1942, described this way:

The caption which accompanied this German picture, received through neutral Portugal, describes the scene of devastation as “An abandoned horse among the ruins of Stalingrad. In the background (at right) Russian women leaving their battered homestead can be seen.”297

There was even a photo from Japan, relayed by the Germans to AP via Portugal, showing Japanese troops landing in the Aleutians with the following caption:

Japanese troops with their Rising Sun flag landing in the Aleutian Islands, said the caption on this picture received in the United States from neutral Portugal after first being radioed from Tokio [sic] Berlin.298

The photo exchange arrangement did not cause New York photo editor Al Resch sleepless nights. A year earlier, before the U.S. entered the war, AP’s top photo editor took a business-as-usual view with the Germans when Lochner approached him in October 1940 with a proposal from the Foreign Ministry regarding Facts in Review, a weekly propaganda bulletin in the United States mailed to some 70,000 persons by the German Library of Information, an
Resch have interesting proposal from German Foreign Office namely wilhelmstrasse offers transmit considerable number wireless (photos) to Associated New York free of charge on two conditions namely first that all pictures which prove unusable in Associated service be automatically given to editors of facts and reviews [sic] published under auspices German embassy Washington Stop Second that pictures acceptable for associated will naturally appear in Associated service first but after publication should also supplied to facts and reviews [sic] for publication therein Stop In latter case facts and reviews [sic] has no right pass these pictures on to anybody else for publication Stop If approved foreign office ready today radiograph three pictures experimentally Lochner Resch's reply was brief: “Lochner go ahead Resch.”

Whether the experiment succeeded is unknown, but the message exchange reflected the continuing eagerness of the Nazis to provide photos to AP and AP's interest in collecting any photos available from wartime Germany for possible use in its service.

On June 16, 1941, the Roosevelt administration ordered the German Library of Information closed and Facts in Review was shuttered, but this mutual interest in photos continued after the United States entered the war six months later.

At least three German photos were distributed by New York on July 4, 1942, including one of an event on May 30, suggesting all arrived in the same package, delayed over a month as it traveled from Berlin to Lisbon to New York and cleared U.S. censorship.

One captured Hitler grasping the hand of Admiral Karl Doenitz, commander of Germany's U-boat forces at Hitler's headquarters. A second showed smoke billowing from a German railroad gun firing shells across the English Channel aimed at the southeast corner of England. The third dated May 30 showed Hitler saluting young German army officers and cadets assembled to hear his annual address. Each caption ended with this advisory: “This photo reached New York from neutral Portugal.”

In addition to the photos from Stalingrad later that year, other images transmitted via Lisbon show the first German armored car arriving in Toulon, occupied France, and German troops marching under the Ports Daix in Marseilles on Dec. 1.

Another photo of occupied France, dated May 30 and distributed by New York, carried a caption advising the photo had “just been received from England.” It showed a blindfolded Frenchman sagging in death before a Nazi firing squad.
who had been shot, the caption said, in reprisal for acts of sabotage. The origin of the photo is unknown.\textsuperscript{307}

The photos arriving from Germany via Lisbon were widely used by the American press. On August 3, 1942, for example, the Washington Post published five on a single page, noting at the end of one of the captions, “This picture and all others in this series came via neutral Portugal and bore captions written by the Nazis.”\textsuperscript{308}

The photos showed the cupola of the Maxim Gorki fortress near Sevastopol, large captured cannons at the Maxim Gorki fortifications, an anti-aircraft gun used against Russian tanks, an American tank destroyed on the battlefield of Tobruk on the Libyan coast and German soldiers collecting booty after recapturing Tobruk from the British.

As the war dragged on, the volume of photos pouring into New York from all corners of the globe mounted dramatically. Resch reported that 1,147 photos of foreign origin were distributed by the limited Wirephoto service in the United States in the first three months of 1943 compared to just 314 photos in the first quarter of 1942. Far more photos were sent out through AP’s widely distributed mailed photo service.

\textbf{In 1943, Cooper reported to the board of directors that AP had achieved “noteworthy firsts on distribution of pictures obtained from enemy territory via neutral capitals — including such copy as the first pictures of Berlin bomb damage.”}\textsuperscript{309} This was a reference to a photo dated Dec. 2, 1943, received from the Laux Bureau via Stockholm. Its caption read:

\begin{quote}
 First picture out of Berlin since big raids
 Caption accompanying this picture made available by Pressens Bild, Swedish picture agency, and sent by radio Dec. 2 from Stockholm, described it as first picture to show any bomb damage after last week’s RAF raids on Berlin — with military band marching up Unter den Linden. Scene was typical, Stockholm caption said, of German efforts to hide bomb damage, with little damage shown except ruins of one building at left and some shattered windows in building in background. Parade of a military band was resumed after Berlin streets were cleared of debris, caption continued, to help morale. Picture was apparently taken, Stockholm caption said, at the corner of Unter den Linden and Friedrichstrasse with the Kranzler coffee house, familiar to tourists, on corner in background. Associated Press radiophoto\textsuperscript{310}
\end{quote}
The appearance in 1943 of German photos in the AP photo service arriving from Pressens Bild, a photo agency established in 1936 in neutral Sweden, is a tangled tale of contradictory recollections by two central figures in the saga of AP's photo coverage of wartime Germany.

Helmut Laux and Willy Brandt offer accounts, almost certainly reflecting memory lapses, that differ significantly in the timing of events and that research for this project has been unable to reconcile.

One of the earliest photos found arriving from Sweden was published July 24, 1943, in The Cumberland Evening News of Cumberland, Maryland, under the headline: “Axis Version of Rome Air Raid.” The caption read:

The Stockholm caption accompanying this picture transmitted by radio to New York said the picture showed “wrecked Lorenzo Basilica with bishop's chair in foreground.” The picture reached Pressens-bild [sic], Stockholm Picture Agency, by telephoto from Berlin after transmission from Rome, according to caption data. (Retouching evident in the picture was done abroad: none was done here).311

Yet, in a brief history of the Bureau Laux and its activities, which was written in English and discovered by U.S. counterintelligence agents in Laux's home after the war, Laux says: “In October 1943 the photoservice exchange was extended to Stockholm. From now the A.P. was getting the European service on two ways, one by Lissabon [sic] and another by Stockholm.”

“In April 1944 I travelled to Lissabon to Lissabon [sic] in order to prolong and to extend the consisting [sic] agreement with the A.P.” he added.312

A separate U.S. military record, however, quotes Laux as saying the Stockholm channel was not operational until July 1944 when he says Willy Brandt traveled to Stockholm “to make the necessary arrangements.” He wrote:

After this [photo exchange] agreement had run successfully for two years Mr. Lupi and I renewed the contract at the end of May 1944 in Lisbon. The exchange of the news photos should in addition be transmitted through the A.P. in Sweden. This addition became necessary because of the war and transportation circumstances. The airway Berlin-Stockholm-London-New York surpassed in speed the Lisbon route. Until the war's end, this photo exchange was successfully carried on by both parties. In July 1944 Mr. Brandt flew to Stockholm to make the necessary arrangements.313

Brandt’s “Confession” provides a third account. Referring to the delays in receiving AP photos in Berlin from Lisbon, he wrote:

These repeated troubles led to an undertaking planned by
Laux and finally turned over to me. I refer to my first trip to Stockholm, which I made in April 1944. Laux wanted to speed up the receipt of AP photos and the delivery of ours to AP. This had until then taken place via Lisbon.314

No contracts, correspondence or other records regarding wartime arrangements with Pressens Bild could be found in AP Corporate Archive other than the many photos from Germany in the AP Photo Library the Swedish agency is credited with relaying to AP in New York.

Earlier in 1943, German photos were still being sent to Lisbon for relay to New York and London.

In January, for example, New York distributed a photo from Lisbon of Goebbels addressing a mass meeting before a huge banner which said: “Never forget that England forced the war on us.”335

The demand for German photos was so great that AP in New York in February that year distributed a copy made in London of a photo of German transport planes flying over the Sicily Channel that had originally appeared in a German publication.336

There were also delivery problems. Some photos sent to New York from Lisbon arrived so late they were never used. In some cases, U.S. censorship was involved.

German photos arriving from Lisbon, whose original German captions were dated April 13, 1943, remain in the AP Archive today, but they were never distributed. There is no corresponding New York caption, just a handwritten notation on each: “released 10/1/1945,” an apparent reference to U.S. censors withholding the pictures until well after war’s end.

The caption of one, quoting the German High Command, said the photo showed members of the Paris fire brigade searching for buried victims after an Allied air raid on April 4, 1943, which, it said, killed more than 250 people and wounded many hundreds more.337

Another, according to the caption, again quoting the German High Command, showed a destroyed church in Antwerp, Belgium, on April 13, following an Anglo-American bombing raid, and added:

One hundred dwelling houses — among them a large number of workers homes — were either completely destroyed or badly damaged. Four schools were hit, two of which were demolished. More than 250 children were
buried under the debris. Over 2,000 were killed and a large number of wounded have been reported.  

Neutral Sweden also served as a lookout post for the AP's news service, where correspondent Edwin A. Shanke (known as “Eddie”), previously based in Berlin until expelled with Lochner and the others, monitored events in Scandinavia.

One insight into AP thinking about news and photo coverage of Germany during the war may be gleaned from AP Foreign Editor Glenn Babb's support for a recommendation by Shanke that AP subscribe in Stockholm to the German-sponsored Scandinavia Telegraph Bureau. Babb served as foreign editor from 1943 to 1948.

In a memo to Gould, AP's executive editor, Babb sought budgetary approval “as a matter of insurance and one more peephole into Germany with a caution to Shanke to always identify any material used as of enemy origin.” The request was approved.

Using Pressens Bild as a quicker relay was fortuitous, coming at a time of declining German fortunes and a parallel demand for more photos from Hitler's beleaguered Third Reich. A photo from Berlin arriving via Pressens Bild and distributed by AP in New York appeared in American newspapers on Aug. 5, 1943, showing residents of the German capital digging air raid shelters and trenches in a park.

Many others quickly followed, some showing the Germans were not entirely a spent force: German Tiger tanks in the Brenner Pass after Germans took control there from the Italians, German paratroopers disarming Italian tank crews amid burning tanks and large fires, POWs being used by the Germans to build a defense wall in Poland near the German border of 1939, Hitler outlining the Nazi war position in a Munich beer hall celebrating the anniversary of his 1923 putsch, German soldiers in the burning streets of Zhitomir, which fell to the Germans in a counter-offensive west of Kiev.

The photos arriving from Germany via Stockholm in 1944 seem to reflect three main themes: Germany's deteriorating military position, the July 20 assassination attempt against Hitler and the brutal subjugation of the Poles after the Warsaw Uprising. There were also photos of captured Allied paratroopers in Holland and American pilots boarding a train for prisoners “somewhere in the Reich.”

Photos depicting the treason trial following the assassination attempt on Hitler selected by the Bureau Laux for distribution to AP included one showing Field Marshall Erwin von Witzleben testifying shortly before he and
seven others were convicted and hanged\textsuperscript{328} and another of Hitler conferring with Goebbels.\textsuperscript{329}

As if to convey confidence in Germany’s military status, even as youngsters in the Hitler Youth were being given military training, the Propaganda Ministry authorized for international distribution a photo of Field Marshall Gen. Guenther von Kluge, commander of German forces on the Western front, conferring with officers,\textsuperscript{330} and another of Field Marshal Irwin Rommel in France at his anti-invasion headquarters.\textsuperscript{331}

There also are numerous German photos from 1944 that arrived via Lisbon that appear to have been rejected by AP’s editors because, although retained, there is no accompanying New York-written photo caption. They were most likely discarded in favor of more timely photos arriving from Stockholm by radio.

Rejects included photos of German anti-invasion exercises at the “Atlantic Wall” in February, April and May,\textsuperscript{332} although AP did distribute a photo arriving via Stockholm showing a huge “Anti-Invasion Gun” placed somewhere “along the Channel Coast and Atlantic Wall” published April 12 in the Courier-Journal of Louisville, Kentucky.\textsuperscript{333}

Another photo distributed by AP June 3 was taken from the May 17 issue of German magazine \textit{Die Wehrmacht}, published in Berlin, showing a German sentry looking at an area in Holland flooded by the Nazis to hinder invasion.\textsuperscript{334} German publications were available in neutral countries such as Sweden and Portugal.

A series of photos from Bureau Laux showing Hitler Youth volunteers joining the German Army,\textsuperscript{335} other German youngsters receiving weapons training in September\textsuperscript{336} and still others marching through Innsbruck, Austria, in November bound for maneuvers,\textsuperscript{337} all appear to have been rejected.

However, a photo received by radio via Pressens Bild on August 14, titled “Germans answer total mobilization call,” was distributed with the following caption:

Caption accompanying this radiophoto, supplied by Pressens Bild, Swedish picture agency, says it shows column of elderly German civilians, carrying guns of various descriptions, passing in review before Gauleiter Lauterbacher in unnamed town as they answer German total mobilization call. This photo was received in New York by radio from Stockholm, on Aug. 14.

Photo coverage of the tragic ending of the Polish uprising against German occupation, which began Aug. 1, 1944, lasted 63 days and was brutally crushed, depended heavily on the official output of the Nazi propaganda machine.

The revolt, the largest act of resistance by any nation under German
occupation, led to the deaths of some 200,000 people, mostly civilians, and the destruction of most of Warsaw. The Poles capitulated Oct. 2.

The uprising was timed to coincide with the advance of the Red Army on the outskirts of the city, but the Soviets held back and the Germans prevailed.

It was a major story that proved the value of the link between Berlin and Stockholm over the Lisbon route.

On Sept. 2, AP distributed a radiophoto from Pressens Bild offering a rare glimpse of the destruction and savagery the Poles faced. Its caption read:

Warsaw rebel barricade faild [sic], say Germans

Received in New York by radio from Stockholm September 2 says it shows “Warsaw ruins resulting from the August uprising of Poles. Barricades made of trains, busses and other vehicles did not protect the rebels against annihilation or capture.” Picture was serviced by Pressens Bild, a Swedish picture agency.338

Captions of some of the first Berlin photos of the so-labeled “End of the Warsaw Tragedy” sent via Lisbon by the Bureau Laux dated September 15 appear to have arrived in New York as late as December 26 and 27, according to pencil notations on their envelopes. Whether transport routes, lack of radio facilities in Portugal or U.S. censorship caused the delays is unknown.339 Others, sent via Lisbon with captions dated Oct. 3, Oct. 5 and Oct. 7, arrived Nov. 26, Nov. 27, Nov. 28 and Dec. 26 and Dec. 27.340

The photos Berlin sent to Pressens Bild in Stockholm, however, reached New York much faster.

On Oct. 7, just five days after the Poles surrendered, AP issued a photo radioed from Stockholm showing “Polish patriots marching into a German internment camp after capitulation.”341 On Oct. 8, The New York Times published an AP radiophoto it titled “The German Version of the Surrender of Warsaw” showing members of the Polish truce delegation crossing a battered square in Warsaw. “So said the caption accompanying this German picture received from Stockholm,” the caption concluded.342 Three days later, the St. Louis Post-Dispatch published a photo radioed from Stockholm of “Gen. Bor,” the captured leader of the revolt, over the following caption:

Nazi photo of captive Gen. Bor

The German photo supplied by a Swedish agency is described as showing Gen. Tadeusz Komorowski (Gen. Bor), who led Polish Patriots in their unsuccessful battle for Warsaw, leaving German headquarters after capitulation.
negotiations. The general, in civilian clothes, is accompanied by an unidentified officer. The Poles surrendered Oct. 2 after a two-month struggle. — Associated Press Wirephoto.

The collapsing Nazi war machine in late 1944 and early 1945 was clearly reflected in the captions for photos AP received from Berlin via Sweden as well as photos from the Soviet Union.

Photos arriving in New York by radio from Moscow credited to state-run Sovfoto, the Soviet picture agency, now provided coverage of the Red Army’s advance produced by Russian photographers turned war correspondents.

As early as August 1944, a photographic glimpse of the horrors of the Holocaust arrived at AP headquarters from the Soviet capital.

One photo showed residents of Lublin, in what was pre-war Poland, gazing into a pit filled with bodies of those killed by the Germans who occupied the city, according to the Soviet picture agency.

The other, according to the Sovfoto caption accompanying it, showed: “The Lublin camp of annihilation. In their well-built cremation ovens, the Hitlerites daily burnt the bodies of those whom they tortured to death in the camp.”

Among an estimated 150,000 prisoners who entered Majdanek, the extermination and concentration camp built by the SS on the outskirts of Lublin, 80,000 people, including 60,000 Jews, were killed, according to the Majdanek State Museum website.

Six million Jews were killed by German Nazis and their collaborators during the Holocaust, wiping out a third of world Jewry and about two-thirds of all European Jews.

The world also was provided a window into the deteriorating conditions inside Germany and the German armies in retreat.

One photo from Berlin via Stockholm distributed Jan. 2, 1945, showed a German officer instructing a group of Hitler Youth in the use of machine guns.

A photo from the Soviets dated Jan. 4 showed “a street in war-torn Poznan, on the Warta River, Poland, during street fighting.” Another dated Jan. 29 described “Russian and Polish troops marching through one of the destroyed streets of Warsaw after Germans were driven from the Polish capital.”

Among the last photos of Adolf Hitler to be relayed to New York from Berlin via Stockholm were two distributed in March just weeks before the Nazi dictator and his wife, Eva Braun, took their lives on April 30 in the Fuehrer’s bunker as the battle for Berlin raged about them.
One, dated March 12, showed Hitler visiting soldiers at the front and bore the following caption:

**Hitler visits his soldiers on Oder River front**

Adolf Hitler (right) returns a salute from soldiers during his visit to a division headquarters on the Oder River front, according to the caption accompanying this German photo distributed by the Swedish picture agency Pressens Bild. Photo was received in New York March 12 by radio from Stockholm.351

On April 16, Soviet forces cross the Oder, and by April 21 the tanks of the Red Army had reached the outskirts of a Berlin already in ruins.

A photo taken March 19, but received in New York from Berlin via Pressens Bild on March 27, is the last photo of Hitler alive found in AP’s photo archive and distributed by AP. It may also be the last photo received from the Bureau Laux. It carried this chilling caption:

**Hitler awards Iron Cross to 12-year-old**

German caption accompanying this picture

Received in New York by radio from Stockholm March 27, serviced by a Swedish picture agency, says it shows Adolf Hitler shaking hands with Alfred Czech, 12-year-old Hitler Youth soldier, after the young veteran of battles in Pomerania, Upper and Lower Silesia, was awarded the Iron Cross at Hitler’s headquarters March 19.352
7. Epilogue

“... I found an indescribable chaos. ... Splinters of thousands of our glass negatives were mixed with down feathers of the beds, of which only a few shreds of fabric remained.”

WILLY BRANDT IN HIS 1945 "CONFESSION" TO LOUIS LOCHNER

In August of 1943, before the great Allied air raids over Germany began, Helmut Laux ordered AP’s photo print archive packed into crates and sent by train in two freight cars to Grueneberg in Silesia, as “important Wehrmacht war material,” where it remained until 1944 in the halls of a castle owned by Nazi dramatist and author Hans Rehberg. Laux said the shipment consisted of 15 tons of newshotos packed in 23 special cases, each 400 pounds, and 10 filing cabinets filled with photos.

The Russian advance from the east, however, forced Laux to later have the archive shipped to Aitrach near Memmingen in Bavaria in several railroad cars commandeered for the Waffen SS.

Until then, Brandt maintained the AP GmbH’s photo archive of prints for the Bureau Laux and earlier had stored AP’s photo lab equipment and the separate archive of photo negatives in rented basement rooms in Lindenstrasse for safety. The news bureau’s contents were stored in the basement of the building on Zimmerstrasse.

“My moves were worth it, even if I had to pay for them with thousands of cigarettes obtained on the black market and had to pay substantially over going rates,” Brandt wrote Lochner after the war. He added:

It saved our things from the first heavy air raids on Berlin on November 22, 1943, which destroyed our office and the AP newsroom being used by Domei [the official news agency of Germany’s ally, the Empire of Japan]. Aside from our [print] photo archive, which Laux had already moved, everything
else escaped destruction because it was in the basement of our building in the Lindenstrasse. For a long time the basement rooms also held our big negative archive, which according to the agreement with Levinsky did not go to Laux. This was to defend against all the plans Laux had in mind for the archive and to keep in hand the large part of the archive represented by the negatives.\footnote{As the Allied bombing runs over Berlin intensified in 1943, Brandt, his wife, Brunhilde, their son and their cat moved two days before Christmas to the relative safety of an apartment in Ziegenhals, near Wernsdorf, 30 kilometers [less than 20 miles] southeast of Berlin. He also moved the stored AP property in Berlin — at considerable risk because of strict controls on civilian transport — to the cellar of Haus Boehmer, a countryside hotel on the outskirts of Ziegenhals.

Brandt said it took three trips to Ziegenhals with a large truck to cart the 20 crates of materials from the news bureau, including office files, the bureau library, correspondence and other items, and an additional 15 crates containing AP GmbH property, including more than 70,000 glass photo negatives. Seven other crates contained the Brandt family's personal belongings.\footnote{Brandt said working weekends and other days off he eventually was able to build shelves and reorganize the archive so that “it could be used right away by the new AP bureau that I expected would be reopened right after the liberation. Everything else stayed in the crates.”}

As the final battle for Berlin loomed in early April 1945, Brandt and his family sought to escape the clutches of the advancing Red Army whose reputation for pillage and rape preceded it. The German forces defending the city by then consisted of a few poorly organized and exhausted Wehrmacht and SS divisions plus the ill trained militia or Volkssturm and youngsters in the Hitler Youth.

Brandt gave this account of his family's departure from Ziegenhals:

> On Monday April 23 at 6 a.m. we set out into the uncertain on bicycles, carrying only the bare necessities and the cat in a rucksack. I took the expensive cameras of the AP with me and left two signs in Russian in the cellar marking the things there clearly as American property. A bicycle accident I had, with our son in the child's seat in front of me, almost forced us to return. But our son held on bravely in spite of his injuries, as if he knew we were running for our lives. On the highway it was an inferno from hell, revealing the full insanity and the crimes of the Hitler adventure. There was collapse, misery, grief, helpless defeat, panic, fear and terror and despair around us as we gasped our way toward our goal. Refugees we met, whether they were military or civilians,
German or foreigners such as Belgians, Dutch, Flemish, or French, all had just one question: Is the way to the West, to the Americans, still open?\(^{359}\)

But there was no escape as the Russians moved in on the area, including Ziegenhals, and the Brandts hid in a home in Neuschulzendorf about 12 kilometers (7.5 miles) away. Some days later, Brandt returned to Ziegenhals on bicycle alone, leaving his wife behind for her safety, and gave this account of what he found:

In the Haus Boehmer I found an indescribable chaos. Every crate was opened and plundered, the shelves collapsed, a complete mess which showed all the signs of the wildest rage of destruction, lay on the floor. Splinters of thousands of our glass negatives were mixed with down feathers of the beds, of which only a few shreds of fabrics remained. Ripped books, files reduced to confetti, pages of news files, photos, file cards showed me the way to the roof of the building. The photo equipment and typewriters were gone by my first visit. Two silver cake forks and a cup from our porcelain were all that was left of what belonged to me. I turned away from this scene of horror filled with worry and anger. The elderly woman manager of the hotel told me that the residents of this part of Ziegenhals had been forced by the Russians to leave their homes. The area had been sealed off and the Russians spent four days working their way through the houses. ...\(^{360}\)

Eventually, the family returned to Berlin, “a dead city, a city of horror,” as Brandt put, and stayed with an old business friend in the western part of the German capital. Brandt said he objected to the behavior of the occupying Russians, observing that “all their actions clearly were aimed at turning an Allied victory into the revolutionary act of German communists who had fled to Moscow earlier and whom the Russians brought along with them when they came.”\(^{361}\) It was a prescient premonition of the Cold War that would divide the city and the country until 1989.

Brandt said he toyed briefly with the idea of starting a newspaper in anticipation of the arrival of the Western powers taking up their sectors of Berlin, but politics dissuaded him early on.

Towards the end, Brandt’s letter to Lochner mentions the delivery of electrifying news from his wife: “LPL is here! I spoke with him.”

Brandt’s account of his wartime activities concludes this way:

This then, Chief, is my confession to you. It contains everything that seemed necessary to give a picture of that Willy Brandt who disappeared for a while from the spotlight of your criticism and was forced to go his difficult way alone.
If only some features of this picture can only vaguely be made out, or seem incomplete, it is left to the reader to interpret them as he will. I myself can make no corrections. The Willy Brandt that I have tried to portray has always been guided by the idea that the proper behavior of a man finds its expression in loyalty.362

In the late summer of 1945, the war over, Byron Price took time to write Kent Cooper, heaping praise on AP’s wartime performance.

“As the Office of Censorship winds up its wartime operation, I want to express my deep appreciation to The Associated Press for its patriotic cooperation and loyal support of voluntary censorship,” Price wrote on Aug. 22.

“We found The Associated Press staff conscious at all times of the provisions of the Code of Wartime Practices, and willing to comply with any special requests issued by this office. This fine spirit, in fact, was evident throughout the publishing industry and was the basis for the success of the voluntary system,” he added.363

Back in Germany, however, U.S. counterintelligence agents had been busy for many months uncovering the background and workings of the Bureau Laux and investigating those who had worked for it in the Foreign Ministry.

Unaware of the decision by the Office of Censorship in Washington in 1942 to approve AP’s photo trade arrangement, two U.S. Army investigators for “Operation Pouch” — a reference to the use of German diplomatic pouches to pass photos back and forth between Lisbon and Berlin — summed up their findings on Jan. 14, 1946.

Special Agents Paul Hoylen and Robert E. Gregg of the Special Investigation Squad of the Counter Intelligence Corps reported to their headquarters that they questioned Lochner’s loyalty as a American and believed a charge that AP engaged in operations coming within the purview of the Trading With the Enemy Act could be substantiated.

They wrote:

a.) From this preliminary investigation it is the opinion of these agents that the definite proof is likely to be found upon which to substantiate a charge that the Associated Press, over a period ranging from 1943 to 1945, engaged in operations coming within the purview of the Trading with the Enemy Act. Through negotiations originally begun by
Louis P. Lochner with Laux in May 1942 and concluded with a written contract executed by Associated Press Agent L.C. Lupi and Laux later in the same year, it was arranged that quantities of Associated Press news-photos were to be transmitted from Lisbon to Berlin through Diplomatic Courier Pouches of the German Foreign Office to the Press Section of this branch of the German government. It is further believed that evidence will be developed to prove that the German Propaganda Ministry had access to these news-photos from the United States, all reaching the enemy government through the Associated Press, and that texts accompanying these news-photos were altered in a manner favorable to the Germans, before their eventual release to the German press; that Associated Press news-photos were illegally placed at the disposal of the German authorities, during the war, for at least information value; that direct use of Associated Press news-photos as German propaganda possibly occurred during the war, through this highly questionable agreement.

b.) Inference may easily be drawn that the loyalty of Louis P. Lochner to the United States is questionable. See Exhibit “B.” Further, Lochner was apparently fully aware that Laux possessed the Waffen SS rank of Sonderfuehrer when he negotiated for Laux’s Bureau to receive and transmit news-photos from the United States to Germany during the war. Under the protective cloak of the Waffen SS, the Associated Press continued to function through a camouflaged process, this whole plan having been planned and acquiesced to by Lochner. Exhibit “B” reveals that Lochner placed at the hand of German civilians Classified Material regarding arrest Categories. It is also indicated that Lochner illegally transmitted personal mail to and from Germany via German Diplomatic Courier Pouches during the war.

Less than two months later, however, on March 8, 1946, Brig. Gen. Edwin L. Sibert, assistant chief of staff [G-2], European Theater of Operations, who served as an intelligence officer during and after the war, dismissed the case and sent the entire “File and Report on Helmut Laux” to Washington to the attention of the chief of the Military Intelligence Service.

“The enclosed background material and interrogation reports on Helmut Laux are forwarded for your information and any further action you may deem desirable,” Sibert wrote on March 8. “In view of the difficulties involved in pursuing this case further and negligible results to be anticipated, this office contemplates taking no further action.”

Whether Sibert was informed by Wes Gallagher or by his superiors in Washington of the Office of Censorship’s knowledge and approval of the
photo exchange arrangement is unknown, but a week later the investigative file stated: “Case is considered closed.”

Efforts by AP to rehire Brandt immediately after the war were ultimately blocked by U.S. military authorities because of his Waffen SS affiliation and work at the German Foreign Office for the Bureau Laux. Initially, military intelligence officials cleared him for employment, but the Information Control Division of the Office of Military Government, whose initial task was to sanitize the German media by removing figures with Nazi connections, revoked that permission. Reluctantly, AP, faced with the possibility of being exposed for championing someone on the Waffen SS payroll, did not appeal the decision.

Brandt was interviewed for a story about AP in Germany published in the Winter 1965-66 edition of AP World, a quarterly magazine distributed to all AP member newspapers and AP employees. He described those days as his darkest times. The article included a summary of his wartime exploits. Brandt said he managed to survive after the war by working as business manager at his brother's medical supply business, Gebrüder Brandt GmbH, in Berlin.

Five years after the war, however, then AP Chief of Bureau Wes Gallagher in Frankfurt wrote New York seeing approval to rehire Brandt as a salesman.

“We need urgently a capable, aggressive man with a thorough knowledge of the newspaper and photo business, not only to sell photos but news as well,” Gallagher wrote. The letter reiterated Gallagher’s view that Brandt “was the victim of an unfair persecution” by U.S. military authorities at the end of the war and recommended rehiring him “in the strongest possible terms.”

On Oct. 26, 1950, his 40th birthday, Brandt rejoined the reconstituted AP GmbH as sales manager for its long-planned German-language news service and its re-established photo service.

His efforts helped expand AP's reach in Germany, Switzerland and Austria. By the time he retired in 1978, the post-war AP GmbH was the largest single AP news and photo operation outside the United States serving more than 200 subscribers. Brandt died in 2001 at the age of 90 following a short illness.
Lochner, who was reassigned to Germany in the closing days of the war, reunited with Brandt and strongly supported efforts to have him rehired. He was angered by Brandt’s treatment. In a bitter memorandum written in 1957 attached to postwar correspondence he had with Brandt between May and July 1946, Lochner wrote:

Willy Brandt, the subject of the attached correspondence, was in the unfortunate position of having been drafted, against his will, into the “Waffen SS.” At the time I first met him (after the war in Germany), he was unable to produce evidence of this fact, although various of his colleagues corroborated his statement, because in the closing days of the siege of Berlin, he had fled eastward, only to find the Russians were advancing with terrifying speed. Knowing that the SS was anathema to all the powers allied in the war and knowing that the Russians made short shrift of anybody belonging to the SS, he tore up his personal papers.

I know that there was a great difference between the SS as such and the “Waffen SS” as a part of the regular armed forces in Germany. Later our occupation authorities recognized this fact. At the time, however, I was unable to persuade our home office that Willy Brandt was an absolutely dependable anti-Nazi who had managed to save a lot of our property from confiscation and who deserved reinstatement.

The AP, during my connection with it, has never been known for standing by someone under fire if it feared that such loyalty might reflect adversely upon the news association. My appeals reached deaf ears.

Later, when a calmer atmosphere prevailed and apparently nobody could be found as able as Willy Brandt to conduct our picture [sic] operations in Germany, and when, unfortunately, his sister, of whose whereabouts he did not know at the time I pleaded for him, had a photostat of the draft into the “Waffen SS,” which was accepted as proof, was reinstated and is head of our picture operations [sic] even now, 11 years after my resignation [in 1946]. 369

Lochner ran afoul of Kent Cooper immediately after the war when he sought approval from President Harry Truman through an AP intermediary in the AP Washington bureau to bring his mother-in-law, Emma Buechner Steinberger, a German citizen who had survived the war in Berlin, to the United States at a time all Germans were banned from leaving their country.

“I was naturally shocked when I learned that you had asked (Tony) Vaccaro to try to get Truman to make special dispensation by which you could get your parents-in-law into the United States … ,” Cooper wrote. “I can understand
your personal concern but this sort of thing should be pursued wholly impersonally and apart from the Associated Press.”  

Lochner sent Cooper’s letter to Wes Gallagher, then chief of bureau in Germany, with a tart hand-written note in the upper left-hand corner:

Wes: After having received this letter I simply went to Army Headquarters (in my uniform, of course) and immediately was given the necessary papers for my mother-in-law to become a U.S. citizen. Best regards to you and your family. Louis. Later: This may convey the idea that she would become a U.S. citizen on arrival. The fact is that [she] was given her passport then and there.”

Lochner’s coverage of the closing days of the war in Germany included a glimpse of the attempted “annihilation of the Jewish race in Europe” which Hitler had predicted in 1939 and Lochner had reported at the time and again in 1941.

A week before Germany’s formal surrender, Lochner found himself at Landsberg, a sub-camp of Dachau, where U.S. military authorities had uncovered a grisly scene. It brought Lochner’s coverage of Nazi Germany full circle.

The Muncie evening Press, of Muncie, Ind., among many other newspapers, published his story April 30, 1945, on page one.

He wrote:

LANDSBERG, April 30 (AP) — Nearly 4,000 Jews from various parts of Europe were killed at concentration camp No. 4, which is located only a few miles where Adolf Hitler wrote his “Mein Kampf.”

Only yesterday the few that could still walk were dragged along by the fleeing Nazi overlords.

Today I saw scores of charred bodies, hundreds of naked virtual skeletons, lying on the ground with unforgettable grimaces of extreme pain. I also saw and smelled the filthy hovels where they were herded until the fleeing SS guards set fire to them burning several hundred Jews alive.

Some 250 Germans, including ministers, priests, farmers, businessmen and common laborers from the surrounding
country were brought to the camp today on the orders of Col. Edward F. Seiller, of Louisville, Ky., head of the Twelfth Armored Division’s military government section.

German civilians were digging mass graves.

Standing amidst the burned, tortured, wound-gashed corpses, Seiller asked the Germans to remove their hats in tribute to men who “Like yourselves, could see, feel, hear, smell and taste like other humans but who were coldly and inhumanely murdered.”

Lochner’s coverage of the opening of the Nuremberg war crimes tribunal in November served as a fitting finale to his editorial career with AP. His story appeared Nov. 20, 1945, in the Evening Independent of Massillon, Ohio, under the headline “Nazis Have Lost Glamour.”

“They were no longer glamour boys strutting across the European stage, these 20 Nazi leaders who filed today into the crowded Neurnberg [sic] courtroom,” he wrote.

There was Goering, “without his medals dangling on his chest and the bejeweled marshall’s wand which he flashed at adulating crowds,” he wrote.

There was Julius Streicher, publisher of Der Stuermer, which played a central role in the Nazi propaganda machinery, “no longer dealing out blows with a riding switch,” and von Ribbentrop, “unattended by the retinue of foreign office flunkies in S.S. uniforms who handed his state papers before his theatrical speeches,” Lochner reported.

Lochner’s resignation the following year came after he was told his assignment in Europe must come to an end.

On May 26, 1946, Lochner wrote Cooper saying he wished to retire. “It was obvious to me from the moment that you wrote me on March 25, 1946, ‘there is really no work for you to do in Germany under present conditions,’ that the end of my career with the AP was in sight,” he wrote. “If at my age of 59 and at this point in my AP work my contribution to our common effort was worth anything, it was naturally along the line of interpretive writing on Europe affairs. For that type of work, however, there is evidently no place for me within the AP.”

That same year, two days after Christmas, Lochner wrote Brandt, — unemployable and destitute in Berlin — addressing him as “My Dear Willy” — and listing the many C.A.R.E. packages he had sent from New York to his old colleague, some of which had gone astray, and promising more. C.A.R.E was the Cooperative for American Remittances to Europe, a food relief program for the many at risk of starvation in Europe following World War II.
In one passage, Lochner wrote, in German: “Bei AP lasse ich mich nie sehen. Das Kapital ist vorüber. Die Behandlung, die man Ihnen und mir zu Teil werden liess, hat doch zu tief in's Herz geschnitten, als dass ich je unnötigerweise einen Schritt bei die Schwelle von Rockefeller Plaza No. 50 tun moechte.” [“I don’t let myself be seen at AP any more. Its capital has run out. How it dealt with you and me has cut too deeply into my heart so that I do not want to cross the doorstep unnecessarily at 50 Rockefeller Plaza.”]

The following year he was named to a committee by former President Herbert Hoover to organize relief supplies for the defeated Germans and in 1952 he joined the State Department. Six years later he was employed by the United Nations and then was a radio commentator from 1960 to 1963.

In 1971, he and his wife, Hilde de Terrea, returned to Germany to live. He died in Wiesbaden on Jan. 8, 1975, at the age of 87.

Helmut Laux was detained and interrogated on several occasions and spent time at an internment camp outside Darmstadt along with over 11,000 other Germans, most of whom were “automatically arrested” by military authorities because of an affiliation with the Waffen SS, the Gestapo or other Nazi organizations.

Ever the photographer, he set up a temporary photo studio in the tent city and told a reporter for Der Spiegel magazine he had historic photos of Stalin and others he hoped to have published abroad after his release.

In 1948, Life Magazine splashed a dramatic series of nine wartime photos over three pages that Laux had carefully guarded for four years.

He was covering Hitler’s meeting with Hungarian Prime Minister Doeme Sztójay in Salzburg on June 6, 1944, which was suddenly interrupted by word of the D-Day invasion in Normandy. Laux kept taking photos, including an iconic one of Hitler in spectacles intently examining a map of the coastline of France.

Life, in its June 14, 1948, edition gave this description of the photos:

A remarkable record of the emotional impact of the invasion on the now-dead Nazi leaders, the pictures reveal the mixture of elation and concern with which Hitler and his aides greeted each battle report.

While Army Chiefs Jodl and Keitel plotted the Allied moves on the map of northern France, Luftwaffe Chief Hermann Göring boasted that his Stukas were smashing Allied
shipping. Actually only three Focke-Wulfs appeared over the beachhead. Gestapo Chief Himmler was also whistling up the dark alley of the future. Hitler assured him that his SS men would “show the American black-faced airborne troops what a German super-soldier can do.”

Der Führer himself beamed at reports that British and American airborne units had been encircled and that the crack 21st Panzer Division was advancing. Then, despite warnings from Jodl and Keitel, Hitler made the biggest mistake of all. “This,” he pronounced pompously, “is not the real invasion.”

When he was released in 1947, Laux established his “Studio fuer Photo und Graphik” at 46 Kronberg Strasse in Frankfurt am Main. It was renamed Laux Studios KG in 1954 and produced commercials for movie and television advertising. Three other firms, also owned by Laux and his family, were established between 1954 and 1963 offering services in market research, public relations and the distribution of audio visual and motion picture equipment. All four firms employed some 50 people, according to a business survey report by the American Consulate in Frankfurt in 1974.

U.S. immigration records show Laux traveled to the United States in 1956 to presumably visit a grandmother in Chicago and an uncle in Lockport, New York.

Laux boasted he was “the best news photographer in Germany” during one of his interrogations and had hoped to be hired after the war by an AP he thought should be grateful for his role in saving its print photo archive.

Throughout, he maintained his innocence of purpose and that his membership in the SS unjustly colored how his interrogators viewed him, especially after “people began talking about concentration camps and that sort of thing.”

Laux died April 29, 1987, according to his daughter, Claudia Laux. She said he never talked about his wartime activities at home because “during his whole life he was just interested in the future, not the past.”

At war’s end, the vast print photo archive, stored temporarily by the U.S. 3rd Army at the Carthusian Monastery at Buxheim near Memmingen, was returned to AP in Berlin in four large trucks. However, space was at a premium in a city largely reduced to rubble.
Wes Gallagher, an AP war correspondent in North Africa in 1942 and in France in 1944–1945, was in charge, appointed to head AP’s operations in Germany immediately after the war.

The Berlin office then consisted of a private residence at 21 Forst Strasse in Zehlendorf in the American controlled part of the city divided into American, British, French and Soviet sectors.

The main floor provided offices: bedrooms upstairs were used to house staffers when necessary. Henry Burroughs, the photographer on assignment in Berlin, worked from a darkroom in the cellar.

No contemporary records have been found documenting the disposition of the photos. In 1990, Gallagher wrote how Brandt (through Laux’s connections), “under great difficulty, had managed to save AP’s pre-war photo file numbering more than a million photographs.”

Laux also put the number of photos in the archive at about 1 million, “consisting of thirty-five wooden boxes and cabinets,” and said they were worth about $500,000 at the time, the equivalent of $6.2 million in 2016 dollars based on inflation alone. Laux said they were photos of “all political, economical and cultural events since 1912.”

With little office space available, Brandt said years later, Gallagher decided so many photos were not necessary to re-establish a photo operation, ordered the number of photos be reduced “and therefore quite a number of photos were destroyed.” How many photos were retained is unknown.

Gallagher went on to scoop his rivals in a legendary maneuver covering the verdicts of the war crimes tribunal in Nuremberg by dashing from the proceedings to where his wife, Betty, was holding open a phone line. He also led coverage of the Berlin airlift in 1948.

Throughout his career, Gallagher was viewed as a champion of the news report, his thick, bushy eyebrows and gruff outward manner belying a generous nature.

He was the driving force in re-establishing the AP GmbH, which could finally provide Germany’s media — fed Nazi propaganda for 12 years and starving for unbiased news — both AP’s news and photo services, fulfilling Kent Cooper’s dream in 1931. Gallagher was appointed AP assistant general manager in 1954 and general manager in 1962 when Frank J. Starzel, who had replaced Cooper in 1948, retired.
Endnotes

1. Almost no women held editorial positions at The Associated Press at the time.

2. Cooper to Robert S. Bates, Sept. 20, 1939, AP01.04B. Papers of Board President Robert McLean, Box 19, Folder 255, Associated Press Corporate Archives, New York (Hereinafter referred to as APCA), See scanned document.


8. Ibid., 2.


10. Lochner to Stratton, Sept. 18, 1934, AP03.04, Office of the General Counsel, Subsidiaries and Related Businesses, Box 1, Folder 19, APCA.

11. Ibid.


13. Lochner to Cooper, April 5, 1935, Louis Paul Lochner Papers, Reel/Frame 1/911, WHS.

14. Ibid.
15. Lochner to Cooper, Aug. 5, 1935, Louis Paul Lochner Papers, Reel/Frame 1/911, WHS.

16. Cooper to Robert S. Bates, Sept. 20, 1939, AP01.04B, Papers of Board President Robert McLean, Box 19, Folder 255, APCA.

17. Ibid.

18. Ibid.

19. Ibid.


22. Ibid.

23. Ibid.

24. Cooper to Nichols, Oct. 7, 1940, AP01.04B, Papers of Board President Robert McLean, Box 19, Folder 255, APCA, See scanned document.

25. Ibid.

26. Ibid.

27. Ibid.

28. Newswire advisory, ca. October 1940, AP01.04B, Papers of Board President Robert McLean, Box 19, Folder 255, APCA, See scanned document.

29. Stratton to MacColl, Dec. 4, 1940, AP01.04B, Papers of Board President Robert McLean Box 19, Folder 255, APCA, See scanned document.


33. In addition to voluminous family and other correspondence, he published four books: What About Germany, in 1942; The Goebbels Diaries, in 1948; Tycoons and Tyrant: German Industry from Hitler to Adenauer in 1954 and Always the Unexpected in 1956.

34. Louis Lochner, “Brushing up against a dictator — My Encounters with Hitler,” Louis Paul Lochner Papers. Reel/Frame 48/256, WHS.


38. Stratton to Cooper, April 21, 1931, AP03.04, Office of the General Counsel, Subsidiaries and Related Businesses, Box 1, Folder 18, APCA, See scanned document.


40. Ibid.

41. Louis P. Lochner to daughter Betty Lochner, Sept. 27, 1934, Louis Paul Lochner Papers. Reel/Frame 15/323, General Correspondence, Lochner Family 1932–1957, WHS.

42. Ibid., 23.

43. Ibid., 24.

44. See, for example, Lochner’s “Anti-Semitism Reaches New High As Nazis Drive Jews from Trade,” The Morning Call (of Allentown, Pennsylvania), Aug. 21, 1938, 2.


46. Evaluation of Correspondents, March 21, 1937. National Archives and Records Administration [hereinafter referred to as NARA], RG165, Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs, Entry 77, Box 1069.

47. The AP was able to sell a dramatic photo of the burning airship to a Berlin morning newspaper for 3,000 marks (about $20,000 in today’s dollars), despite shaky image quality because of the trans-Atlantic radio
transmission involved. It sold the same image to an evening newspaper for 1,500 marks, according to Rudi Josten's recollection cited in The AP World, Winter, 1965–66, 16.

48. Louis P. Lochner, What About Germany?, 238.

49. Schaleben, 25.


51. Lochner to his children, Nov. 28, 1938, Louis Paul Lochner Papers, Reel/Frame 15/616, WHS.

52. Ibid.

53. Lochner, What About Germany?, 239.


57. Louis P. Lochner, Always the Unexpected (New York: Macmillan, 1956), 43.


62. Ibid.

63. Ibid., 224.

64. Ibid., 224–225.

65. Ibid., footnote 3, 224.

66. Ibid., 226.
67. Ibid.

68. Ibid., 228.


70. Ibid.

71. Ibid.

72. Ibid.

73. Freifeld, 232.

74. From the Nazi marching song, “Bomben auf Engeland.”

75. Freifeld, 233.

76. Ibid.


78. Ibid.

79. Ibid.

80. Ibid.

81. Ibid.

82. Minutes of the Fall meeting of the Chesapeake Association of the Associated Press at Cumberland, Maryland, Sept. 14, 1940, AP02A.01, Bureau/Member Correspondence, 1938–41, Box 33, Folder: Maryland Meeting, APCA, See scanned document.

83. Ibid.

84. The Associated Press, Forty-First Annual Volume, Fiscal Year of 1940, (Printed in 1941), 40, AP01.01, Records of the AP Board of Directors, APCA, See scanned document.

85. McLean to Ickes, May 9, 1941, AP02A.03, Subject Files, Box 54, Folder: Harold Ickes, APCA, See scanned document.
86. McLean to Noyes, May 9, 1941, APO2A.3, Subject Files, Box 54, Folder: Harold Ickes, APCA, See scanned document.

87. Ibid.

88. Lochner, What About Germany?, 305.

89. State Department letter of Jan. 12, 1942, to American ambassador in Buenos Aires with excerpt from a report by the Imperial Censorship at Trinidad, NARA, Record Group 59, General Records of the Department of State, 1940–44 Central Decimal File: 841.711/1015.

90. Oral History Interview with Rudi Josten, conducted by Steven Miller, Oct. 30, 1997, AP 20, Oral History Collection, APCA.

91. Ibid.


94. The AP's central role in reporting events related to the Holocaust is reflected in a crowd-sourcing project called “History Unfolded: US Newspapers and the Holocaust” being conducted by The United States Holocaust Memorial Museum in Washington, D.C. Almost 1,300 students, teachers and others have so far submitted articles. The study aims to establish which articles about 31 Holocaust-era events were published when and where between 1933 and 1945 in newspapers throughout the United States. The museum says that while it is impossible to say “this is what Americans as a whole knew,” the project has discovered that the information available to readers varied widely across geographic regions and by what sources were used in local newspapers. The articles submitted were published in newspapers in all 50 states and the District of Columbia. As of April 5, 2017, the museum says it has so far reviewed 6,436 published articles of both domestic and foreign origin from 816 different newspapers and that 2,283 of the articles, or 35 percent, were credited to The Associated Press. https://newspapers.ushmm.org/.


98. Stratton to Lochner, May 21, 1931, AP03.04, Office of the General Counsel, Subsidiaries & Related Businesses, Box 1, Folder 19, APCA, See scanned document.

99. Deposition of Louis P. Lochner, June 2, 1931, AP03.04, Office of the General Counsel, Subsidiaries & Related Businesses, Box 1, Folder 18, APCA, See scanned document.


101. Lochner to daughter Betty, April 30, 1933, Louis Paul Lochner Papers. Reel/Frame 15/225, WHS.

102. Lochner to daughter Betty Lochner, September 21, 1933, Louis Paul Lochner Papers. Reel/Frame 15/255, WHS.

103. Geist to U.S. Secretary of State Cordell Hull, Feb. 27, 1934. Subject: Intervention of the Consulate General on behalf of the Associated Press G.m.b.H., Berlin, Feb. 27, 1934, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland, Record Group 59, Department of State, Central Decimal File: 362.1154/25.

104. Ibid.


107. The Allgemeine SS (General SS) was responsible for enforcing Nazi racial policies and general policing, the Waffen SS (Armed SS) was made up of combat units within Germany’s military and the SS-Totenkopfverbaende ran the concentration and extermination camps. Additional subdivisions of the SS included the Gestapo (secret police).

108. Scharnberg.

109. Thompson to Stratton, Aug. 26, 1935, AP02A.01, Bureau/Member Correspondence, Box 16, Folder: Berlin, APCA, See scanned document.

110. Ibid.

111. Ibid.
112. "Wir Zerschlagen eine Luge" ["We are Smashing a Lie"]. Das Schwarz Korps, Aug. 28, 1935, 10.

113. Ibid.

114. Scharnberg.

115. Louis P. Lochner, What About Germany?, 91.

116. Lochner, Tycoons, 216.


121. Scharnberg.


124. Scharnberg.

125. Oral History Interview with Rudi Josten, conducted by Steve Miller, Oct. 30, 1997, AP20, Oral History Collection, APCA.

126. Ibid.


129. “German Papers Assail La Guardia,” Los Angeles Times, March 5, 1937, 3.


132. Scharnberg.

133. Ibid.


135. For an idea of the extent of comment, see Press Information Bulletin for the period from Nov. 10 to early December 1938.

138. Ibid.

139. Scharnberg.

140. Cooper to Lochner, Dec. 13, 1938, AP01.04B, Papers of Board President Robert McLean, Box 34, Folder 654, APCA, See scanned document.

141. Stratton to Brooks, June 27, 1939, AP01.04B, Papers of Board President Robert McLean, Box 34, Folder 655, APCA.

142. Excerpt of Minutes of a Meeting of a Committee of Directors of the Associated Press of Great Britain ... on Aug. 23, 1939, enclosed in letter from Stratton to Brooks of Nov. 1, 1939, AP01.04B, Papers of Board President Robert McLean, Box 34, Folder 655, APCA, See scanned document.

143. Minutes of the AP Board of Directors, Oct. 6, 1939, Associated Press Annual Report for the Fiscal Year of 1939, 41, AP01.01 Records of the AP Board of Directors, APCA, See scanned document.

144. Stratton to Brooks, Nov. 24, 1939, AP01.04B, Papers of Board President Robert McLean, Box 34, Folder 655, APCA, See scanned document.

145. Stratton to Brandt, Feb. 20, 1940, AP01.04B, Papers of Board President Robert McLean, Box 34, Folder 654, APCA, See scanned document.

146. AP story, Paris, March 13, 1934, AP02.01, Records of General Manager Kent Cooper, Box 40, Folder 7B, APCA, See scanned document.

147. Ibid., See scanned document.

148. Ibid., See scanned document.

149. Ibid., See scanned document.


152. AP Photo Library, New York. (NY28–May 13) Gun rolls over emergency bridge in Holland, 1940.

153. AP Photo Library, E1343, WWII: Europe, Germany, Germany Personnel.

155. In a letter regarding Roth of May 2, 1936, to Wilson Hicks in New York, Lochner wrote: “I did not go into full detail respecting him in my letter to you; the file here contains adequate evidence of the inadvisability of permitting him to rejoin the staff.”

156. Stratton to Brooks, May 17, 1938, AP 01.04B, Papers of Board President Robert McClean, Box 34 Folder 655, APCA, See scanned document.


160. Scharnberg.


163. AP Photo Library, E2300, WWII: Poland after War.

164. Ibid.


168. Scharnberg.

169. AP Photo Library, File: Poland People, Germans Flee to Germany before WWII. See, for example, “Germans Fled from Polish terror” of Aug. 18, 1939, and “German women try to escape from Poland,” of Aug. 28, 1939.

170. Ibid.
To All New York Desk Editors:

There has been personal discussion with almost all of you within the last week on various fundamentals in good caption writing.

So there may be no further excuse for misunderstanding of any nature on these points, there follows reiteration of the vital points covered.

Because the basics apply to all captions, even though the recent specific references have been to foreign picture captions, a copy of this memo goes to all newsphoto editors in the field.

(A) The top line of any caption, for Wirephoto or mail, should describe or otherwise briefly identify the picture itself — avoiding above all a generalized statement that has no application to the picture being serviced.

A prime example of what not to do was the caption on a picture of an Italian plane downed in Britain. The caption, as written, said: "British Bag 13 Italian Planes in One Day." That did NOT describe the picture, which was sufficient error in itself; additionally, it did NOT state anything any of us knew to be true, but rather was a reiteration of what the British ministry claimed at the time. As such it was rank propaganda. The plain statement "Italian Plane Downed in Britain" described the picture at hand adequately and completely.

We had a domestic example of the same principle from Boston this week on a picture showing a tenement house fire. The overline read: "Child Dies In Tenement Fire." The picture showed no such thing. The line might better have read: "Chimney Topples in Blazing Tenement," if what appeared to be a falling chimney (and there was no reference to it whatever in the lines) was a chimney.

In other words, SAY WHAT THE PICTURE SHOWS in the overline and in the caption itself. It need not be a dull caption, it can be and should be a sprightly, bright caption — and inevitably will be more accurate.

(B) Avoid anything smacking of editorial comment in captions. If the available facts are not extensive, say what we know is true and quit.

An example of one New York caption that was plainly editorial read like this: "These fur-collared Italian airmen are catching a glimpse of the
London they hoped to enter in triumph under conditions far different from those they had expected. As they stride along a London railway station on their way to prison camps for the duration of the war, an escort of British Tommies make sure they see all the sights of the British capital.

Many captions have tended to be too long, some in a well-intentioned but misplaced attempt to be “interesting.”

No oratory is needed; let the picture speak for itself with the basic facts about it.

Pertinent facts on the accompanying news story many times are woven into the picture caption to distinct advantage, which is fine, but please remember we are describing a picture in connection with a news story — not telling the whole news story to boot, as some captions apparently try to do.

(C) Write the caption without recourse to the trite, a long-ago-worn-out and in most cases utterly needless phrase “this picture shows,” or so-and-so “is shown.” If the situation or personality were not shown, we wouldn’t be servicing the picture. All it takes is a little ingenuity to avoid this hackneyed phraseology nine times out of ten.

(D) Applying especially to captions on foreign pictures, the phrases “According to British censor-approved caption,” or “German sources say this picture shows,” have been vastly and needlessly overdone. Plain everyday judgment will dictate when reference properly should be made in a given caption to the source when occasion warrants, and it long since has ceased to be news that pictures from belligerent countries are passed by censor.

None of these points is made to hamstring the caption writer in the least; they are made to facilitate the writing of much better captions by keeping in mind just a few basic considerations.

See scanned document.

174. AP Photo Library, E2305, WWII: Europe: Poland, Russian Forces.

175. Cable from Earnest Fischer to New York, April 23, 1941, Louis P. Lochner Papers, Reel/Frame 32/200, WHS.

176. Stratton to Lochner and Brandt, Sept. 9, 1940, AP02A.03, Subject Files, Box 48, Folder 402, APCA, See scanned document.

177. Scharnburg.

178. Ibid.
179. Ibid.

180. Price to Brooks cable of Sept. 8, 1939, AP02A.03, Subject Files, Box 54, Folder: Newsphoto/Wirephoto, APCA, See scanned document.

181. Wire story of Sept. 8, 1939, AP02A.03, Subject Files, Box 54, Folder: Newsphoto/Wirephoto, APCA.239 240, See scanned document.

182. Resch memorandum, Dec. 12, 1940, AP02A.03, Subject Files, Box 54, Folder: Newsphoto/Wirephoto, APCA.

183. Ibid.

184. The city with a mixed population of Jews, Ukrainians and Poles, was part of Poland before World War II and became part of Ukraine when Stalin shifted postwar borders westward. Its name is Lviv in Ukraine, Lwow in Poland, Lvov in Russia and Lemberg in Germany.


186. AP Photo Library/Photo Archive, Caption is as it appears on the original negative. Caption for online version varies slightly, AP410811037/APHSL.22256 00136.

187. Resch memorandum, Dec. 12, 1940, AP02A.03, Subject Files, Box 54, Folder: Newsphoto/Wirephoto, APCA.

188. Stratton to Walters, May 27, 1940, AP02A.03, Subject Files, Box 54, Folder: Newsphoto/Wirephoto, APCA, See scanned document.

189. Attachment to letter from Stratton to Walters, May 27, 1940, AP02A.03, Subject Files, Box 54, Folder: Newsphoto/Wirephoto, APCA, See scanned document.

190. AP Photo Library, E2296, WWII: Europe, Poland, People.

191. “Were these Ukrainians purged?” The Daily Courier (Connellsville, Pennsylvania), July 8, 1941, 1.


194. AP’s Alvin Steinkopf was also in the region covering the story at the time but a search of his papers at the University of Wisconsin failed to turn up matching prints or negatives of the photos distributed by AP.
195. AP Photo Library, (NY-10 – JULY 6), Nazis claim slayings by Russian secret police, 1941.


197. Alvin Steinkopf, Bureau Journal, Louis Paul Lohner Papers, 1940–41, Reel/Frame 32/709, Wisconsin Historical Society, Madison, Wisconsin, WHS.

198. Ibid.

199. Scharnberg.

200. United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, Photograph #63742, Photographer Roth, Lvov, Poland, June 30, 1941.

201. Scharnberg.

202. Ibid.

203. Ibid.

204. Ibid.


210. AP Photo Library, R35, WWII: Russia, Destruction, Smolensk.

211. AP Photo Archive, 410822132/APHSL 22328, An image crediting Steinkopf exists in the Alvin and Irene Steinkopf Papers, Album 5: Poland, Danzig and Smolensk, 1938, Wisconsin Historical Society, Madison, WHS.

212. Cooper to Stratton and Miller, Sept. 2, 1941, AP02A.03, Subject Files, Box 54, Folder: Newsphoto/Wirephoto, APCA, See scanned document.
213. N.R. Howard to Alan J. Gould, July 18, 1942, NARA, College Park, Maryland, RG 216, Office of Censorship, Administrative Subject File, Portugal, Box 113.


215. Ibid., 431.

216. The Unpopular War, Sept. 6, 1942, Louis Paul Lochner Papers. Reel/Frame 29/651, WHS.


218. Ibid., 394.


221. Ibid., 3.

222. Ibid., 5.

223. Ibid., 6.

224. Ibid., 3.

225. Willy Brandt composed his “Confession” (“Geständnis”) in 1945 in order to explain to Louis Lochner, his former supervisor, what he had done during the war. Shortly after receiving it, Lochner may have translated it into English, because an English translation, with a supplied date of 1946, is housed in Lochner’s papers at the Wisconsin Historical Society in Madison.

The original German typescript likely no longer exists. However, Frankfurt bureau chief Steve Miller, working from a copy of the original, translated it into English in 2001. In 2005, he sent copies to various executives in New York, who transferred it to the Corporate Archives. In 2017, the Frankfurt bureau digitized its copy and sent it to the Corporate Archives.

See scanned document.
226. Ibid., 4.

227. Ibid., 5.

228. Ibid., 6.

229. Ibid., 8.


231. Memorandum Report, Subject: Operation POUCH, Laux File, NARA.

232. Laux told his U.S. military interrogators that all contact between Lochner in New York and his mother-in-law in Berlin (Emma Buechner Steinberger) between 1942 and 1945 was maintained by Brandt. Several letters were sent to and from Berlin via diplomatic courier pouches and Brandt sent between six and eight personal photographs of Lochner's mother-in-law to Lochner. See Memorandum for the Officer in Charge, Subject: Operation POUCH of Feb. 5, 1946, National Archives and Records Administration, Record Group 0319, Investigative Records Repository, LAUX, Helmut, File X8502334, Box 456.

233. Memorandum Report, Subject: Operation POUCH, Laux File, NARA.

234. Willy Brandt, “Confession,” 13, AP21.59, Larry Heinzerling Papers, APCA.

235. Ibid., 14.

236. The basic agreement between The Associated Press and the Bureau Laux, as described in writing by Helmut Laux under interrogation in Memorandum Report, Subj: Operation Pouch, Jan. 14, 1946, National Archives and Records Administration, Record Group 0319, Investigative Records Repository, LAUX, Helmut, File X8502334, Box 456.

237. Willy Brandt, “Confession,” 14, AP21.59, Larry Heinzerling Papers, APCA.


240. Ibid.


244. Joseph J. Wurzel was directing news photo editor in London.


246. Memorandum for the Officer in Charge, Subject: Operation POUCH, Feb. 8, 1946, NARA, RG 319, Records of the Army Staff. IRR, LAUX, Helmut, File X8502334, Box 456.

247. Ibid.


252. Ibid.

253. Ibid.

254. Resch to Lupi, ca. 1942, APO2A.03, Subject Files, Box 48, Folder 402, APCA, See scanned document.


256. Gould to Howard, July 14, 1942, APO2A.02, Foreign Bureau Correspondence, Lisbon, APCA, See scanned document.
257. Howard to Gould, July 18, 1942, NARA, RG 216, Office of Censorship, Administrative Subject File, Portugal, Box 113.

258. Carlson to Price, July 16, 1942, NARA, Record Group 216, Office of Censorship, Administrative Subject File, Portugal, Box 113.


260. Lockhart to Miller, April 6, 1944, NARA, Record Group 216, Office of Censorship, Administrative Subject File, “News Photographs Jan. 1944,” Box 574.


263. Price to Knight, March 11, 1944, NARA, Record Group 216, Office of Censorship, Administrative Subject File, “News Photographs Jan. 1944,” Box 574.

264. Ibid.

265. Ibid.

266. Thomson to Knight, March 25, 1944. NARA, Record Group 216, Office of Censorship, Administrative Subject File, “News Photographs Jan. 1944,” Box 574.

267. Ibid.


269. Brandt identifies seven other AP GmbH employees who eventually worked in the Bureau Laux. Incomplete records make the full identification of some impossible. They were identified as Gerhard Baatz, a photographer; Arthur Von Brietzke, darkroom technician; Frauleine Thieme, an American who served as administrative assistant; Frau Remus, photo archivist; Frau Laubis, photo archivist; Borchert Sr., darkroom technician, believed to be the father of AP photographer Eric Borchert, and Herbert Sucker, a messenger.

271. Willy Brandt’s “Confession,” 14, AP21.59, Larry Heinzerling Papers, APCA.

272. Ibid.

273. Ibid., 10.

274. Ibid., 15.

275. Ibid., 15.

276. Ibid., 16.

277. Ibid., 16.

278. Ibid., 16.

279. Ibid., 18.

280. Ibid., 18.

281. Ibid., 18.

282. Ibid., 13.

283. Ibid.


289. Ibid.

291. Report of the General Manager, Dec. 31, 1942, Associated Press Annual Report for the fiscal year 1942, 80, AP01.01, Records of the AP Board of Directors, APCA.

292. Gould to Cooper, memo and clipping, April 29, 1942, AP02A.03, Subject Files, Box 56, Folder: Newsphoto/Wirephoto, APCA, See scanned document.

293. Ibid.


296. AP Photo Archive, AP296707381560.

297. AP Photo Library, R36, WW II: Russia, Destruction, Stalingrad, See also: AP Photo Archive, 4212180279.


300. Lochner to Resch, Oct. 2, 1940, AP 02A.03, Subject Files, Box 48, Folder 402, APCA.

301. Resch to Lochner, Oct. 2, 1940, AP 02A.03, Subject Files, Box 48, Folder 402, APCA, See scanned document.


303. AP Photo Archive, 4207040454.


305. AP Photo Library, E930a, WWII: Europe, France, German Occupation Other Than Paris.

306. Ibid.

307. AP Photo Library, E930a, WWII, Executions, France.

309. Report of the General Manager, Dec. 31, 1943. Associated Press Annual Report for the fiscal year 1943, 80, AP01.01, Records of the AP Board of Directors, APCA.

310. AP Photo Library. E1341, WWII: Europe, Germany, Germany Parades & Reviews.

311. Cumberland Evening Times (Cumberland, Maryland), July 24, 1943, 2.

312. James O’Grady, Special Agent, Counter Intelligence Corps, Attachment “Activity of BURO LAUX during the war” to Memorandum for the Officer in Charge, Jan. 6, 1946, NARA RG 319, Records of the Army Staff, Investigative Records Repository, Laux, Helmut, File X8502334, Box 456.


314. Willy Brandt’s “Confession,” 19.

315. AP Photo Library, Name files: Goebbels, Joseph — Groups & Miscellaneous.

316. AP Photo Library, E1341, WWII: Europe, Germany, Germany Parades & Reviews.


318. AP Photo Library, E52, WWII: Europe, Belgium, Destruction, Antwerp.

319. Babb to Gould, Oct. 12, 1943, AP02A.02, Foreign Bureau Correspondence, Box 4, Folder: Sweden, APCA.


332. AP Photo Library, E973 and E974, Europe: France, German Defense Atlantic Wall, Biscayne Bay, & Channel; Coastal Area: Misc.


334. AP Photo Library, WWII: Europe, Holland, German: Miscellaneous.

335. AP Photo Library, E1395, WWII: Europe, Germany, People: Hitler Youth.

336. Ibid.

337. AP Photo Library, E1503, WWII: Europe, Germany, Print Folder, People Prints.

338. AP Photo Library, E2276, WWII: Europe, Poland, Destruction, Warsaw.

339. AP Photo Library, E2311, WWII: Europe, Poland, Print Folder.

340. AP Photo Library, E2290, WWII: Europe, Poland, People, Miscellaneous; E2302, WWII: Europe, Poland, Polish Prisoners; E2311, WWII: Europe, Poland, Print Folder.

341. AP Photo Library, E2311, WWII: Europe, Poland, Print Folder.


344. According to the Maclaren Art Center of Barrie, Ontario, which became the recipient in 2001 of Sovfoto’s 23,116 vintage Soviet press photographs, Sovfoto was established in New York by the Soviet government in the early 1930s and was the primary Soviet photographic agency and archive in the West. Its function was to disseminate Soviet photographs to the American press. The agency came under private ownership during the 1950s and continues to operate as Sovfoto/Eastfoto, a stock photo agency specializing in photography from Russia, the former Soviet Republics, Eastern Europe, and China.


346. Ibid.


348. AP Photo Library, E1395, WWII: Europe, Germany, People, Hitler Youth.

349. AP Photo Library, E2277, WWII: Europe, Poland, Destruction N-Z Sectors.

350. AP Photo Library, E2311, WWII: Europe, Poland, Print Folder.

351. AP Photo Library, E1343, WWII: Europe, Germany, German Personnel.

352. AP Photo Library, E1395, WWII: Europe, Germany, People: Hitler Youth.


355. Ibid.

356. Ibid.

357. Brandt provided a detailed breakdown of the inventory as follows: “It was about 20 crates with the material of the news department, including the whole library, correspondence and other files, letterhead stationery and other office supplies all the way down to rubber erasers. In addition there were the file cabinets with the news files, mail stories and more such things that had accumulated since the start of the Berlin bureau. From the photo department there were 15 crates with files, office supplies, envelopes and most of all, thousands of sheets of paper for photo captions. In addition there were three tables, a number of chairs, ceiling and table lamps, seven 1 x 2.5 meter shelves and three shelf
systems three meters long, 2 21/2 meters high and 50-centimeters deep, stuffed full of glass negatives. The number series of these negatives ran to 70,000, and some numbers covered about 10 negatives. There was also a new office typewriter, a calculating machine, two travel typewriters and a giant box full of cameras and accessories, including two enlargers, several Nettel cameras in formats from 9 x 12 to 13 x 18, two changing cassettes and a number of lenses, from wide-angle to telescopic. Seven further crates held my personal things, including our silverware, clothing and my library. I was also storing bedclothes, mattresses and other things for Gerd Baatz. Shortly before the fighting began I also took part of my furniture, along with a sewing machine, piano, couch, chairs, armchairs, rugs, lamps, refrigerator and bedclothes into the roomy basement."

358. Willy Brandt’s “Confession,” 27.
361. Willy Brandt’s “Confession,” 33.
362. Willy Brandt’s “Confession,” 35.
363. Price to Cooper, Aug. 22, 1945, NARA, Record Group 216, Office of Censorship, Index of Administrative Records, Box 970.
364. Memorandum for the Officer in Charge, Subject: Operation Pouch, Laux File, Jan. 14, 1946, NARA.
366. Ibid.
368. Brandt was rehired as AP GmbH salesman, not as head of the photo service as Lochner mistakenly wrote.
369. Lochner Memorandum, 1957, Louis Paul Lochner Papers, Reel/Frame 3/928, WHS.
370. Lochner to Brandt, Dec. 27, 1946, Louis Paul Lochner Papers, Reel/Frame 3/971, WHS.
371. Ibid.


375. James O’Grady, Special Agent, Counter Intelligence Corps, in Memorandum for the Officer in Charge, Jan. 6, 1946, NARA, RG 319, Records of the Army Staff. Investigative Records Repository, Laux, Helmut, File X8502334, Box 456.

376. Ibid.


382. Interview with Willy Brandt, conducted by Steven Miller, Oct. 30, 1997, 6, AP20 Oral History Collection, APCA.